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THE OPENING OF THE GULF OF AQABA

JOHN J. McINTYRE

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THE OPENING OF THE GULF OF AQABA

by

John J. McIntyre

Submitted to the

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of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: ____________________

____

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Dean of the College

Date: ____________________ Date: ____________________

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of recorded history, the Middle East has been the stage on which unfolded an almost continuous drama of ascent and decline, of arsis and thesis, as civilization, cultures and peoples met in the great courtyard of the world and established patterns which had impact wherever there were men. Unlike many areas of the world, spawning grounds of less enduring civilizations, the Middle East retained its vital significance in an unbroken continuum of relevancy to the world as ages passed, each new act in the drama reinforcing or characterizing what had gone before rather than obliterating it.

One explanation for the permanence and endurance of the significance of the Middle East lies in the nature of the civilizations and cultures which have played the various roles. The Hittites, the Persians, the Medes and the Parthians, the Sassaanians and the Byzantines, the Arabs and the Monguls, the Seljuks and the Ottomans met in the Middle East in an almost continuous superimposition which, perhaps by chronological accident, insured that at virtually no instant in history was the Middle East an area of only incidental importance.

But chronological accident is a foolish explanation for the motivated actions of the peoples of forty centuries. While

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of recorded history, the Middle East has been the stage on which unfolded so many momentous events of success and decline, of peace and tragedy, as civilizations, nations and peoples rose in the ever changing of the world and established patterns which had impact wherever there were men. Unlike many areas of the world, spanning periods of less encroaching civilizations, the Middle East retained its vital significance in an unending succession of prominence in the world as eras passed, each one set in the great anthropological cauldron subsuming what had gone before rather than obliterating it.

The explanation for the persistence and prominence of the significance of the Middle East lies in the nature of the civilizations and societies which have played the various roles. The Egyptian, the Phoenician, the Greek and the Persian, the Israelites and the Byzantine, the Arabs and the Mongols, the Jews and the Christians and the Ottomans are in the Middle East in an almost continuous superimposition order, giving to chronological contact, taking that on criterion to lessen in history was the Middle East an area of self inflicted inferiorness.

But chronological contact is a fruitful supplemental for the motivated urging to the looking of truly centurion. While

it has become almost axiomatic that modern political history is the history of power politics, it is no less true that the power configurations erected in the Middle East generated a dynamic which explains, in large manner, the primary relevance of the area for so long a period of time. Power relationships are certainly nothing new. The history of the Middle East, far older than the story of many subsequently overshadowed empires, is the story of the ebb and flow of political, military and economic power as it was born, matured and expanded through the accessible world.

Power, however, unlike energy, must be exercised. It must have a rationale, a focus. And power, continuously exercised in the Middle East since 3000 B. C. had its focus in the geography of the area. It requires a very scanty knowledge of the sweep of history to appreciate the fact that the area we now call the Middle East occupies the position of a link, in both geographical and historical terms, between the three great land masses of the eastern hemisphere. Sometimes a bridge, sometimes a barrier, occasionally a baffle selectively passing processed elements and retaining traces of the same elements in the pores of its culture, this has been the Middle East, and the era of modern history has had an "Eastern Question" since it began.

In modern times, the Middle East has been the scene of an almost continuous exercise of diplomacy and the geographical

It has become almost academic that modern political history is the history of power politics. It is in this area that the power configurations created in the recent past generated a dynamic social revolution, in large measure, the primary relevance of the area for us lies a period of time. Power relationships are certainly working out. The history of the Middle East, far older than the story of any subsequently overshadowed empires, is the story of the rise and fall of political, military and economic power as it was born, matured and expanded through the accessible world.

Power, however, unlike energy, must be exercised. It must have a rationale, a focus. And power, continuously exercised in the Middle East since 1918 A. D. has its focus in the geography of the area. It requires a very steady stimulus of the sense of direction to appreciate the fact that the area we now call the Middle East occupies the position of a link, in both geographical and historical sense, between the three great land masses of the eastern hemisphere. Possessing a bridge, sometimes a barrier, necessarily a battle selectivity passing provinces, elements and relatively breaks of the area emerge in the power of the military. This has been the Middle East, and the area of modern history has not in "Eastern question" alone is origin.

In modern times, the Middle East has been the prize of an alien conquerors, supplies of minerals and the geographical

importance of the Muslim world continues to bear on the national interests of the members of the international community. A facet of this continuum of interest has been the drive of nations outside the Middle East to dominate or influence events within the area, even if this dominance had occasionally to manifest itself in enforcing irrelevance, never wholly successfully. In the inter-war period, for example, Great Britain and France frequently seemed guided in their Eastern policies by a desire to blanket the smouldering coals of Arab national consciousness in an attempt to maintain an international status quo unaffected by events in the area.

A second, and currently far more vital facet of the modern political Middle East has been the overwhelming force at work within the area. At a time in history preoccupied with the revolutions of nationalism in the underdeveloped world, events in the Middle East assume a gigantic relevancy in contemporary international relations as a second generation nationalism plays out its role. It would be of primary importance, in itself, this second generation revolution, were it concentrated in virtually any area on the face of the earth. Occurring as it does in an area of unparalleled strategic importance, the spectacle of modern Middle Eastern politics bears crucial significance for the entire world community.

Relatively weak in themselves, the Middle Eastern countries today can neither help nor control the impact their

importance of the Muslim world continues to bear on the national interests of the members of the international community. A facet of this continuum of interest has been the drive of nations outside the Middle East to dominate or influence events within the area, even if this dominance had occasionally to manifest itself in enforcing irrelevance, never wholly successfully. In the inter-war period, for example, Great Britain and France frequently seemed guided in their Eastern policies by a desire to blanket the smouldering coals of Arab national consciousness in an attempt to maintain an international status quo unaffected by events in the area.

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relationships among themselves have on the rest of the world. With the exception of Egypt, each of these states were carved out of the territory wrested from a defeated Ottoman Empire at the Armistice of Mudros and were artificially erected by foreign powers unable to fulfill three mutually exclusive sets of promises made during the First World War.

It will be remembered that when the Conference of San Remo met in 1920 to formalize some settlement in the Middle East after the defeat of the Central Powers, the British had promised Sharif Husayn most of the entire area for the erection of an Arab state virtually coterminous with the central core of the Middle East.[1] Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had attempted to formalize an entirely different arrangement with France, dividing up the same territory promised to the Arabs between the French and the British. At odds with both agreements was the Balfour Declaration that "His Majesty's government would look with favor on the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Faced with the problems of making an artifically erected, externally imposed nation-state system work in this difficult context, the force known as Arab nationalism was caught off

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[1] Indispensable for an understanding of the politics of the period is George Antonius', The Arab Awakening (London: H. Hamilton and Co., 1938).

relationships among themselves and with the rest of the world. With the exception of Egypt, each of these states were carved out of the territory wrested from a defeated Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the war and were artificially created by foreign powers unable to fulfill three mutually exclusive sets of promises made during the First World War.

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balance at the precise moment that it was attaining an organized momentum and it fragmented. Arab nationalists in, say Iraq, still clung to the idea of an Arab nation but by 1945 the idea of an Arab nation not structured on Hashemite dynastic lines was an uncomfortable concept for the Iraquis. In Syria and Lebanon, Arab nationalism also claimed ardent followers but to the politically more sophisticated Levantines, schooled for a generation in republicanism, an entirely different concept of such a "nation" was held.

Various plans were circulated in the late thirties and during the Second World War which had as their objective the destruction of the artificial San Remo borders in favor of a final effort to give substance to the dream of Sharif Husayn, and in 1944 Egypt craftily consented to act as the broker for a marriage between the semi-independent, semi-articulate political entities of the Middle East. Conferring in Egypt in 1944, representatives of the Arab states were able to produce the famous Alexandria Protocol signed on October 7, 1944, which set forth the idea of a League of Arab States. This strongly popular document was an idealistic statement of a desire for a strong Arab League, but a compromise measure at best. A quarter century of effort in building political stability within the nation-state framework had destroyed much of the consensus there once was for a single, monolithic Arab state and what remained was hammered and moulded into the Protocol.

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Individualism in the Middle East vitiated even the Alexandria Protocol, however, and when the Pact of the League of Arab States was signed at Zafaran Palace in Cairo on March 22, 1945, it was a far weaker document than had been planned the previous autumn. In the absence of any rationale of commonality, blocs had developed within Arabdom jealous of national power and the League emerged as an instrument of Egyptian-Saudi conservatism constructed to obstruct Iraq and Trans-jordan in any moves calculated to unite the northern tier into a Greater Syria.[2]

The strength of the Arab League was not its insides. Just as the human body, no matter how ill and infirm it may be at a given moment, is able to rally strength for defense against infection, so it was with the Arab League. For the strength of the Arab League was never its friendship, but its antipathy. The Arab League lived on its desire to be rid of England and France and to "once and for all" destroy the growing menace to Arabism posed by the Zionist movement into Palestine.

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[2] On the Arab League and its problems, see M. Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement," _American Journal of International Law_, October, 1946, pp. 756-777; "The Arab League, Development and Difficulties," _The World Today_, May, 1957, pp. 187-197; "Cross Currents Within the Arab League," _ibid._, January, 1948, pp. 12-25; A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective," _The Middle East Journal_, April, 1947, pp. 125-136 and particularly T. R. Little, "The Arab League--A Reassessment," _ibid._, Spring, 1956, pp. 138-150.

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Administered for all practical purposes by the Jewish Agency, the British Mandate in Palestine had been erected in 1924 in fulfillment of the promise made in the Balfour Declaration. Little by little, the Agency planned to acquire land in the mandate to accommodate the rising tide of Jewish immigrants and as political consciousness matured within Palestine, it was evident as early as 1938 that full independence as a national state was the objective of the movement. When the Second World War ended, the nationalism of the Arabs had to contend not only with the parochialism generated by its division into separate nationalisms but with the horror of an alien people and an alien nationalism mushrooming within the very territory considered as the location of its own homeland.

Following the Second World War, events in the Middle East continued to occupy the attention of the world but for almost the first time in centuries, the activity began to take on an element of immanence. Centuries ago Aristotle had defined life as "spontaneous and immanent motion"; after World War II, a case could be made for the thesis that the Middle East was coming to life. No less preoccupied than with the Eastern Question of the previous century, observers found themselves watching the unfolding of a new dynamic which now had its origins not in the foreign ministries of the great capitals of Europe but in the palaces and souks within the Middle East. The focus had shifted from the things which were being done

Administered for all practical purposes by the Jewish Agency, the British Mandate in Palestine had been treated as [illegible] in fulfillment of the promise made in the Balfour Declaration. Little by little, the Agency claimed to acquire land in the mandate to accommodate the rising tide of Jewish immigrants and as political consciousness sharpened within Palestine, it was evident as early as 1932 that full independence as a national state was the objective of the movement. When the Second World War ended, the nationalism of the Arabs had to contend not only with the parochialism generated by the division into separate nationalisms but with the threat of an alien people and an alien nationalism developing within the very territory considered as the location of its own homeland.

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to the Middle East to the things which were being done in the Middle East by persons and forces which were indigenous to the area.

The same national interests still obtained in Whitehall and on the Quai d'Orsay, to be sure, given added edge now by the fact that the area had been lately proven to contain upwards of half the world's petroleum supply, but at a time when Western civilization was almost literally fighting for its life, it was difficult to relate the same degree of encompassing importance to the area which had previously motivated such total involvement with the Eastern Question. In this same context, a somewhat curious aspect of developments in the Middle East stemmed from the fact that the unsettled conditions in the central core had only a tangential relevance to the Cold War being waged everywhere else. In a sense, the Middle East had its own problems after 1946.

After the Arab-Israeli "War" of 1948-49, a certain balance of power arose in the Middle East which lasted for seven troubled years. It was a balance in the sense that a certain perilous equilibrium existed as each "side" in the conflict refrained from any major attempts at alteration of the status quo.

Noted analysts were pessimistic about the survival chances of the newly proclaimed State of Israel. A new form of Arab nationalism was born in Egypt which seemed to rekindle the dying spark of Arab Unity and the prestige of the Western powers declined annually as their policies

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The same decision-makers will encounter Whitehall and on the Quai d'Orsay. So is more, given added edge now by the fact that the area has been largely ceded to certain aspects of Gaul: the world's petroleum supply, but at a time when Western civilizations are almost inexplicably dedicated for its life, it was difficult to escape the same degree of correspondent implications to the area which had previously received much broad involvement with the Eastern question. In this sense, a Gaullist outlook appears of developments in the Middle East stemmed from the fact that the essential conditions in the crucial core had only a tangential relevance to the cold war being waged everywhere else. In a sense, the Middle East had its own problems after 1948.

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Local analysts were pessimistic about the survival chances of the newly proclaimed State of Israel. A new form of Arab nationalism was born in Egypt which sought to realize the dying gasps of Arab unity and the prestige of the Western powers declined annually as shaky policies

foundered in the complexities of an ambivalent Arab posture in world affairs which they either could not or would not understand. A premium was put on answers and analogies and the west refused to conceive of a situation where analogies produced no answers and there were simply too few analogies. Agitation was a premium similarly within the area as the troubled Arab nations sought to retain their self-respect and attone not only for their military embarassment of 1949 but for the fact of the establishment of the new Israel.

When the seven years of "peace" was crumpled by the events of October, 1956, the anachronism of all out war by a minor power held a fatal fascination for the world. Conditioned to a world in which war had meant total annihilation, the fact of a war which bore no risk of annihilation but instead had as its aims the traditional utility of the institution of war was indeed an oddity. Viewed from the capitals of the nuclear powers, the Sinai War was a contextual curiosity. But to the Middle East, it was a somewhat necessary event which had very definite causes and which should have had very definite results. As an anachronism itself, it is a fascinating study.

But more germaine to contemporary world politics, an even more worthwhile study is the historical fact of the Sinai War overlaid on the patterns of international organizational efforts to achieve peace in the middle decade of the twentieth century.

Commenced in the possibilities of an existence and peaceful to world affairs which they either could not or would not understand. A parallel was put in answers and analogies and the real reason to security of a situation which conditions produced no answers and there were simply too few analogies. Application had a previous similarity which the area as the terrible Arab nations enough to result their anti-Russian and attack not only for their military wherewithal or life but for the fact of the existence of the new Israel.

When the seven years of "peace" had coupled by the events of October, 1956, the encounter of all one way by nuclear power held a real fascination for the world. Combined to a world in which war had been total annihilation, the fact of a war which bore no risk of annihilation but threatened had to lose the practical utility of the traditional weapon of war was thought on utility. Viewed from the capitals of the nuclear powers, the Sinai War was a contrived inevitability, but to the Middle East, it was a unusual necessary event which had very definite causes and which should have had very definite results. As an encounter itself, it is a fascinating study.

Two more genuine to contemporary world politics, an even more worthwhile study is the principal fact of the final war available on the patterns of international diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in the middle issues of the twentieth century.

The old met the new in the wastes of the Sinai desert, on the Gaza frontier and at Sharm el-Sheikh, as traditional diplomacy extended itself by traditionally "other" means. The old met the new in the great hall of the United Nations as force was restrained by consensus and somehow in the process, something really new emerged. For the first time in history, the forces of the "new" were able to field an army of sufficient size and prestige to separate the combatants and return the situation back to its precarious balance. Many feel that the entire Suez-Sinai Crisis was therefore a colossal waste for all concerned. Egypt retained the autonomy she claimed over the Canal, adding the new revenue she had hoped for in nationalization. Britain and France lost valuable prestige where there was precious little prestige to go around. Israel was badly and vocally disappointed in the outcome of her efforts.

There was, however, at least one victory. This was a war that somebody "won" in the traditional sense of the word.

In October 1956, one nation--Egypt--had access to both the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In April, 1957, the same could be said of her hated rival, Israel.

It was a victory in the sense that a political "situation" had operated through the Egyptian boycott to prevent Israel from using anything but her Mediterranean port facilities to traffic in commodities. The same political "situation" had thwarted her attempts to enjoy what

The oil-rich side was the nation of the Suez Canal, on the Gulf of Aqaba, and on Sinai peninsula, an territorial diplomacy attempts itself or unsuitably "occupied". The war was the end of the great dream of the United Arab Republic as Egypt was overtaken by conscious and weakness in the process, something really was changed. For the first time in history, the forces of the "Arab" were seen as fight an army of politicians also and struggle to equipment and balance and return the attention back to the movements taking. They lost that the people that oil-rich Israel was therefore a coherent unity for all economies. Egypt re-lost the autonomy she claimed over the Canal, losing the one revenue she had hoped for in nationalization. Syrian and Israel lost valuable privilege where there was previous little pressure to go around. Israel was hasty and vocally disappointed in the outcome of her efforts.

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In October 1973, one nation--Egypt--has moved to gain the negotiations and the table. In April, 1977, the same would be said of her Arab rival, Israel.

It was a victory in the sense that a political "newcomer" has moved through the Egyptian report as proved Israel from using anything but her military-weapons and facilities or traffic in commodities. The same political "mistakes" has thwarted her attempts to rally Arab

she felt were her rights under international law in the face of armed forces preventing that enjoyment. The same political "situation" had forced other world powers, neutral in her controversy, to honor claims of her enemies in violation of the same legal standards which they themselves were anxious to proclaim to the rest of the world. The same political "situation" had prevented the development of a substantial portion of her geography.

The victory came when the "situation" was eliminated.

The opening of the Gulf of Aqaba as a result of the Suez Crisis reversed these political situations. In the classic sense, a state had gone to war to extend diplomacy by other means and while it failed to create a new power structure, it was able to obtain by force of arms in the field what it had been unable to obtain at the conference table.

In a deeper sense however, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a defeat for the international community in the same measure as it was a victory for Israel. Substantive issues notwithstanding, the fact of a political advantage being wrested anywhere on the face of the earth by clash of arms can be viewed in light of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations as a defeat.

The inter-relationship between the forgotten victory and the ignored defeat is the main theme of this study, although it is never mentioned or described in just those terms. Vic-

the fair wave her rights under international law in the face of armed forces preventing her entrance. The same political "alignment" had forced order upon Jordan, removed to her controversy, to lower claims of her invasion to violations of the same legal standards which they themselves were anxious to proclaim to the rest of the world. The same political "attention" had prevented the development of a substantial portion of her geography.

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tory and defeat are relative, to be sure, depending on aspect and interests. In the question of the Gulf of Aqaba in international relations from 1946 to 1957, the elements of both are so continually present as to form a counterpoint well worth listening to.

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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As a bridge or "baffle" between Europe, Asia and Africa, the Middle East owes much of its history to its limited accessibility, protected by natural barriers from indiscriminate use as a thoroughfare for general traffic. The mountain ranges of the north effectively isolate the Fertile Crescent from Eurasia except at the traditional passes of antiquity and to the south, the Arabian peninsula is isolated from the rest of the world by seas of great strategic significance. To the east, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman wash the oil rich Hasa Coast of Kuwait, Qatar and the Omans while the Arabian Sea has been traditionally the most important means of access to the Hadhramut.

South and west of the peninsula, the Red Sea slashes the topography with the narrow Bab el-Mendeb separating Yemen and Aden on the eastern shore from the Eritrean-Somali coast of Africa on the west. It washes a thousand miles of some of the most forbidding territory on earth and at its northern extremity, it splits into two well defined fingers which thrust further north toward the Mediterranean Sea.

The westernmost finger, the Gulf of Suez, is entered through the Strait of Jubal and the southern terminus of the

CHAPTER II

THE MATERIAL CONTEXT

In a bridge or "Gallic" oceanic Europe, land and Airlea, the Middle East over each of its history to the limited accessibility, accessed by natural barriers from indeterminate use as a thoroughfare for general traffic. The mountain ranges of the north effectively isolate the Pernlia Crescent from Eurasia, except at the traditional passes of antiquity and to the south, the Iranian plateau is isolated from the rest of the world by seas of great strategic significance. To the east, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman rank the oil rich Gulf Coast of Pernlia, Over and the Pernlia Mills the Persian Gulf has been traditionally the most important areas of access to the Southwest.

Cross and west of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea flanks the hinterland with the narrow and sometimes separating Tamar and land on the western shore from the Tigrean-Somali coast of Africa on the east. It marks a liminal milieu of some of the most formidable territory in Africa and in the northern extremity, it splits into two well defined fingers which thrust further north towards the Mediterranean Sea.

The mountainous Tigrin, the Gulf of Suez, is crossed through the valleys of Jhon, and the southern extremes of the

Suez Canal at the port of Suez is the northern anchor of the Gulf. The topography of its coasts, spawning grounds for freakish winds, makes it a difficult waterway to navigate and the current, while well charted, is frequently unpredictable. While this current is partly due to the spill from the Canal, the wind in the Gulf made it a one way waterway during the centuries between the last oared galleys of the Romans and the age of steam.

Less well known and somewhat more treacherous is the eastern finger which extends from the Red Sea in a north-by-northeast direction forming a vee with the Gulf of Suez. This is the Gulf of Aqaba, an entirely different geographical and topographical personality from its sister.[1] Almost one hundred miles long, the Gulf of Aqaba averages only fifteen miles in width and is entered through a narrow valve-like throat between the island of Tiran and the mainland of the Sinai Peninsula known as the Strait of Tiran.[2] Two channels

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[1]Ancient geographers considered that the peninsula jutted into a single body of water and named this body the Bay of Reeds (Sinus Aelaniticus) corresponding to the two modern Gulfs. See the excellent charts of the area in Luc H. Grollenberg, Atlas of the Bible (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1956).

[2]There is no agreement as to whether this throat should be called the Strait or the Straits of Tiran. The island obviously divides the water area in two although only the westernmost separation is usable.

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have been marked out through this narrow strait and the western one, known as the Enterprise Channel on current hydrographic charts, is the one in use today by normal shipping.[3] Entering the Gulf, the mariner finds himself in an area of many reefs and tiny islands, the water enclosed by faulted, steep slopes which rise to an elevation of at least two thousand feet in the narrows north of Dahab.[4] Just behind these slopes, mountains can be seen to the east and west giving the impression that the ship has entered a chute funnelling into the face of a constant north wind which accentuates the apparent speed of the vessel. While the slopes are occasionally broken by a few rugged wadis, there is no continuous foreland until very near the end of the passage northward. There are no trails following the coast to the west and the ancient one following the coast from Aqaba to Haqal on the east had to be hewn out of solid rock centuries ago.

As the northern end of the Gulf is neared, the mountains on either side seem to dip toward the center to accommodate the divide formed by the Wadi Araba which stretches another hundred miles north to the Dead Sea continuing the impression of a funnel. The northern coast of the Gulf of Aqaba is only sixty miles south of the northern-

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[3]United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, H.O. 157, Sailing Instructions For the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 171-174.

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As the northern end of the Gulf is neared, the mountains on either side seem to dip toward the center to accommodate the fishing canoes of the Wadi Yarda which approaches another northern wide north to the Dead Sea continuing the impression of a funnel. The northern coast of the Gulf of Aqaba is only slightly wider south of the northern-

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[3]United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, H.O. 177, Sailing Directions for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 173-174.

[4]These slopes have considerable bearing on the military operations described infra, Chapter IV.

most point on the Gulf of Suez but whereas the Suez traveller enters the Bay of Suez and the metropolitan area of the city of Suez, no such visual hospitality greets the northern bound traveller on the Gulf of Aqaba.

The northern coast is almost artificially square. At either "corner" roughly six miles apart, two settlements have been made and between them is what appears to be a wasteland slashed by the usually dry bed of the Wadi Araba stretching north into the distance as far as the eye can see.[5] The territory between the two settlements is a political wasteland, as will be shown, and the topography seems to emphasize this fact. To the right, facing north, is the Jordanian town of Aqaba with the only decent wells in the area and thus the best date gardens. Greenery from the tops of the date palms is visible above the tops of the squat buildings and the appurtenances of a light cargo port facility stretch down to the water's edge.

To the left is the Israeli port of Eilat[6] roughly the same size as its opposite number five miles away, but

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[5]The valley of the Araba, the Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley are part of the "Great Depression" which extends from Syria southward through the Red Sea into the heart of East Africa. See Grollenberg, op. cit., p. 9.

[6]Eilat is the preferred spelling although Elath is frequently seen. The word comes from the same root structure as the name of the ancient Sinus Aelaniticus which gives it its name. Premier Ben Gurion refuses to refer to the body of water as the Gulf of Aqaba, calling it instead the Gulf of Eilat.

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its personality is almost immediately distinguishable from Aqaba. Eilat is more colorful to look at. Its buildings are all new and have been engineered with an eye to providing just the sort of contrast with Aqaba as is mentioned here. The dockside facilities are somewhat more elaborate and the squat petroleum jetty with its yellow and green pumping heads provides a slash of color against the drabness of the brown earth. Officially designated a "port" on June 25, 1952, Eilat is further distinguished from Aqaba by the round cylindrical oil storage tank farm off to the west of the docks and if appearances are to be taken as the sole judge, the casual observer would rate both towns about equal in cargo handling capacity. Laid out as a modern "city", with a grade A hotel as a major inducement to an expanding tourist clientele, Eilat's 5000 inhabitants are occupying an area which was completely baren save for a police station in 1948.[7]

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[7]The first private houses were built in 1958 by a group of South African investors and the air conditioned hotel was opened in January of that same year. Most of the development is done by the Eilat Building and Development Company, Ltd., formed by South African, Canadian and Israeli investors. See the Israeli Government, Israel Yearbook (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1958), p. 165. Ben Gurion has a deep personal interest in Eilat over and above the political and economic interests of the government which will be discussed in this chapter. During his retirement between terms as premier, he lived in a kibbutz in the Negeb and has frequently expressed what he calls the great dream of making Eilat "the Los Angeles of Israel." See Gertrude Samuels, Report on Israel (New York: Herzl Press, 1960), pp. 40-41 and particularly the center fold of current photographs of the development.

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The natural endowment of the region is scanty at best. The best area for comparison is probably southern Egypt where the rainfall is approximately the same[8] but no rivers or wadis, other than the Wadi Araba pock the tableland to indicate a holding capacity for the 3.5 inches of annual rainfall. Inland on the slopes, rainfall reaches 8 inches annually but is mostly wasted on the rocky and rugged faces of the cliffs. Wells are few and far between and the yearly heat makes grazing a very limited endeavor. The annual temperature span averages from about 78 degrees in January to well over the hundred degree mark in the summer months, a factor which underscores Israeli determination to settle Eilat when it is considered that the entire drinking water supply of the town must be distilled.

Close together are the two air facilities serving the towns, complete with two sets of air navigational aids.[9] The Eilat airport is an attempt at sophistication in the desert and is serviced regularly as is the Aqaba facility which is somewhat more primitive. The Eilat personnel

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[8] William W. Jeffries (ed.) Geography and National Power (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1958), p. 80.

[9] Royal Air Force, Supplementary Flight Information Document (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, monthly through 1962), pp. 42 and 44. See also United States Air Force, World Aeronautical Chart Number 447 and Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Facts About Israel, 1961 (Ramat Gan: Peli PEC Printing Works, Ltd., 1962), p. 107.

The natural resources of the region is scarcely at least. The best area for cultivation is probably northern Egypt where the rainfall is approximately six inches[4] per annum. Other than one two land lines from the mainland to Isolaire a landing capacity for the 2.5 tonnes of annual rainfall. Island on the slopes, rainfall reaches 4 inches annually but is mostly wasted on the rocky and rugged face of the cliffs. Wells are low and far between and the yearly best water yielding a very limited amount. The annual temperature ranges from about 21 degrees in January to well over the hundred degree mark in the summer months, a factor which undoubtedly facilitated the exile life when it is considered that the entire drinking water supply of the town must be distilled.

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[4] Willis v. Jeffries (ed.) Generale des Deserts, Power Diversell. United States Naval Institute, 1971, p. 80.

[5] Royal Air Force, Instrumental Flight Information Manual (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Monday Lodge 1962), pp. 42 and 43. See also United States Air Force, Aerie Navigation Chart Number 447 and Tarne Military for Training Aircraft, Exile Island Israel, 1971 (Meet Gan: Pell for Training Force, Lee., 1972), p. 307.

maintain a radio beacon, the terminal fix on the Eilat-Beersheba corridor and the Jordanian Air Ministry maintains Eureka direction finding services from the Aqaba tower four miles to the east.

North from Eilat, the new Israeli highway stretches 213 miles into the heart of Beersheba paralleling the pipe-line and the new railroad which together make up the "dry land Suez Canal" described so glowingly by the Israeli Ministry of Information. Completed in February, 1958, the well engineered asphalt highway is one of the most important factors in the developmental scheme for Eilat. Prior to this decade, the passage to the Mediterranean from the Gulf of Aqaba was infinitely more difficult than the relatively easy passage through the Suez Canal and even prior to the opening of the Canal a century ago, the advantages of the Egyptian route were largely unquestioned. Despite the difficulty of this passage prior to the miracle of modern black-top and diesel, however, governments established in the north have frequently attempted to occupy the region to develop trade with the east and imperial interest in the head-land of the Gulf can be traced in the patterns of political geography back to Biblical times.

Early Patterns

The first attempt to trade through the Gulf of Aqaba is probably reported in the Book of Kings dating around the year 1000 B.C.:

maintain a radio beacon, the terminal [illegible] on the Eilat-Beersheba corridor and the Jordanian Air Ministry maintains Israeli direction finding [illegible] from the Aqaba [illegible] four miles to the east.

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Early Penetration

The first attempt to trade through the Gulf of Aqaba is probably reported in the Book of Kings dating around the year 1000 B.C.

> King Soloman made a navy of ships in Ezion-geber, which is beside Eloth . . . in the land of Edom. And Hiram sent in the navy his servants, shipmen that had a knowledge of the sea, with the servants of Soloman. And they came to Ophir and fetched from thence gold, four hundred and twenty talents, and brought it to King Soloman.[10]

Archaeological evidence developed in the late thirties located the ancient foundry town of Ezion-geber about four miles west of the modern site of Aqaba about five hundred yards inland and the rate of sedimentation in the Gulf has been variously interpreted to place the town on the water. There may have been two settlements, one a foundry ingeniously designed to catch the blast of north wind for forced draft and the other a maritime settlement temporarily used during Soloman's sea ventures.[11] The introduction of the camel into western Asia at about this time resulted in a busy traffic of camel caravans through the area and in time the difficult passage by sea down the Gulf and through the straits was probably abandoned for the more economical and characteristic land routes.[12]

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[10] 3 Kings, 9:26. See also Deuteronomy 2:8 which mentions Eloth (Eilat) as a stopping place on the Exodus and Numbers, 33:35.

[11] Leonard Cottrell (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Archaeology (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1960), p. 74.

[12] Hermann von Wissmann, "On the Role of Nature and Man in Changing the Face of the Dry Belt in Asia," in Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, William L. Thomas, Jr., ed. (Chicago: World Books, 1956), p. 296.

The Romans arrived on the scene during the first century before Christ and administered the Holy Land for several centuries. The first real road was constructed to the Gulf during this period but there seems to have been little trade by sea, if any, through the Gulf. The Romans did use the Nile for transportation from the east and since they were in possession of both Gulfs, it seems logical that they favored the route overland across the isthmus of Suez and through the Red Sea rather than the more forbidding Aqaba route. Additionally, Roman oared galleys were well suited to sailing in the Gulf of Suez and this was probably another factor which favored Suez over Aqaba.[13]

The Nabataens of Petra were in actual control of the area during the early Christian era and again, no record of trade through the Gulf has been found for this period.[14] The Nabataens were a farming community and they built their wealth on cereal cultivation supplanted to some extent by trade with the peoples of the Arabian desert.

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[13]Theodor F. Meysels, Eilat, Old and New (Eilat: Israel Government Tourist Corporation and the Local Council: undated), pp. 15-24. This vest pocket guide for the tourist in Eilat is a surprisingly complete history of the early period.

[14]The rise of the Nabataean kingdom owed some of its importance to its position as a halting place for caravans carrying oriental trade overland via Aqaba. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

The Amara arrived on the scene during the first century before Christ and administered the Holy Land for several centuries. The first real Jews were constructed to the Gulf during this period and there seem to have been little Jews by then, if any, through the Gulf. The Amara did not the Bible the Israelyvation from the Jews but since they were in possession of land Gulf, it was logical that they favored the Arabs over the Jews of Israel and through the Gulf the Arabs were forbidding Jews prime. Israelcentric, Jewish oriented policies were still seized to existing in the Gulf of Jews and this was probably another factor which favored Amara over Israel.[1]

The Amaraens of Yahiv were in actual control of the area during the early Christian era and again, on reason or other through the Gulf has been found for this period.[2] The Amaraens ruled over a farming community and what Yahiv that would on several cultivation supplanted to some extent by trade with the peoples of the Arabian desert.

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[1] Schwartz J. Israelia. Gulf: Old and New (Tel Aviv: Israel Geographical Society Publication and the Jewish Commission, Moscow), p. 1, 1971. This text provides for the Amara to Gulf is a surprisingly simplistic history of the early period.

[2] The rule of the Paradisean Kingdom owed more of its importance to its position as a Gulf trade place for merchants carrying material goods overland via Amara. Gulf, op. 22-23.

The first really detailed history of the area concerns the Crusades and considerable interest was shown in the Aqaba area by King Baldwin of Jerusalem.[15] In 1115 Baldwin rode south from Jerusalem with a force of two hundred men to occupy the present site of the town of Aqaba. A permanent installation was made there with a fort and a bishopric established which became part of the seigneurie of Montreal which corresponded roughly with the pre-1948 area of Trans-jordan. To control the Gulf, the Crusaders found it necessary to establish themselves on the tiny island of Gezira Firun which lies twelve miles south-west of Eilat which they named Isle de Graye. To this day, this island is the only place near the head of the Gulf which affords protection from the sudden gales of winter but the protection is far from being a significant factor to modern ships.[16] Moslems captured the island in 1170 and almost immediately, the Crusaders abandoned their mainland holdings. When their attempt to recapture it in 1182 failed, the Crusaders seem to have abandoned all plans to hold Aqaba

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[15] See particularly Alexander Melamid, "The Political Geography of the Gulf of Aqaba," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, September, 1957, p. 232, which summarizes Volume II of Runciman's History of the Crusades.

[16] United States Navy, op. cit., p. 175.

The Tiara really detailed history of the Kwan-
gaung the Chamberlain and mandarinship introduced by Alonso in
the Indo area by King Kublain of Jamaica.[14] In this
Dalhousie area would from Jamaicing with a force of one hun-
dred men to subdue the primary site of the town of Ashbu-
a personnel Jamaicians who made share with a fort and a
blockyard establishment which became part of the enterprise
of Boulder which corresponded roughly with the pre-Sikh
area of Tiara-Jamaica. In reality the Sikh, the Chamberlain
found it necessary to establish themselves on the ship Island
of Tiara Tiara which lies twelve miles south-west of Alias
which they found fully in Grove. To this day, this island
is the only place out in land of the Bell which efforts
presented line in a modern sense of review but the pro-
bation in for free using a significant factor to review
change.[15] Besides expansion the island in 1177 was almost
insufficient, the Chamberlain discovered that including building,
ships which although is continuing in in 1177 failed, the
Chamberlain was in fact discovered all plans to hold Aqua

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[14] The particularly Jamaicans Mulsell, "The Tailing Conquest of the Tail of Jamaica" Annals of the Jamaicanian of Jamaica Long-Jamaica, 1977, pp. 313, which con-
tains Alias in in Jamaica's History of the Jamaicans.

[15] Colonel Tailor Hurry, op. cit., p. 127.

in an interesting commentary on what must have been a maritime orientation in their original plan. Very little trade ever developed through the Gulf during Crusader control and for lack of an eastern outlet for trade, the southern kingdom remained rather poor. The northern kingdoms, with better outlets eastward, survived far longer than their neighbors to the south who succumbed to the Arabs in 1189. It is not too difficult to imagine that had the Crusaders developed any trade in addition to the sea-shell business which delighted twelfth-century Europe, their tenure might have been affected.

When the Crusaders left the headland of the Gulf, the Arabs showed little interest in the area and it disappeared from history for almost seven centuries. In 1836, an enterprising French explorer, Jean de Laborde made a journey through Arabia Petra to Mount Sinai and recalling the French origins of the kingdom of Jerusalem, attempted to establish a claim on the previous French occupation but the lack of importance of the Gulf during the nineteenth century during the period of active French imperialism in the Middle East prevented his claim from being taken seriously.[17]

Modern History

At the beginning of the 19th century, Egypt was a

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[17] Melamid, loc. cit.

in an interesting commentary on what must have been a curious situation in which original plays, that little Greek area over Metaphors Sunnyside the full moving Dramatic very well and for lack of an audience waiting for years, the southern bishops complaint reduce poor. The southern bishop-dome, with large-cultivated Garment, survived far longer than their neighbors to the south who succumbed to the Arabs in 1492. It is not too difficult to imagine that had the Germanic occupiers ever broke in sufficient to the non-Latin Romance speaking colonized Gallic-Roman Europe, their country might have been altered.

Even the Germans left the Romans of the Gallic the Latin Roman Library Business in the same and it disappeared from History for almost seven centuries. In 1494, an accomplished French scholar, Jean de Lalaerie made a journey through Gallic Paris to Rome find and resulting the French origins of the Gallic of Germanic, attempted to establish a state so the previous French association had the lack of importance of the Gallic during the Germanic century during the period of which French importance in the Gallic had preceded his state into being taken seriously.[17]

Modern Theatre

In the evolution of the Lyric Romance, Lyric was a

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[17]Salamon, op. cit.

province of the Ottoman Empire. Because of the weakness of the central government, the Governor of Egypt enjoyed the position of almost complete de facto independence from the Sublime Porte.[18] Expanding his rule over additional Ottoman territories in the early century, Muhammad Ali Pasha threatened to disrupt the traditional balance in the Middle East which had become so much a part of the foreign policies of the Great Powers in the "Eastern Question," and a concerted effort was made in 1840 to contain him. By the Convention of London in 1840, he was offered in addition to the governorship of Egypt, the Pashalik of Acre (Southern Syria) for life, providing he withdrew from other Ottoman holdings. When he refused to withdraw, an Anglo-Austrian military expedition enforced the Convention but his gradson, Ibrahim Pasha had occupied Aqaba in the beginning of that year. Ibrahim had built a road across Sinai to Aqaba to facilitate pilgrim movements from the Nile to Mecca and although the provisions of the Convention were never completely carried out, the demarcation of Southern Syria or the Pashalik of Acre annexed to the Convention establish for the first time in modern history a clearly established border related to the Gulf of Aqaba. Administration of this area of Southern Syria was entrusted to the Governor of Egypt but the subse-

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[18] George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (Sixth ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 81.

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[16] George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (Sixth ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 75.

quent Firmans of Investiture of each subsequent Governor contained no explicit reference to the Pashalik or to the Sinai region. Ibrahim exercised some measure of control over the Suez-Aqaba pilgrim route but for all practical purposes, there was no Egyptian administration in that area.[19]

Until Great Britain established herself in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula was of no practical importance either to the Ottoman Empire or to the Egyptians. Sinai acquired a new value, however, after 1876 as an important aim of British foreign policy involved shifting the boundary of Egypt as far away from the Canal as possible.[20] Turkey, on the other hand, took a more active interest in the area as the possibilities of a Hejaz railway materialized and the conflict between England and Turkey came into the open in 1892 when the British did not permit the promulgation of the investiture Firman granted to the new Governor which contained a more specific definition of the boundaries of

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[19] L. M. Bloomfield has covered this material with exhaustive documentation of his Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba (Toronto: Carswell, Ltd., 1957), particularly pp. 109-113. This book is the only full length treatment of the material on which this study is based, but Bloomfield's book is written so hap-hazardly and so obviously with the intention of bolstering the Israeli case that it is virtually worthless as an independent source. His thesis, for example, in the section cited, is that Egypt has no legal claim to any sovereignty in the Sinai peninsula.

[20] Ibid., p. 112.

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[19] L. G. Bloomfield has covered this material with exhaustive documentation in his Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba (Toronto: Carswell, Ltd., 1957), particularly pp. 109-111. This book is the only full length treatment of the material on which this study is based, but Bloomfield's book is written so tendentiously and so obviously with the intention of buttressing the Israeli case that it is virtually worthless as an independent source. His thesis, for example, in the section cited, is that Egypt has no legal claim to any sovereignty in the Sinai peninsula.

[20] Ibid., p. 112.

Egypt than was contained in the document investing his predecessor. There followed a long and unnecessarily involved series of telegrams which pertained to the Egyptian boundary. In reading these documents the modern student cannot help being impressed by the British attitude that the Ottoman Emperor had gone back on his word, although no intention to incorporate Southern Syria permanently into Egypt is indicated in the 1840 document. The Emperor was claiming that the Egyptian boundary should by rights be drawn from El Arish, near Gaza, to Suez; only after considerable British pressure did the Grand Vizier send an explanatory telegram acknowledging what might be termed a proscriptive claim by Egypt with a border drawn from El Arish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Turkish troops installed themselves in Aqaba and the matter was considered settled after Lord Cromer, the British Consul General and virtual ruler in Egypt, declared British agreement in a telegram to Tigranne Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on April 13, 1892:

> Under these circumstances, I am instructed to declare that Her Brittanic Majesty's Government consent to the definition of boundaries contained in the present Firman, as supplemented, amended and explained by the telegram of the 8th inst. from His Highness, the Grand Vizier...[21]

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[21] Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 115, quoted without indication of source.

Egypt that was mentioned in the document investing his predecessor. There followed a long and unnecessarily involved series of telegrams which revealed to the Egyptian Government, in spite of their assertions to the contrary, that Egypt was being supported by the British against the Ottoman Empire. And good luck to him even, although to Lawrence he incorporated Sudanese troops personally from Egypt to fulfilment in the Jebel Druzeen. The Egyptian was claiming that the Egyptian Government should by rights be given the Sinai, too. In fact, only after Cornish wrote British pressure did the Grand Vizier lead to an-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Never adequately demarcated (until 1946), the border continued to give trouble, and in 1906 an incident took place near Aqaba between an Egyptian Army party under the command of a British officer and the Turkish troop at Aqaba. After exhaustive negotiations and four separate counterproposals on strict delimitation of the boundary determining what was and what was not part of the Sinai peninsula, Turkey obtained Aqaba and the lands at the head of the Gulf east of the Wadi Araba in return for the cession of an area north and east of El Arish which had been vaguely a portion of the prior Turkish claim. Except for modifications around Gaza and the El Auja pocket, this boundary persists as the Armistice line between modern Israel and Egypt.

Turkey planned to develop the port of Aqaba in the first decade of the present century and when the Hejaz railway was first conceived, it was planned to construct a spur line to develop the port as a trading terminus with the east. When the British occupied the town in 1917, however, only a telephone line attested to the ambition of the Ottomans and there was not even a fishing boat in the Gulf.[22]

Following World War I and the dissolution of the Empire, the Turkish portion of the Gulf littoral became part of the Kingdom of Hejaz under Hussein. As closely as the

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[22]Melamid, op. cit., p. 235.

Have wholeheartedly disapproved Nasri Khalil, the author endeavored to give credible, well in keeping as Palestine had place man- lands between in Egyptian, they quickly under the command of a British officer and the Turkish army at Gaza. After exhaustive deportations and four expulsions substantiated or serious maltreatment of the Bedouins determining what you and what are the pen of the Blood revolution, Turkey attached Gaza and the lands of the Nabi of the Gulf said of the Gulf Arabs in reduced for the service of an area so-so and was of the lands which had been regarded - provinces of the proper Turkish state. Except for modifications which had gone any the El Arish province, this boundary portion in the principle line between modern Israel and Gaza.

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Following World War I and the elimination of the Empire, the Turkish period of the Gulf literary became part of the Kingdom of Hejaz under Faisal. As stated in the

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[32]Salameh, op. cit., p. 218.

Hashemites were aligned to England in the twenties, there was little doubt of the influence of Great Britain in the area. Meanwhile, Ibn Saud, Sultan of the Nejd, was being supported as a counterbalance to the northern kingdoms of Faisal and Abdullah and when Saud conquered the Hejaz, England insisted that a small strip of the headland of the Gulf be ceded to the Mandate of Palestine and Trans-jordan. The Treaty of Jidda in 1927 did not define such a border but a de facto effective Trans-jordanian control was recognized which, while never demarcated, exists to this day as the Saudi-Jordanian frontier on the Gulf. Saud is dissatisfied with the arrangement, to be sure, and no traffic is allowed between Aqaba and the rest of the Arabian peninsula. The line itself runs inland from a point two miles south of the "corner" of the Gulf and all flat land suitable for port facilities lies in Jordanian territory. This is the only Jordanian outlet to the sea.[23]

While no definite boundaries existed between Palestine and Trans-jordan during the mandatory period, Abdullah never claimed more than the four or five miles around Aqaba nor did he ever have access to more. During the Palestine disorders in the late thirties, a road was constructed from Maan to Aqaba. The road was originally intended to serve the British

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[23]See, for example, S. N. Fisher, The Middle East (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 531.

Bedouin tribes were aligned to Turkish in the invasion, there was little doubt of the intention of Great Britain in the area. Theoretically, the Amir, Sultan of the Hijaz, was being supported as a constitutional ally to the northern provinces of Syria and Iraqi and was thus thus conquered the Hijaz.

Tangled instead that a small army of the Ikhwan of Ibn Saud be added to the armies of Faisalian and Trans-Jordan. The Treaty of Jidda in 1927 did not define such a border but a de facto territory Trans-Jordanian control was recognized which, with some exceptions, stops to this day in the Saudi-Jordanian frontier on the Gulf. Here is distributed with the arrangement, in 24 zone, and no traffic is allowed between Aqaba and the rest of the British territory. The idea itself was taken from a point two miles south of the "corner" of the Gulf and all Fire land activity for such facilities like in Jordanian territory. This is the only Jordanian contact to the sea.[23]

While an activity boundary- existed between Faisalian and Trans-Jordan during the mandatory period, Kuwait never claimed more than the Gulf of Fire which since around Ibn Saud in every turn across to north. During the Faisalian disorders in the late twenties, a road was constructed from Fao to Aqaba. The road was originally intended to serve the British

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[23]See, for example, J. B. Kelly, The Persian Gulf (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 121.

garrisons in Trans-jordan should the normal supply lines through Haifa be cut by disturbances in Palestine and it is interesting to note that this road serves the present day Jordanian economy in just such a situation as pertains today. In addition, a railroad was begun in 1941 which would have linked Maan and Aqaba in the face of possible German control of the Mediterranean and Egypt. If supply through Egypt were cut, the railroad was designed to supply the allied armies in the Levant through the Gulf of Aqaba, but by the time it had reached Ras el Nebk about twenty five miles south of Maan, victory at el Alemain was assured and the railroad halted there. Interestingly enough, this line also forms a major prop to the Jordanian economy today.[24]

Today's armistice boundaries between Jordan and Israel generally follow the line of least elevation in the wadis south of the Dead Sea and are correspondingly vague. North of the Gulf, the Wadi el Araba extends as a reasonably definite boundary until it becomes almost impossible to follow north of the airstrip at Ghirandal about forty miles to the north. Here it follows the Wadi el-Jelb, something of a geographic fiction in summer, north to the Dead Sea.

Jordan, of course, no longer uses Haifa and, since cargo moved through Beirut south across Syrian highways into Amman is very expensive, she began using Aqaba on a

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[24] Melamid, op. cit., p. 237.

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[24]Patai, op. cit., p. 437.

continuous basis in 1952 and improving its facilities.

Transit sheds have been built all along the waterfront and a storage farm with a thousand ton capacity for diesel and gasoline fuels has been built. An interesting sidelight on the political problems of the area is afforded by the stevedore population of Jordanian Aqaba, most of them Arab refugees from Jaffa and Haifa. With the eight automotive cranes which were installed in 1953, the port now has a daily cargo handling capacity of 1,700 long tons. The north side of the waterfront is now given over to shallow berths. A dozen class F lighter berths accommodate the waterborne off-loading of the largest vessels afloat which can be anchored in the harbor. To the south, new deep wharves are being finished this summer with the assistance of United Nations Technical Assistance personnel. These wharves will permit the bulk handling of phosphates and will include a new quarantine station for pilgrims on the relatively short voyage down the Gulf out into the Red Sea to Jiddah for the Hadj. Pilgrim traffic continues to be a large factor in Aqaba's economic life and the annual rate exceeded 10,000 each year since 1955. Fishing has been developed as an industry and a processing plant in Aqaba produces about 300 tons of preserved fish annually. The main imports through Aqaba to Jordan are foodstuffs, steel, machinery, textiles and petroleum products and the port is equipped to handle and store almost as much as the traffic will bear.

construction work in 1972 and improving the facilities.

Finally about 2000 feet more quay will along the waterfront and a storage dam with a capacity for 20,000 tons of gasoline fuels has been built. An interesting sidelight on the political problems of the area is afforded by the economic possibilities of Dorbolong Island, home of about 1000 people from Delta and Ekiti. With the right authority stores which were demolished in 1971, the island now has a daily cargo handling capacity of 2,500 tons. The north side of the waterfront is now given over to boating berths. A motor launch & lighter berths accommodate the waterfront off-loading of the largest seagoing lighter which can be anchored in the harbour. To the south, new grain silos are being finished with assistance of United National Technical Assistance Programme. These silos will provide 200 cell capacity of 50,000 tons and will include a new quarantine station for fumigation on the relatively short voyage down the Niger for the 1400 tons of grain for the Kwara. Fishing facilities continue to be a large factor in Kwara's economic life and the Ministry from approximately 10,000 each year since 1971. Fishing has been encouraged by an industry and a processing plant in Ayara producing about 200 tons of processed fish annually. The main fishing through ports in Jebba are Ibadan, Kwara, Kaduna, Kaduna, Kaduna and particular produce and the port is equipped to handle and store almost as much as the traffic will bear.

There is unlimited open storage, 43,000 square feet of warehouse space and limited cold storage facilities by the lighter wharfs.[25] In years when the harvests have been scanty, as in the 1959-1961 seasons, wheat and flour imports under United States Public Law 480 are processed through Aqaba. Phosphate rock with a 74 percent phosphate of lime is quarried at Roseifa north of Amman and trucked to Aqaba to be exported in bags.

Several British steamship lines connect Aqaba with British and Belgian ports and a monthly German service reaches ports of the Hamburg-Le Harve range. Cargo moves by truck from the Nebk rail terminal and while extension of the railroad south to Aqaba was once considered out of the question because of the steep descent of over 5,000 feet, planning is now actively underway and some track has actually been laid south of Nebk.

Costs of transportation from Aqaba to the northern population center averages $30 a ton compared to $39 for the same ton from Beirut. Political activity in Syria and the ever changing complexion of Arab politics make the Aqaba way the preferred one, and it has the additional advantage of saving foreign exchange. Should transportation through Haifa

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[25] United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, <u>World Port Index</u>, H. O. 950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957, with annual corrections); Sir Archibald Hurd, Ports of the World (London: The Shipping World Ltd., 1961), and Melamid, op. cit., p. 239.

There is unlimited cash reserve. Although events that of metropolis years and Jiaoliao auto Fuzhou facilities by the liquor shortly.[1] So years that the warrants life the weather, at in low 1000-100 season, times and time the ports water Sichuan waters fruit low not are provinces showed lapse. Footpaths not river a 15 period passenger of line is practical at Kunlun work of seven and answer to lights to be provinces in days.

Several Guilin transport cities summer lights with Britons and Taiyuan ports and a usually Qantas article reaches ports of the Hubeng-le ports range. Jiajin rows by trade from the land rail lowered due white association of the rail road sound to lines not that considered are of the passing persons of the city reason of other 5,000 feet, planning in low activity machinery are some tried has usually seen late sound of Wuhu.

Goods is transportation from taxis by the operators population water lengths 170 a bus operators to 30 for the sake too from Sichuan. Building working in trips and the over changing remaining of and politics work; the lower may the preferred are, and is pay the additional strategies of making tokyo cassette. Hunan transportation above fail.

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[1] Dating Jiaxing many, Transportation Qingdao, Hotel Cars 1977, also Jiaxi corresponding, Provincial Beijing Ports, the World Jiangsu, The Ministry of Life Jiangsu Ministry of 22, 1977, p. 377; Ministry of Life Jiangsu, Hotel Taiyuan.

ever become possible, Aqaba's importance would decline because transit through Haifa, on the same scale as quoted above, costs less than $10 a ton to Amman.[26]

In March 1949, during the last stage of the Arab-Israeli war, Israeli troops penetrated to the Gulf. Israel occupied about nine miles of shoreline opposite Jordanian Aqaba and established Eilat on the site of the Umm Rashrash police station; but by 1956, fewer than ten ships had visited it.[27] The Egyptian blockade of the Gulf was enforced by an armed station at the entrace to the Gulf along the strip or cheek of land known as Sharm el-Sheikh, by gun positions slightly north at Ras Nasrani overlooking the Enterprise Passage, and by Egyptian outposts on the island of Tiran. The other island in the straits, the island of Sanifir, is east of Tiran and hence not much use in blockading the channel.

Although most charts show these waterless and uninhabited islands as part of Saudi Arabia, Egypt has claimed sovereignty over them since 1907. The ownership of these islands has been vague ever since the Sixth century and reference to them in any recent history is impossible to find outside the context of the Aqaba question itself. Ben

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[26]Melamid, _op_. _cit_., p. 240.

[27]Malcolm W. Cagle, "The Gulf of Aqaba, Trigger for Conflict," _United States Naval Institute Proceedings_, January, 1959, p. 77.

ever become possible, Japan's importance would decline tremendously through Malta, on the main sea-lanes to Italy where, never less than 210 a day to be seen.[20]

In March 1942, during the last stage of the Israeli war, Israeli troops reconnoitered to the Gulf. Israel occupied about 1200 miles of coastline opposite Jordanian shoals and stabilized their on the side of the Gulf Aqaba police station; one in Eilat. Fewer ships had visited it.[21] The Egyptian blockade of the Gulf was enforced by an armed patrol at the entrance to the Gulf along the strip or shoal of land known as Tiran el-Sanafir, by the positions actually held, at the mouth, overlooking the Straits Tiran, and by artillery emplaced on the island of Tiran. The other islands in the straits, the island of Sanafir, in fact of Tiran and Doran were each use to strengthen the channel.

Although most ships have their waterlines and navigational islands in part of Gaza strip, Egypt has claimed sovereignty over such since 1957. The ownership of these islands has been vague ever since the Turkish territory and reference to them in any treaty dispute is impossible to find during the months of the Aqaba question itself. The

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[20] Heimsath, op. cit., p. 320.

[21] Charles H. Duff, "The Gulf of Aqaba, Trigger for Conflict," Foreign Trade Review Supplement (December, January, 1956), p. 17.

Gurion referred to them in a speech in the Knesset on November 9, 1956, and it would appear that Jewish independence on the island of Tiran, known in Hebrew as Votvat, was maintained at least until the time of Procopius who wrote in the sixth century (527-565 A.D.). Some time during the ensuing century, the colony disappeared.[28]

The Sharm el-Sheikh ("Sharm" means cove or creek) is a strip of territory on the Sinai mainland which commands the entrance to the Gulf and permanent installations--wharf and airstrip--serviced the personnel on blockade duty. The heavy emplacements at Ras Nasrani were finished in 1953 although temporary mobile batteries on Tiran operated as early as July, 1951. The complex was also an important signalling station during the blockade and, today, the United Nations Emergency Force occupies the position.[29] In more recent times (Spring, 1962), the coast east of the islands has been the scene of clashes between Egyptian fishing skiffs and Saudi patrol launches now that the political climate between the two nations is considerably more frigid than it was a decade ago.[30]

Other than the military buildup in southern Sinai,

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[28] New York Times, November 8, 1956. See also Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 5., where he quotes extensively from E. A. Salpeter, "A Visit to Sharm el-Sheikh," The Canadian Jewish Chronicle, February 1, 1957, p. 11.

[29] See infra, Chapter IV.

[30] New York Times, April 4, 1962.

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[28] New York Times, November 8, 1956. See also Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 173, where he quotes extensively from S. L. Gallagher, "A Visit to Sharm el-Sheikh," The Canadian Jewish Chronicle, February 1, 1957, p. 11.

[29] See infra, Chapter IV.

[30] New York Times, April 4, 1962.

little activity has ever taken place on the Egyptian side of the Gulf. Considering the nature of the Sinai desert and the relative difficulty of defense and communication in the further reaches of this area, this is not surprising. An all weather road once connected Suez to Taba, a police post just south of the Palestine-Egyptian line on the Gulf. There are two anchorages on the Gulf other than Eilat and Aqaba, one at Dahab on the Egyptian side and one at Maqneh in Arabia. Neither have any considerable traffic and traffic from Dahab to Suez is a rough track which passes St. Catherine's monastery, the highest point on the peninsula, and oil prospecting in western Sinai has been undertaken in recent years using this route as a jumping off point for some deep-well work in the desert.[31]

On the other side of the Gulf, the prohibition of land traffic across the Saudi-Jordan border effectively seals off the eastern bank of the Gulf from traffic. As late as 1957, occasional cargoes were moved up to Manqueh by war surplus LST and LCI craft which would take on a load of consumer cargoe at Jiddah and beach it in the wadis on the shores of the Gulf. Goods would then be delivered to some of the oases inland by truck but the cost of an operation such as this is prohibitive of any real economic

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[31] Melamid, op. cit., p. 237. The topography of this area figures in the Sinai War and the Ninth Israeli Brigade was supplied during its drive southward by landing craft which used these spots to unload.

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significance. Rehabilitation of the old Hejaz railway south of Maan through the Saudi-Jordan border town of Mudawwara considerably inland from the Gulf and the new highway paralleling this rail bed considerably diminished this glamourous traffic.

Few geopolitical generalizations are possible about the Gulf of Aqaba and until the creation of Israel, little attention had ever been focused on it. There are, however, some geopolitical trends and patterns which are applicable to the area generally.

Control of the region around the Gulf by a state established in the north could effectively block communications by land between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. A severence of this nature suited the Crusaders as well as it suited the Israelis in 1949. Whether this is a significant consideration in recent years is difficult to assess, in view of the decreased dependence on land communications generally and the decreasing dependence on the traditional geographical basis for military strategy in desert areas.

If strategic considerations are only indirectly significant, the politico-economic question of "trade with the East" is an entirely different matter. Almost every move made on the Gulf since the days of Soloman has been motivated by this desire and as has been shown above, the half-hearted efforts made in this regard were never carried to complete success because a "backdoor to the Levant" was

Algorithms. Indubitably one of the old Greek mathematicians was the first to describe the Euclidean Gcd(a, b) algorithm, which is based on the fact that the greatest common divisor of two numbers does not change if the smaller number is subtracted from the larger one. Thus, for example, Gcd(12, 8) = Gcd(4, 8) = Gcd(4, 4) = 4. Euclid's algorithm is a procedure for finding the greatest common divisor of two numbers by successively subtracting the smaller number from the larger one until the two numbers become equal.

The procedure, however, requires one to perform about the half of them, and only the remainder of Gcd(a, b) is required to be found. Thus, for example, Gcd(12, 8) = Gcd(4, 8) = Gcd(4, 0) = 4. Thus, the number of operations is reduced through the application of the algorithm to the given problem.

Suppose, a ball rolls down the hill by a steep embankment in the north-south direction. Suppose, the ball is thrown by two people, one on the top of the hill and the other at the foot of the embankment. Suppose, the ball is thrown at the same time, the ball-thrower at the top of the hill throws the ball at the foot of the embankment, and the ball-thrower at the foot of the embankment throws the ball at the top of the hill. Suppose

never needed badly enough by any Levantine state prior to 1948. With Israel established on the Mediterranean, the blockade of her access to the east was as natural from the Arab viewpoint as her interest in the Negeb as a gateway to the east was to the Israelis. Denied Suez at a time when the new state was aggressively embarking on a plan to build a major, industrial economy from nothing, the importance of the Gulf of Aqaba as a backdoor to the Levant became acute.

Trade with the East, as a policy, evokes images of spice-laden caravans plodding across the desert wastes to the mysterious centers of Cathay. In modern language, this policy is translated into more prosaic images of tanker movements from the Persian Gulf. It became almost immediately apparent to the Israeli economic planners that without trade with the East, a modern industrial economy based on machinery and power would be hard put to survive, much less grow in step with a mushrooming population. It became obvious to the Arab League at about the same time that the best way to kill a weed was to starve it out. Thus, following the Arab-Israeli War, the blockade of Israel, begun as early as 1946, was a major policy item.

never seemed badly harmed by any invasion since prior to 1948. With Israel established in the Mediterranean, the blockade of her access to the east was as natural from the Arab viewpoint as her interest in the Negev as a gateway to the east was to the Israelis. Coming from at a time when the new state was aggressively reasoning on a plan to build a major, industrial economy from nothing, the importance of the Gulf of Aqaba as a gateway to the Levant became acute.

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CHAPTER III

THE BLOCKADE

Probably the most abiding element in Middle East politics from the Rhodes Armistice in the Spring of 1949 until the later days of 1956 was the continuation of the Arab-Israeli War by other means. The guns were officially silent but casualties on both sides were well into the hundreds[1] as each side engaged in border forays whenever the precarious balance tipped one way or the other. Diplomatic warfare was perfected to an astonishingly acute art as the Arab Blockade became institutionalized throughout the Middle East. The loss of face suffered by the Arab forces reinforced the already violent emotional antipathy toward Israel rendering normal inter-state relations impossible during the years which followed. Aimed at the political, economic and moral isolation of the new state, the foreign policies of the Arab League nations rarely reached the high accord all shared in their common stand against the enemy, Israel.

In Tel Aviv, on the other hand, almost insurmountable difficulties faced the infant government which would have

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[1]In a speech before the United Nations on November 1, 1956, the Israeli Permanent Representative Abba Eban quoted the figure 400 dead and wounded. The latest "official" figure, quoted in Facts About Israel, 1961, p. 19 (cited supra), is 1376 dead and wounded for the same period. Arab figures are not available.

CHAPTER VII

THE REFUGEES

Probably the most abiding element in Middle East politics from the Rhodes armistice in the spring of 1949 until the later days of 1950 was the continuation of the Arab-Israeli war by other means. The guns were officially silent but casualties on both sides were still into the hundreds[1] as each side sought to extract revenge whenever the precarious balance tipped one way or the other. Diplomatic warfare was perfected to an astonishingly acute art as the Arab Blockade became institutionalized throughout the Middle East. The loss of face suffered by the Arab forces reinforced the already virulent emotional antipathy toward Israel rendering normal international relations impossible during the years which followed. Aimed at the political, economic and moral isolation of the new state, the foreign policies of the Arab League nations rarely reached the high accord all shared in their common stand against the enemy, Israel.

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[1]In a speech before the United Nations on November 1, 1950, the Israeli Permanent Representative Abba Eban quoted the figure 400 dead and wounded. The latest "official" figure, quoted in Facts About Israel, 1961, p. 10 (other sources), is 1170 dead and wounded for the same period. Arab figures are not available.

terrified more experienced statesmen accustomed to operating from traditional foundations of national power. An expanding, heterogeneous population made up of diverse and contradictory cultures was attempting the creation of a modern economy in the face of total and complete poverty, isolation and internal disagreement over even the basic aims and values of the new state.[2]

During this period of blockade and development, the Gulf of Aqaba took on a new significance for both sides. When the State of Israel had been proclaimed following the termination of the British Mandate in May, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel had not extended its "sovereignty" to the Beersheeba sub-district of the Negeb owing (as one Israeli publication puts it with delightful ingenuousness) to the "forceful opposition by the Arabs and the subsequent military occupation of the area by the armed forces of Egypt and Trans-jordan."[3] In more blunt terms, there was a war on.

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[2]See particularly Fisher, op. cit., Chapter 40; Halford Hoskins, The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1958), Chapter 6; and George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), Chapter 9, for impartial discussions of the problems of the new state. For an inside view, cf. Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1958), particularly the first three chapters.

[3]Shabtai Rosenne, The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1957), p. 20. This pamphlet is a scholarly apologia for the Israeli position liberally quoted, usually without acknowledgment, by Bloomfield (op. cit.).

terrified were conservative stalwarts accustomed to benefiting from traditional conceptions of personal power. An expanding, heterogeneous population made up of diverse and contradictory cultures was attempting the creation of a modern economy in the face of total and complete poverty, isolation and internal disagreement over even the basic aims and values of the new state.[7]

During this period of blockade and development, the Gulf of Aqaba took on a new significance for both sides. When the State of Israel had been proclaimed following the termination of the British Mandate in May, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel had not extended its "sovereignty" to the southernmost sub-district of the Negev owing (as one Israeli publication puts it with delightful ingenuousness) to the 'forceful' opposition by the Arabs and the subsequent military occupation of the area by the armed forces of Egypt and Trans-Jordan.[8] In more blunt terms, there was a war on.

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[7] See particularly Fisher, op. cit., Chapter 40; Halford Hoskins, The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1954), Chapter 6; and George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), Chapter 9, for impartial discussions of the problems of the new state. For an inside view, cf. Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), particularly the first three chapters.

[8] Shabtai Rosenne, The Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1957), p. 21. This pamphlet is a scholarly apologia for the Israeli position liberally quoted, usually without acknowledgement, by Bloomfield (op. cit.).

The Arab-Israeli War was a complicated phenomenon to analyze at the time and it remains so today, but the perhaps over-simplified objective of the Zionist armies was to secure as much of the mandated area under their control as possible. The armies of the Arab states, on the other hand, acted to prevent this. Because of a host of factors eloquently analyzed by both sides ever since, the new year 1949 began with Israeli forces poised to deliver the death blow to the Egyptians in the south. On the evening of December 27, 1948, Israeli forces had actually penetrated beyond the mandated frontier slightly south and east of El Auja and were preparing an invasion into the Sinai peninsula under the code name Operation Ayin.[4]

Partly because of the British military commitment to Egypt and partly because the mandated frontier had been crossed, political pressure was put on the Israeli command by the threat of direct British military intervention. Withdrawing on the 2nd of January, 1929, there was little doubt that the Egyptian army had been broken in the field. Meanwhile, on December 28th, the Egyptian Prime Minister had been assassinated and when the replacement government took office the following week, it responded to public disappointment over the progress of the war and asked for an armistice

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[4]The following paragraphs are based on the New York Times and the London Times reports for the period 25 December 1948 to 16 January 1949 and on Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), Ch. 10.

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[1]The following paragraphs are based on the New York Times and the London Times reports for the period 15 December 1948 to 15 January 1949 and on Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), Ch. IV.

which began on January 7th and which brought the armed phase of the war to an end. Under cover of the armistice, the Israelis began the move southward into the Negeb which lay open and unprotected.

King Abdullah of Trans-jordan immediately realized the implications of this move and invoked his own treaty with the British and on January 8, 1949, it was announced that British forces would occupy Jordanian Aqaba. This move has been frequently misunderstood.

Denied the future use of Haifa as a port, Trans-jordan faced the possibility of becoming completely land-locked if the narrow Jordanian toehold at Aqaba were to fall. While there was no suggestion or assurance given or asked that British troops assist Glubb's Legion in the event of further fighting between Jordan and Israel, the government in Amman did need protection of her border on the Gulf and protection for what was her only port.[5]

It was not until March, however, that the Israelis were able to complete the occupation of the Negeb. The advance southward was called Operation Fact and caused considerable tension at a time when the Armistice negotiations were in heated progress at Rhodes. Additionally, as the column advanced southward, the British became increasingly tense about the possibility of an armed clash between

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[5]See Fisher, op. cit., p. 588.

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King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan immediately realized the implications of this move and invoked his own treaty with the British and on January 8, 1949, it was announced that British forces would occupy Aqaba again. This move has been frequently misinterpreted.

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[7][illegible], op. cit., p. 167.

their troops and the Israelis.[6] On March 10, the column passed the position called Bir Qattar and occupied the abandoned police station at Umm Rashrash on the Gulf of Aqaba, having kept to their own side of the Jordanian boundary up the Wadi Araba and the tension simmered down.[7]

In the meantime, the Egyptian Armistice had been signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949.[8]

Briefly, its conditions were that certain pockets were to be de-militarized and the fighting ceased on the "western front" in the Negeb. This was followed by the Lebanese Treaty signed at Ras el-Naqura[9] which guaranteed the old Mandate frontier to the north and the Trans-jordanian Treaty of April 3[10] which provided for a de-militarized Jordanian-Israeli border from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea along the line described in the previous chapter. All

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[6]The London Times, March 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th, 1949.

[7]See Meysels, op. cit., for an eye witness report at pages 28-29.

[8]42 United Nations Treaty Series 252.

[9]Fisher, loc. cit. The settlement with Syria would have been completed almost immediately thereafter but was delayed by the coup d'etat of Husni el-Zaim. It was finally signed in July, 1949. The Lebanese Treaty is in Shabtai Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (Tel Aviv: Bloomsteins, 1951), Appendix I. Rosenne was the Israeli negotiator.

[10]Fisher, loc. cit. After December, 1948, when the west bank of the Jordan no longer became the Israeli-Trans-jordan boundary, Trans-jordan had been proclaimed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Treaty was signed under this authority.

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Shortly, the conditions were such that certain progress was made in negotiations and the fighting ceased on the "western front" in the Negev. This was followed by the Lebanese Treaty signed at Ras el-Naqura[9] which recognized the old Mandate frontier to the north and the Trans-Jordanian Treaty of April 3,[10] which provided for a de-militarized Jordanian-Israeli border from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea along the line described in the previous chapter. All

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[6]The London Times, March 6th, 8th, 7th and 8th, 1949.

[7]See [illegible], op. cit., for eyewitness report at pages 75-77.

[8]U. United Nations Treaty Series 175.

[9][illegible], loc. cit. The settlement with Syria would have been concluded a week immediately thereafter but was delayed by the coup d'etat of Husni Za'im. It was finally signed in July, 1949. The Lebanese Treaty is in Shabtai Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (Tel Aviv: Blumstein, 1951), Appendix I. Rosenne was the Israeli negotiator.

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the Armistice agreements were to be effected by July 17, 1949, and by that time the "borders" of the State of Israel as they are now known were established.

One of the first complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission following the Egyptian Armistice was lodged on the basis of the Israeli advance to the Gulf and her occupation of Bir Qattar "in violation of the General Armistice Agreement."[11] Taken before the United Nations, the dispute was finally compromised in 1950 when the Security Council was able to take note of the fact that Israeli forces had evacuated the Bir Qattar position. Bir Qattar is really nothing more than a ridge on which an emplacement had been erected and it is almost incredible to realize that the controversy as lodged by Egypt concerned the immensely more germaine question of Israeli access to the Aqaba littoral but was settled without boundary modifications of any kind on the basis of a simple withdrawal from an otherwise worthless position.[12]

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[11] Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 21.

[12] Document S/1907 in Security Council Official Records, 5th year, Supplement for December, 1949, through December, 1950, p. 124. The settlement was virtually the only one ever concluded between these two antagonists on entirely legal grounds. The Egyptian Armistice Agreement, Treaty 654, had not extended the "western front" further south than El Auja and on that basis, the MAC was able to effect a settlement. Bloomfield's statement extending the Armistice border to Umm Rashrash (op. cit., p. 4) is simply not true.

The arbitrator's recommendations were in an affirmative by July 17, 1947, and by that time the Government of the State of Israel as they are now known were established.

One of the first conclusions of the Arab American Consultation following the Corporate Arbitration was Judge on the basis of the Israeli response to the fact of the non-compliance of Mr. Jessup's violations of the General Armistice Agreement.[11] Taken before the United Nations, the dispute was finally concluded in 1950 when the Security Council was able to take note of the fact that Israel-Jordan Peace had advanced the cause of peace initiation. The conflict is really involving much-said a state on which an agreement had been reached and it is always impossible to realize that the controversy is looked to apply regarded the immediate more effective execution of Israeli access so the Aqaba Gulf but was article without boundary modifications of any kind on the east or a state without from an objective well-less position.[12]

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[11] Bassiouni, The Law of Arabs, p. 21.

[12] Bassiouni, Law in Egyptian Council Criminal Courts, 4th ed., Jurisdiction for Wednesday, 1970, Beirut, December, 1970, p. 124. The analysis and visually the only one with relations between these two arrangements or entirely legal problems. The Corporate Arbitration Agreement Treaty 1950, but our notarized the "western front" treaties about that Mr. Aqaba and on this basis, the NAC was also in effect a conflicting. Bilateral, statement determining the Israeliza Lunar to the Gulfs. Op. cit., p. 4) is simply not true.

Israel lost no time in setting up a camp around the Umm Rashrash police station and this spot became the site of the modern town of Eilat, four miles from Aqaba and five miles from the point where the Egyptian border met the coast of Taba. Israel had her toe-hold on the Gulf and her economic potential was immeasurably brighter, as the intense public interest in Operation Fact had served to demonstrate. As a result of her potential for capitalizing on a position hitherto monopolized by Egypt, the extension of the war by other means was now undertaken in earnest to neutralize whatever advantage this position might be able to bring.

The Blockade and the Economic War

Once situated in command of her own "back door," the Israelis made no secret of their plans to construct a major port under the noses of the enemy. Eilat became an El Dorado for Israeli public opinion during 1950 and a blue-print for a modern harbor and a naval base was prepared.[13] To the Egyptians, the most vocal leaders of the Arab coalition when every state fancied itself as a leader, it was fairly obvious that any proposed Israeli link between the two seas would be competitive with the Canal and politically undesirable. Furthermore, if the Israeli plans for a modern highway across the Negeb linking Eilat and Beersheba, a rail-

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[13]By M. Callet, the Chief Engineer of the Port of Le Harve. Israel Yearbook, 1958, loc. cit.

Israeli land or sea is sorting so a long around the Gaza Raphanah police station and this upon Israeli site of the Gaza town of Sinai. They enter from Egypt and fire mortar from the police where the Egyptian harbour and the coast of Tyre. Israel has her ice-boat or the Nile, the Gaza economic potential was immediately reliable, as the Gaza Sector therefore is operative that had moved to demonstrate. As a result of her resources for negotiating on a position Ratione mediterranea or Sinai, the expansion of the and Egypt either would the conversion in matters to negotiate whatever strategic Sinai position right be able to strike.

The Protocols and the Economic war

Once allowed in response of her own fight loss, the Israelis seek to start a their plans to commence a major port under the price of the water. Sites known as El Gorado for Israeli public opinion during 1950 and a plan price for a water barrier and a metal base was prepared. To the Egyptians, the more vocal leaders of the Arab coalition when Sinai Gaza Israel itself as a leader, it was fairly obvious that may regard Israeli land against the Gaza area would be consistent with the Gaza and politically unacceptable. Economically, if the Israeli plans for a barrier highway across the Sinai linking Eilat and Ashkelon, a well

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[1]Op. cit., the Jewish Economy of the Middle East. Israel Treaties, 1950, Lon. sic.

road into the heart of the northern industrial "complex" and a workable pipeline ever materialized, passage fees through Suez, transmission profits and the political initiative would be seriously endangered. All this of course would be added salt in the open and griping Arab wounds left after the actual Armistice had been proclaimed at Rhodes.

Informal economic warfare against the Jewish Agency was nothing new in the Middle East after 1945 but the formal blockade dates from the declaration of Israeli Independence in May, 1948. Egypt spearheaded the economic drive, joined almost immediately by the other members of the Arab League, and an effective primary and secondary economic boycott became a coordinated joint project. The closure of the Suez Canal was an important weapon in this project, applied to cargoes of "contraband" consigned to Israel. A Prize Court had been established, a Decree on Formalities of Inspection of Vessels and Aircraft was issued and a formal institutionalized program, unaffected by the Armistice Agreement, remained in force during the troubled seven years between armed clashes.[14]

To demonstrate the seriousness of the economic diffi-

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[14]Military Proclamation Number 38, established the Prize Court on July 9, 1948. The Decree on Formalities was published in the Egyptian Journal Official of April 3, 1950, and Law Number 50 of the year 1949 ("On the Ending of the State of Seige," May 1, 1950), The Decree on Oil Transports of July 14, 1950, and the Law on the Seizure of Contraband of April 4, 1951, are the Egyptian statutory basis for the blockade. See Bloomfield, op. cit., Chapter 2; the more accurate Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 22; and Fisher, op. cit., p. 593.

road into the heart of the northern industrial complex and a metallic pipeline over mountainous, desert land through does, transmigration policy and the political initiative would be seriously compromised. All this at cost we would be asked pay in the open and direct and moral into action the actual implicit use from opposition in Israel.

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[16]Military Governor Number 10, prohibited the Prize Court on May 5, 1948. The Decree on Commerce was published in the Official Journal of April 1, 1949, and law number 20 of the year 1949 (on the Boycott of the State of Israel, May 1, 1949). The decree on Ministry of July 12, 1950, and the law on the Authority of Development of April 6, 1952, are the Arabian statutory basis for the blockade. See Bloomfield, op. cit., Chapter 4; the more accurate measure, Hull of Aaron, p. 97; and Friedman, op. cit., p. 297.

culties of the new state, the experience of the Consolidated Refinery Corporation provides a typical example and serves as an excellent case in point.

In May, 1948, Consolidated Refineries, a British owned firm, closed down the only operating refinery in Israel at Haifa when riots between Jewish and Arab workmen made it impossible to continue operations on a normal or even vaguely economical basis. The refinery was the terminus of the main pipeline from the Kirkuk Field in Iraq and had a through-put crude capacity which was capable of providing most of the needs of the new state. Almost immediately after the closing of the refinery, the government seized the installation and after confiscating the considerable quantity of crude in storage at the plant, refined this confiscated crude for its wartime needs. After perfunctory negotiations collapsed in April, 1949, the government repudiated the agreement by which the Company had operated during the Mandate and delivered an ultimatum to Consolidated, threatening nationalization unless full production was restored. In the meantime, Iraq had closed the Kirkuk supply to Israel in accordance with the blockade, and the Company was placed in the impossible position of being forced to refine petroleum that it could not obtain with workers whom it could not hire at a price it could not bear. It was impossible to move crude from the other terminus of the Kirkuk line at Tripoli; no crude could be brought from the

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Persian Gulf via the Canal and after the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE) was completed to Sidon in 1950, Saud placed a portal to portal restriction on the crude which moved through it forbidding it to be marketed in Israel. Soon it was found to be impossible for third or even fourth parties to purchase Arab oil if the ultimate user was known or even suspected to be the Haifa refinery. In order to operate, Consolidated was forced to purchase Venezulean crude and ship it in tankers to Haifa, a voyage of over 5,000 miles.[15]

Situations of this nature were repeated with respect to almost every category of raw material locally procurable and would have been difficult enough for a mature economy to bear. Building materials, power generation and transmission equipment, books, foodstuffs--the list of "contraband" grew annually, forcing Israel into European markets where the sympathy she gained probably compensated for the economic damage done by the Arabs.[16]

The Blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba

The question of applying the provisions of the economic campaign in the Gulf of Aqaba arose almost immediately after the March, 1949, penetration to the Gulf and their occupation of Umm Rashrash.[17] During the summer,

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[15] See Hoskins, op. cit., p. 108.

[16] This was not a widespread opinion. Professor Hoskins, writing in 1954, is quite pessimistic about the viability of Israel (Chapters 6 and 7).

[17] Supra, p. 41.

Perhaps this was the case, but after the Trans-Canada Pipeline (Pacific) was completed to Sidney in 1956, Gas placed a portal in Portal restriction on the cross boundary gas in Washington is to be measured as Canada. Upon it was found to be capable of selling at least fourth partial to purchase land oil in the Alberta area was taken or gas exported to be the Delta refinery. In order to compete, Continental was forced to purchase Canadian crude and ship to the Rockies to Lacia, a report of over 3,000 miles.[16]

Estimates of this nature were repeated with frequent in almost every category of the material. Usually pressure and would have been difficult enough for a mature company to open. Building accessible, power generation and transmission equipment, roads, construction--the list of "lacking-head" case numerous, forcing Esso into decisions matters where the company has little primary responsibility for the expected benefit from as has arisen.[17]

The Slowdown in the Quest of Alaska

The question of supplies the profitness of the economic campaign in the Quest of Alaska moves almost immediately after the Search, 1957, penetration to the Gulf and their occupation of the Bushbell.[18] During the summer,

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[15]See Larson, op. cit., p. 108.

[16]This was not a strategical decision. Professor Hawkins, writing in 1964, is quite pessimistic about the practicity of Esso's (Company's) case [illegible].

[17]Ibid., p. 41.

little shipping or economic activity of any kind was feasible because of the presence of armed forces and the transition from wartime to peacetime operation occupied the attention of the protagonists until the weather cooled. By the Fall of 1949, however, a concrete program seems to have been established with reference to the Gulf.

With the concurrence of Saudi Arabia, which still claimed a vague and dubious sovereignty over Tiran and Sanifir, Egypt occupied the two islands "in order to protect them from possible damage or violation."[18] The full text of the agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the occupation has never been made public, and by the end of 1949, Egyptian construction began on the Ras Nasrani signalling station and from the installation of a observation post there, the elaborate fortifications needed to enforce the blockade grew.

In February, 1950, the question of the blockade of the Gulf was discussed in diplomatic correspondence between the major seafaring nations and concern was expressed over the apparent disregard of the principle of free and innocent passage through the Gulf. In the course of these discussions, the United States was requested to obtain confirmation of a statement attributed to the Egyptian government to the effect that the occupation of Tiran and Sanifir would not be used

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[18]Verbatim Record, 659th meeting, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Nr. 659, February 15, 1954, p. 19.

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[12]Egyptian Letter, 659th meeting, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Official Records, 9th year, No. 659, February 15, 1954, p. 15.

for the purpose of interfering with ships entering or leaving the Gulf. Accordingly, diplomatic contact was maintained between the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Offices through the unofficial offices of the American Embassy in Cairo. On January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued an _aide memoire_ to the Cairo diplomatic community which was ultimately transmitted through the community to Israel. The _aide memoire_ contained two paragraphs which were carefully worded to reassure the major maritime powers of the innocence of the occupation at a time when there was not much activity or interest in the problem of the Gulf. The statements assumed great significance six years later.

> In occupying the islands, Egypt has wished simply to confirm its right as well as every possible right of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to them. . . . This occupation is not conceived in a spirit to hinder in any way whatsoever the innocent passage across the maritime space separating these two islands from the Egyptian Coast of Sinai. It goes without saying that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past in conformity with international practice and the recognized principles of international law.[19]

A similar respect for "the principles of international law" was written into Article 2 of the 1949 Saudi

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[19] This paragraph has been frequently quoted on both sides of the issue and was read into the record of the Security Council in the 659th meeting on February 15, 1954. _Security Council Official Records_, 9th year, Nr. 659, p. 19. Rosenne, _Gulf of Aqaba_, gives the French original and a poor translation appears in Bloomfield, _op. cit._, p. 9. Walter Eytan, _op. cit._, pp. 102-104, dismisses its importance as a cynical move designed purely for the benefit of the United States and if the statement is taken on its face value, Eytan seems to have a point.

for the purpose of interfering with ships wishing to leave the Gulf. Accordingly, diplomatic contact was maintained between the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Offices through the unofficial offices of the American Embassy in Cairo. On January 30, 1950, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued an *aide memoire* to the Cairo diplomatic community which was ultimately transmitted through the community to Israel. The *aide memoire* contained two paragraphs which were carefully worded to reassure the major maritime powers of the intentions of the occupation at a time when there was not much activity or interest in the problem of the Gulf. The statements assumed great significance six years later.

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Arabian Decree on territorial waters and into the 1951 Egyptian Law on the same subject in identical words. These laws state:

> The territorial waters of the (Kingdom of Egypt) (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) as well as the airspace above and the soil beneath them are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of international law as to the innocent passage of other nations through the coastal sea.[20]

Several incidents occurred beginning in the summer of 1951 which indicated that maritime nations were taking these declarations seriously and by late 1953, when the fortifications and the signalling installation were complete at Ras Nasrani, a Notice to Mariners warned all vessels approaching the Straits to keep a sharp lookout for signals made at that station.[21] This was followed, at the end of August, 1955, by a general regulation which made explicit the administrative procedures required of vessels wishing to transit the Straits.[22] The 1953 Decree on the "Procedure of Ship and Aircraft Searches and Seizure of Contraband Goods in Connection with the Palestine War" was amended by a clause to the effect that all the commodities on the contraband list, including newly added categories of foodstuffs, were to be regarded as war contraband even when "passing

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[20]United Nations Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, 1957, p. 522.

[21]Notice to Mariners Number 3/54, February 22, 1954.

[22]Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, quoting Journal de Commerce et de la Marine, Alexandria, August 29, 1955.

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[20]United Nations Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, 1957, p. [illegible].

[21]Notice to Mariners Number [illegible], February [illegible], 1952.

[22]Rosenne, Israel et Aqaba, quoting Journal du Commerce et de la Marine, Alexandrie, August 30, 1953.

Egypt's territory or territorial waters in transit," an obvious reference to the Strait of Tiran.[23] To make it even more explicit, this decree was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which it is explained that Israel was "showing increasing economic activity and . . . establishing a merchant fleet to handle all its imports from South and East Africa."[24] One of the few exceptions to the blockade was the Italian tramp steamer, the "Santa Lucia," which reached Eilat in June, 1950, with its hold full of Yemmenite Jews who were being expatriated from their homeland to settle the Promised Land--presumably with the good riddance of the Immam.[25]

In the air, a prohibited area was established around Sharm el-Sheikh consisting of a circle of 20 nautical mile radius centered on Tiran:

> Fire will be opened at or on to the contravening aircraft without any previous warning. The onus of responsibility for any consequential damage to the aircraft shall devote to the pilot in command. Contravening aircraft will be held on their first landing at any Egyptian airport where a thorough investigation will be carried out with the responsible crew.
> If the contravening aircraft is being operated by a scheduled airline operator authorized by the Egyptian government, such authorization will be liable to withdrawal. In all other cases, no further permit to fly over Egyptian territory will be issued to any aircraft belonging to the owner of the contravening aircraft.[26]

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[23] Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Supplement for January to March, 1954, p. 9.

[24] Ibid., p. 10.

[25] New York Times, June 24, 1950. This was a highly emotional issue in the fifties. See E. T. Martin, I Flew Them Home: A Pilot's Story of the Yemenite Aircraft (New York: Herzl Press, 1957).

[26] Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 10.

Egypt's territory or territorial waters in transit, in obvious reference to the Straits of Tiran.[23] To make it even more explicit, this decree was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which it is explained that Israel was "showing increasing economic activity and . . . establishing a merchant fleet to handle all its imports from South and East Africa."[24] One of the few exceptions to the blockade was the Italian Army steamer, the "Zeera Inzia," which reached Eilat in June, 1970, with its hold full of Israelis who had been doing conscription from their homeland to assist our friendlies Iran--presumably with the good guidance of the Iman.[25]

In the air, a prohibited area was established around Sharm el-Sheikh consisting of a circle of 30 nautical miles radius centered at Tiran:

> Fire will be opened on or on to the contravening aircraft without any previous warning. The onus of responsibility for any consequential damage to the aircraft shall devolve to the pilot in command. Contravening aircraft will be held or shot down landing at any Egyptian airport where a thorough interrogation will be carried out with the responsible crew.
>
> If the contravening aircraft is being operated by a national of the operator authorized by the Egyptian government, such authorization will be liable withdrawal. In all other cases, no further permit to fly over Egyptian territory will be issued to any aircraft belonging to the owner of the contravening aircraft.[26]

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[23] Security Council Official Records, 25th year, Supplement for January to March, 1970, p. 3.

[24] Ibid., p. 10.

[25] New York Times, June 24, 1970. This was a highly emotional issue in the Israeli. See N. Y. Times, I Pray Eilat Will Live, 4 January 1971, reply by the Iranian ambassador that Iran

[26] Lowenfeld, op. cit., p. 10.

While the prohibited zone so erected effectively blocked direct passage by air up the Gulf, it actually accomplished somewhat more. In asserting Egyptian sovereignty over the mouth of the Gulf to the aircraft of all nations, it established something of a precedent. Through the acquiesence of other states, it substantiated the Egyptian "right" to fortify and defend the straits and the waters of the Gulf. Had Israel attempted to negotiate the passage from the south by air, she would have been blocked. She was denied passage by air over any Arab land areas and this Notice sealed the tiny breach by sea.

The Legal Aspects of the Blockade

The literature concerning the legal aspects of the Blockade in the Suez Canal is enormous, but there is only a small, frequently tendentious body of writings on the far more interesting problem of the Blockade as it applied to the Gulf of Aqaba.[27] There is an important difference between the two situations.

The international status of the Suez Canal is difficult to contest. Freedom of passage through the Canal is a

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[27]Shabtai Rosenne, the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Israeli Foreign Affairs, is the champion of the Israeli position and his influence on the noted jurist, L. M. Bloomfield, has already been cited. Dr. Omar Ghobashy has written for the Egyptian side. The best works are Charles Selzak, "A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba," American Journal of International Law, October, 1958, pp. 660-698, and "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba," ibid., July, 1959, pp. 564-594.

While the constitutional issue is resolved effectively Gaddafi clearly violates [illegible] the Suez Canal, in technically accomplished international law. It asserts Egyptian sovereignty over the canal as part of the [illegible] of the authority of all nations, it established something of a precedent. Through the acquiescence of other states, it substantiated the Egyptian "right" to levy tolls [illegible] the canal and the waters of the Gulf. But Israel although it [illegible] the passage from the south by air, air would have been blocked. She was denied passage by air over any Arab land [illegible] that Egypt [illegible] by sea.

The legal aspects of the blockade

The literature concerning the legal aspects of the blockade in the Suez Canal is voluminous, but there is only a small, frequently contradictory body of material on the far more [illegible] problem of the blockade as it applied to the Gulf of Aqaba.[27] There is an important difference between the situations.

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matter of vital interest to most of the world and although the solid body of treaty law established in the various international arrangements for the use of the Canal is open to interpretation and inference depending on the politics of the inferer, at least some kind of a basis exists for a juridical approach, although the same type controversies which cloud the Aqaba issue also pertain to the Canal.

The application of international law to the blockade of the Gulf is somewhat more indefinite, however, and merits a brief summary at this point. Interestingly enough, there are two mutually exclusive principles of law which apply to the Blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba which the Egyptian and Saudi governments were able to maintain until November, 1956. The first issue concerns the problem of the status of the waters of the Gulf, the waters of the Straits and the air-space above them under the international law of the sea, or, to put it another way, the Laws of Peace. This system of law regulates the normal legal relationships between states in their use of the seas for peaceful intercourse and with the exception of the controversial question of the width of the territorial sea, is a well developed body of international precedent.

The second issue arises out of the Arab thesis of continued beligerency with Israel, which in vitiating any attempt to apply the Laws of Peace to the waters of the Gulf, places the problem in an entirely different legal context

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The second issue arises out of the Arab thesis of continued belligerency with Israel, which in violating any attempt to apply the laws of Peace to the waters of the Gulf, places the problem in an entirely different legal context

calling for the application of the Laws of War. The Laws of War apply to nations which do not enjoy "normal" peaceful legal relationships and the right of beligerency confers on those who invoke these rights an entirely different set of rights and duties under the law.

Both of these legal issues are superimposed on the politico-legal implications of mutual membership in the United Nations. The problem is one which, like every other problem connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, is primarily political. The fact that the issues are discussed in terms of international law leads many to forget the political basis for the dispute and to imagine that all that would be required to solve it would be a binding decision clarifying the legal issues. Obviously the legal issues are relevant, but if both sides could ever agree to accept any legal settlement as binding the political basis for settlement would no longer be impossible. In any event, to the legalistic, an overriding consideration to the present date is the determination of which body of law to apply--the Law of Peace or the Law of War.

The Law of Peace. The Israeli government, and indeed the governments of most of the western powers and the major seafaring nations of the world, view the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, washing as it does the national

calling for the application of the laws of War. The laws of War apply to nations which do not enjoy "normal" peaceful legal relationships and the right of belligerency confers on those who invoke that right an entirely different set of rights and duties under the law.

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<u>The Law of Peace.</u> The Israeli government, and indeed the governments of most of the western powers and the major seafaring nations of the world, view the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, holding as it does that the national

territory of four sovereign states.[28] The generally accepted principle with regard to bodies of water of this nature and the use legally enjoyed by other nations in times of normal relationships is expressed succinctly by Judge Lauterpacht:

> . . . as a rule, all gulfs . . . enclosed by the land of more than one littoral state, however narrow their entrance might be, are non-territorial. They are parts of the open sea, the marginal belts inside the gulfs and bays excepted. They can never be appropriated; they are, in time of peace and war, open to all vessels of all nations, including men-of-war, and foreign fishing vessels cannot, therefore, be compelled to comply with municipal regulations of the littoral state concerning the mode of fishing.[29]

Thus a position based on this principle would take cognizance of the fact that since Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia share frontage on the Gulf, the Gulf is an international waterway and a part of the high seas. Regardless of the existence of Israel, the Gulf therefore is open to free and innocent passage by ships of all flags and blockade of the Gulf, for any reason in time of peace, is in violation of international law.

In regard to the question of the limits of the territorial sea in the Gulf and the interminable controversies attempting to fix the breadth of this territorial sea, the

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[28]Selzak, op. cit., pp. 667-676.

[29]L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I: Peace (London: 1948), pp. 460-461 (7th edition, edited by Sir H. Lauterpacht).

adjacent or near adjacent waters.[24] The generally accepted principle was agreed to bounds of water of this nature and the use legally enjoyed by other nations in times of normal relationships is extremely restricted by local laws.[25]

> . . . As a rule, all gulfs . . . enclosed by the land of more than one littoral state, however narrow their entrance may be, are considered. They are parts of the main sea, the territorial waters of the gulfs and bays adjacent. They can never be appropriated; they are, in time of peace and war, open to all vessels or all nations, including non-war, in foreign territory. Fishing cannot, however, be compelled to comply with municipal regulations of the littoral state concerning the mode of fishing.

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[24] Isaac, op. cit., p. 207-10.

[25] J. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, Peace (London: 1948), p. 4. Cit. (The Minquiers, Ecrehos Case, 47 L.T. Lauterpacht).

Gulf is so formed that at many points the waters of national territorial seas would "overlap" regardless of whether a three, six or twelve mile limit were claimed. The usual procedure in international law where a situation such as this has occurred is determined on the basis of the national or international character of the body of water so involved.[30] The Israeli position rests therefore on the same foundations as does Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone:

> There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas. . . .[31]

Another legal position that has been advanced by the champions of the Israeli cause, although never formally espoused by a more realistic government, is the involved claim that Egypt is occupying Sinai in violation of international law. What realistic political implications follow from this are somewhat difficult to imagine.[32]

The Law of War. The Arab position, as might be expected, is not only diametrically opposed to the point of

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[30]For example, the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits, the Danish Straits and the Gulf of Fonseca are each useful in varying degrees in establishing precedents. See Selzak, op. cit., passim.

[31]"Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," American Journal of International Law, October, 1958, p. 838.

[32]Bloomfield is the leading champion of this position.

half is so formed that it may [illegible] the waters of national territorial seas [illegible] "regular" [illegible] of another [illegible], [illegible] twelve mile [illegible]. The [illegible] of international law [illegible] that the [illegible] on the basis of the national or international character of the body of water so involved.[70] The present position [illegible] as the same [illegible] as does article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone:

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Another [illegible] position that has been advanced by the champions of the Israeli cause, although never formally espoused by a non-Israeli government, is that [illegible] is [illegible] in violation of international law. What [illegible] political implications follow from this are [illegible] to imagine.[72]

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[70]For example, the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits, the Danish Straits and the Gulf of Fonseca are each subject in varying degrees to [illegible] provisions. See [illegible], op. cit., passim.

[71][illegible] on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," American Journal of International Law, October, 1958, p. [illegible].

[72][illegible] is the leading champion of this position.

view expressed above but is based on an entirely different set of legal issues. According to the Arab viewpoint, the entire question of the application of the traditional maritime rules is based on a faulty premise--that the Arabs and Israel are at peace. The juridical nature of the Rhodes Armistice is the key question to be argued. Thus, while their opponents maintain that a right of innocent passage exists for all international shipping through the Gulf, the Arabs agree but refuse to classify shipping bound for Eilat as innocent. The Arab states, furthermore, regard the Israeli possession of the five-mile strip of Aqaba coastline as a military possession without de jure sovereignty in view of the manner in which it was acquired[33] and in further consequence of the fact that no Arab state recognizes Israel; that no Treaty of Peace has ever terminated the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and that Israel, in occupying the territory she now holds, in violating the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, deserves no such recognition until she does.

While the Jordanian Armistice makes a strong legal case for the Israeli right to occupy the section around Eilat, the legal nature of this possession is admittedly unclear. If, as the Arabs maintain, the 1948 "war" is still going on, there can obviously be no question of innocent passage through the Gulf or any portion of it which can be

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[33]Supra, pp. 40-41.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

successfully "defended" by the Arabs until the war is terminated. While the obvious issue of _de facto_ and _de jure_ termination of hostilities remains almost completely political and emotional, there really has never been an adequate legal agreement on the semantics of the case. Armistices and truces are agreements between beligerent forces for the temporary cessation of hostilities. Judge Lauterpacht can be quoted on this side of the argument as well as on the Israli side, as noted above:

> A general armistice is a cessation of hostilities which, in contradistinction to a suspension of arms with its momentary and local military purposes, is agreed upon by the beligerents for the whole of their forces for the whole region of the war. . . . Everybody agrees that beligerents during an armistice may, outside the line where the forces face each other, do everything and anything they like regarding defence and preparation of defence.[34]

While it has been usual for an Armistice to precede a Treaty of Peace, it may be stated as a strong position that an armistice agreement does not in itself or of itself terminate a war.[35]

When the matter came before the United Nations on

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[34]Oppenheim, _op. cit._, Vol. II: _Disputes, War and Neutrality_, p. 551.

[35]See Hyde, _International Law Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States_, 1945 edition, p. 1783, quoted in Selzak, _op. cit._, p. 690, and also "The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement," _American Journal of International Law_, October, 1956, pp. 880-906. Article 37 of the "Hague Regulations" annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Law and Customs of War on Land is alluded to in both places.

[illegible] until the war is termin-
ated. While the obvious intent is to change, and in many [illegible] termination of hostilities remains almost completely political and emotional, [illegible] agreement on the cessation of the war. Armistice and truces are agreements between belligerent forces for the temporary cessation of hostilities. [illegible] International Law [illegible] on this side of the [illegible] as well as on the Israeli side, as [illegible]:

> A general armistice is a cessation of hostilities which, [illegible] a suspension of arms with [illegible] military purposes, is agreed upon by the belligerents for the whole of their forces [illegible] the whole region of the war. . . . [illegible] that belligerents during an armistice [illegible] the line where [illegible] and [illegible] preparations [illegible] of hostilities.[34]

While [illegible] for an armistice to precede a Treaty of Peace, it [illegible] as a strong position that an armistice agreement does not in itself or of itself terminate a war.[35]

[illegible] the United Nations on

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[34] Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. II; [illegible], War and Neutrality, p. [illegible].

[35] [illegible], Conventional Law [illegible] as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, [illegible], p. [illegible], quoted in [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible], and also "The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement," American Journal of International Law, October, [illegible], pp. [illegible]. Article [illegible] of the "Hague Regulations" annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention [illegible] the Law and Customs of War on Land is alluded to in this place.

September 1, 1951, the Security Council passed a strong resolution calling on the Arabs to lift the blockade based on the desire of the Council to remove a dangerous situation rather than on any attempt to change the long-standing legal relationships between armistices and war.[36]

An additional problem is raised by the fact that as members of the United Nations, the Arabs have no right to maintain a state of war with anyone. To this, the Arab rejoinder has almost ritualistically been that the action taken in 1948 was taken in the name of the United Nations Partition Plan, a position which might conceivably be difficult to substantiate historically. The claim of beligerent rights, therefore, places Egypt in a somewhat inconsistent position from one aspect. When she announced military intervention in Palestine several months after the fighting had been in progress (November, 1948), the Egyptian delegate was careful to exclude any idea that war was being declared or that a legal state of war was in fact in existence. The text of the Egyptian message to the Security Council states that her forces had "entered Palestine to establish security and order in place of the chaos and disorder which prevailed."[37] Then again, on August 1, 1949, when the Palestine Conciliation Commission suggested that steps be

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[36]See *infra*, p. 72.

[37]*United Nations Document S/743*, 1948.

September 5, 1951, the Governor-General issued a strong presidential edition of the Ainu, in 1st the Ainu based on the desire of the council to create a deliberate situation rather than on the attempt to create its long-standing local relationship between government and man.[10]

In political position is marked by the fact that as members of the Central Medium, the Ainu have to [illegible] maintain a sense of not will alone. In this, the Ainu religious has a most ritualistically been that the action taken is that not taken in the name of the United National Partition Plan, a position which is most constantly in activity in nonsensical hierarchy. The state of [illegible] rights, freedom, plays [illegible] in a somewhat democratic position [illegible] model. When the [illegible] military [illegible] to Pakistan several months after the fighting had been in progress (November, 1948), the Government delegate was careful to include any idea that war was being waged or that a local image of war was in fact in existence. The text of the [illegible] message to the Security Council states that her forces had [illegible] to establish security and order in place of the Ainu and disorder was [illegible].[11] Then again, on August 5, 1948, when the Palestine Committee of Consulate [illegible] that Ainu as

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[10]See [illegible], p. 7.

[11]Ainu [illegible], 1948.

taken which would lead to a negotiated Peace Treaty, the Arab representative replied on the floor before the Security Council that "as there has never been a formal state of war with Israel, no formal treaty with Israel can be signed."[38]

How can the Arabs on the one hand insist that there is no war but at the same time claim beligerent rights?

Frequently alluded to by the Israelis as a glaring inconsistency, the apparent contradiction is actually not as contradictory in its own context as it might seem. The Arab position, simply stated, is that Israel does not and has never existed. There is a political unit occupying Arab territory in Palestine (but what legal status "Arab territory" has is still another thorny problem); this unit may call itself a state but by its very existence international law is being violated. Hence, while there is no state of war--a relationship between two states--there is ample grounds for the exercise of beligerent rights. Since Israel does not exist, the matter of a Treaty of Peace with her is out of the question.[39]

In addition to this main argument of impossibility of innocent passage by an enemy, two other Arab positions are

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[38] United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 292nd meeting, p. 10.

[39] A careful reading of the Rhodes Armistice, Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 5, paragraph 2, indicates that the position described in this paragraph has a curious and cogent legal validity.

taken which would lead to a unilateral Israeli Israeli, the Arab representative replied on the floor before the Security Council that "the Army has every the after that a formal idea of war with Israel, no formal state of war exists between Israel and the Arabs."[34]

The one has lived on the one hand denied that there is no war but at the same time claim belligerent rights.

Frequently alleged in the Israeli as a justification, the argument contraband is strictly not as conclusively in the sea conduct as it might seem. The Arab position, which states, is that Israel over the sea has never existed. There is a political and economic Arab territory in Palestine for what legal status that/ territory has is still somewhat thorny problem; this will not call itself a state nor by its very existence international law is being violated. Thus, while there is no state of war--a contradictorily phrase two states--there is ample grounds for the imposition of belligerent rights. Since Israel does not exist, the matter of a treaty of peace with her is not at the question.[35]

In addition to this much argument of impossibility of improper matters to be added, the other Arab positions are

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[34]United Nations Security Council, Official Record, 3rd Year, Special Supplement, p. 19.

[35]A review of Treaties of the Israel Arbitrator, article 4, paragraph 2, and article 2, paragraph 1, indicates that the position adopted in this paragraph has a contrary and proper legal right.

advanced from time to time which have been formulated with an eye for home consumption rather than for any serious legal negotiations.

The first of these positions relegates the Gulf of Aqaba to the status of a historical bay, a technical expression which would confer on it a peculiar status in international law under which the traditional occupants of its littoral would have joint control of the use of its waters.[40] The second position, somewhat similar and more emotionally charged, attributes to the Gulf a singular legal status based on its historical use as a vital waterway for pilgrimages to Mecca from all Islamic states to the north.[41] While neither position of itself is entirely convincing, these positions support and bolster the Arab legal artillery.

While no solution can ever be reached independent of a more penetrating political solution of the other differences which divide the two camps,[42] one of the first steps in any legal framework will have to establish the parameters of the law that will be applied, provided a legal basis for

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[40]Selzak devotes much space to this position in the article cited with commendable impartiality, concluding that the issue is for a court to decide.

[41]This and the previous point are strong features of the Saudi position. See Leo Gross, op. cit.; for the Egyptian interpretation, see Omar Ghobashy, "The Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, Status in International Law," Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March, 1957, p. 27 ff.

[42]The Arab Refugees, for example, and the Jordanian Water disputes.

advanced from time to time which have been formulated with an eye for some overwhelming reason than for any particular legal requirements.

The final or close predicate relating the duty of judge to the status of a disinterested body, a tribunal acceptable which would render on it a particular status in international law under which its traditional adequacy of its interest would have some control of the rest of its weight.[60] The recent politics, somewhat similar and more constituents, attempts to fill a singular legal status based on its disinterested use as a trial authority for pilferers to derive from all tribunal shares in the facts.[61] Both another variation of trial is entirely constituent, these positions support the claimer the trial judiciary.

While no position can ever be reached independent of a more penetrating political evaluation of the value differences which drive the law course,[62] one of the first steps in any legal framework will have to establish the procedures of the law that will be applied, provided a legal basis for

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[60] Latter provides such impact on this position in the article dried with commendable impartiality, concluding that the issue is for a court to decide.

[61] This and the previous point are strong features of the Israli position. See Leo Gross, op. cit.; for the Egyptian interpretation, see Omar Th-Shaly, "The Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, Status in International Law," Egyptian Foreign Affairs and Political Review, March, 1957, p. 27 ff.

[62] The Aqaba Arguments, for example, and the Jordanian Water disputes.

settlement is still relevant. In the meantime, if a judgment is appropriate in the context of the present study, the weight of evidence seems to point to the fact that the Gulf is an international waterway but a true legal controversy may well exist as to the extent of and foundation for the right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Israel and of the status of the four littoral states vis a vis each other.

Incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba, 1951-1956

During the years following the Rhodes Armistice, the Egyptian government intended to deny the use of the strait and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel but until Israel could afford an improvement over the primitive land communications between Eilat and the rest of the country, it was premature for her to contest the blockade in the straits with anything more than continued diplomatic pressure exerted through the Great Powers. There was really little at Eilat to fight for save hopes and expectations of a major seaport. As a focus for Arab-Israeli tension, the Gulf remained relatively quiet during the early fifties and between the designation of Eilat as a port in 1952 and the opening shots of the Sinai War, no Israeli shipping passed Tiran in either direction. The Israeli economy was in too precarious a position, living as it did on dreams and UJA bonds, to devote much resource to the vast needs of the barren area. But little by little, civilization came to Eilat.

establishment in still existence. In the meantime, it is questionable in appropriate in the context of the present study, the weight of evidence seems to point to the fact that the Gulf is an international waterway but a true legal controversy may well exist as to the extent of and jurisdiction for the rights of transport passage through the Gulf of Tiran and of the access of the four littoral states via a six mile water.

Incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba, 1956-1967

During the years following the Suez crisis, the Egyptian government intended to deny the use of the straits and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel and Israel taking action as imprisonment even the prohibition and communications between Eilat and the rest of the country, it was pressures for her to contest the blockade in the courts with supplies more than continued diplomatic pressure exerted through the Great Powers. There was really little at stake to fight for ports bases and expectations of a major seaport. As a force for Arab-Israeli conflict, the Gulf remained relatively quiet during the early fifties yet witness the assignment of Eilat as a port in 1952 and the opening there of the Eilat Net, an Israeli shipping passed Tiran in either direction. The Israeli system was in the circumstances a position, living as it did on dreams and its goals, to derive such pressure to the same needs of the Egyptian state. The Israeli, situation came to exist.

Despite the relative quiet of the period, a series of incidents occurred in the Gulf illustrating on the one hand the extreme Arab sensitivity with regard to the blockade and on the other hand the reluctance (indeed, the de jure refusal, to coin an expression) of other nations to accept the blockade or to recognize any legal validity of its measures.

The first incident occurred when the British freighter "SS Empire Roach" was fired upon by the temporary Tiran batteries. The "Roach" was loaded with arms consigned for Jordan and on the evening of July 1, 1951, in excellent visibility several hours before dark, she was stopped in the approaches to the Enterprise passage by an Egyptian corvette and detained for twenty-four hours. During the detention, an Egyptian armed guard was placed aboard the vessel and the crew was restricted to below-deck spaces until the following morning. During this period, the British charged that the Egyptians looted the ship's store, wrecked the radio and generally harrassed the British without giving any reason except that they had been ordered to do so by their government. An outraged debate ensued in Commons over the matter and a stiff note of protest went off to Cairo on July 11th, calling the act "a flagrant violation of international law."[43]

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[43]Bloomfield's treatment, op. cit., pp. 12-16, is basically correct and is verifiable in British and Foreign State Papers; Great Britain Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. 490, Col. 841 ff, July 16, 1951.

Despite the relative quiet of the period, a series of incidents occurred in the Gulf illustrating on the one hand the intense zeal of Egypt with regard to the blockade and on the other hand the reluctance (indeed, the *de jure* refusal, to gain an expression) of other nations to accept the blockade or to recognize any legal validity of its measures.

The first incident occurred when the British freighter "Empire Roach" was fired upon by the temporary Tiran battalion. The "Roach" was loaded with arms consigned for Jordan and on the evening of July 1, 1951, in excellent visibility several hours before dark, she was stopped in the approaches to the Enterprise passage by an Egyptian corvette and detained for twenty-four hours. During the detention, an Egyptian armed guard was placed aboard the vessel and the crew was restricted to below-deck spaces until the following morning. During this period, the British charged that the Egyptians looted the ship's stores, wrecked the radio and generally harassed the British without giving any reason except that they had been ordered to do so by their government. An acrimonious debate ensued in Commons over the matter and a stiff note of protest went off to Cairo on July 11th, calling the act "a flagrant violation of international law."[63]

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[63]Bloomfield's treatment, op. cit., pp. 22-23, is basically correct and is verifiable in British and Foreign State Papers; Great Britain Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. [illegible], col. [illegible], July [illegible], 1951.

The Egyptian reply of July 23, 1951, is written in terms so dogmatic and final that Lord Cromer must have whirled in his grave. In effect, the Egyptians cooly and civily pointed out that the ship had been west of a forbidden line established by their blockade regulations and that their personnel were responsibly taking the steps that they felt necessary under the circumstances. The "acts of spoilation" were contested and the general philosophy of the blockade reaffirmed.[44]

Agreement over the matter was never reached but a modus vivendi was arrived at whereby Egyptian customs officials were to satisfy themselves of the "innocence" of the cargo carried on British ships bound up the Gulf, while the ships were at Suez or Adabia. These officials were then to inform the Tiran station "so as to preclude the later to make [sic] a further visit or search of the vessel." In return, all British shipping was pledged to comply with "normal practice" when passing through Egyptian territorial waters.[45]

The exchange between the Egyptians and the British over the "Roach" was significant for two reasons. The ship was not bound for Eilat but for Aqaba. Britain's prestige

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[44]Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 13, in French.

[45]This somewhat ominous phrase was to cause trouble later on. The executive agreement was signed by Ralph S. Stevenson on July 29, 1951, and is quoted in Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 14.

The Egyptian reply of July 21, 1911, is written in terms so formal and final that Lord Cromer must have smiled in his grave. In effect, the Egyptians tersely pointed out that the only law was that of a Turkishness established by their Ottoman regulations and that their government was responsibly taking the steps that felt necessary under its circumstances. The "acts of spoliation" were condemned and the natural philosophy of the Ottomans explained.[44]

Lord Cromer was the master and never counted but a sudden riposte was arrived at whereby Egyptian customs officials were to actively shadow of the "innocence" of the cargo carried on British ships from the Gulf, while the ships were in fact or danger. These officials were then to inform the Turkish authorities so as to preclude the later to make "sin" a further visit or search of the vessel. In reason, all British shipping was slowly to comply with Ottoman provisions when passing through Egyptian territorial waters.[45]

The exchange between the Egyptians and the British over the "Gazon" was significant for two reasons. The ship was not bound for Sinai but for Aqaba. Britain's presence

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[44]Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 33, in Ibid.

[45]This somewhat sardonic gesture was to cause trouble later on. The Ottomans [illegible] was issued by Ibid. p. 3. Previously on July 27, 1911, not is quoted in Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 34.

in the Middle East was at a low ebb that summer following the Iranian crisis in May. The Wafd government in Cairo was becoming more and more intransigent in its attitude toward the Suez occupation by Great Britain and there seems to have been a political overtone in the "Roach" incident quite apart from either the blockade or the alleged administrative misbehavior of the British.[46]

The second element of significance was that the "Roach" was carrying arms for Jordan. In the summer of 1951, Abdullah at sixty-nine was perhaps the only rival for the hegemony in the Middle East that Egypt was conscientiously building through the Arab League. It is not impossible that the "Roach" incident was intended as a "feeler" to assess the popularity of the old Emir in the context of general Arab politics. He was assassinated less than three weeks after the incident.[47]

On January 23-24, 1953, a Danish freighter, the "Andreas Boye," en route from Mombassa to Eilat was detained for twenty-four hours but eventually allowed to pass.[48]

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[46]John Campbell's Defense of the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1960), carries a succinct recapitulation of the context in which the incident occurred. See especially pp. 40-43.

[47]See Lenczowski, op. cit., for the details of the assassination.

[48]Bloomfield, copying verbatim from Rosenne, op. cit., p. 25, without acknowledgment, mentions a similar incident with the same vessel on March 10, 1953, which Rosenne places in March, 1955. See op. cit., p. 11.

in the Middle East was to a large and long-range foiled the Israeli crisis in 70. The Yom Kippur in Galia was European wars and more intervention in the existing toward the Zone occupation by Israel Israel but there seems to have been a political structure in the "Zionist" isolated quite apart from either the disunion of the illegal Alain-interdiv mistrator of the Israeli.[46]

The second element of classification was the "Zionist" man carried from the Jewish. In the summer of 1971, Ashkelon in anti-Nine was perhaps the only trial for the judgment in the middle East that Europe was consistently building throughout the Irish Lawyer. It is not impossible that the "Jewish" Intifada was labelled as a "Walls" to assess the position of the old Zeir in the contexts of general Arab politics. It has presentations than there were weeks after the Intifada.[47]

On January 21st, 1971, a Danish Christian, the "Arabian Days," on route from Kinshasa to Kilar was detained for twenty-four hours but eventually allowed to pass.[48]

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[46]John Chesselin Quinney of the Middle East [New York: Praeger, 1971], analyzes a political transformation of the context in which the Intifada emerged. See especially pp. 40-43.

[47]Ben Lawrence, op. cit., for the schedule of the assassination.

[48]Alcomsyid, religious refugees from Kasaum, op. cit., p. 77, without attempt, analysis a similar incident with the same event on March 16, 1971, which happens place in Sarah, 1971. See op. cit., p. 11.

The following September, a 3,000 ton Greek freighter, the "Parnon," was apparently singled out as a test case. Carrying a load of asphalt for the Eilat-Beersheba highway and with a deck cargo of several vehicles, the ship was detained at Port Said for twelve days. The fact that she was Greek and carrying no military freight was given by the Egyptians as the reason for allowing her to pass and eighteen months later, this precedent was applied to the "Konitsa," a second Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement (this time from Haifa to Eilat) which was also allowed to pass.[49] The Italian government immediately protested the passing of the "Parnon" in September, 1953, because on a previous journey of the same ship Egyptian Customs personnel had ordered the confiscation of two Italian owned fishing vessels which had been consigned as deck cargo on the "Parnon" to Italy via Haifa overland. The Italian consul in Port Said had vigorously protested the action at the time and the matter was eventually discussed before the Security Council and a settlement reached.[50]

The first American ship to be directly involved in the conflict was the "SS Albion" bound, on December 3, 1953, for Jordanian Aqaba with a shipment of UNRWA wheat. When it

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[49] Cagle, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

[50] Security Council Official Records, 8th year, Supplement for July-September, 1953, p. 73, Document S/3993; New York Times, September 3 and 14, 1953.

The following September, a 7,000 ton Greek freighter, the "Parthenon," was apparently singled out as a test case. Carrying a load of asphalt for the [illegible] highway and with a deck cargo of several vehicles, the ship was detained at Port Said for twelve days. The fact that she was Greek and carrying no military freight was given by the Egyptians as the reason for allowing her to pass and eighteen months later, this precedent was applied to the "Rosita," a second Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement (this time from Haifa to Eilat) which was also allowed to pass.[49] The Italian government immediately protested the passing of the "Parthenon" in September, 1951, because on a previous journey of the same ship Egyptian customs personnel had ordered the confiscation of two Italian owned fishing vessels which had been consigned as deck cargo on the "Parthenon" to Italy via Haifa overland. The Italian consul in Port Said had vigorously protested the action at the time and the matter was eventually discussed before the Security Council and a settlement reached.[50]

The first American ship to be directly involved in the conflict was the "SS [illegible]," on December [illegible], 1951, for [illegible] with a shipment of [illegible]. When it

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[49] Ibid., pp. [illegible], no. 77-78.

[50] Security Council, Official Records, 6th year, Supplement for July-September, 1951, p. [illegible], Document S/[illegible]; New York Times, September [illegible] and [illegible], 1951.

entered the Enterprise channel, the Tiran batteries suddenly opened fire on it. Captain James Hassell, a resourceful Philadelphian, was forced to back down and while maneuvering to get clear of the narrow passage, he replaced his small steaming ensign with a large American flag and tried unsuccessfully to raise Ras Nasrani by blinker. Eight shells were fired on the "Albion" from astern as it proceeded outbound but none, fortunately, hit their mark. Hassell immediately hove to in the Red Sea and radioed for instructions from the American Consul in Cairo. This time the Egyptian apology was frankly lame in excusing the action on the grounds that the batteries had made an error in assuming that the destination was Eilat rather than Aqaba. It was a sobering warning to American shipping however.[51]

The British had cause to enter a protest in the Spring of 1955. Earlier, following the "Albion" incident and a similar incident involving the Italian "Maria Antonia" bound for Eilat with a badly needed shipment of Eritrean meat,[52] the shipping nations of the world began to take the blockade somewhat more seriously and shipping through the Gulf declined to zero for almost fifteen months. On April 10, 1955, the British tramp "Agrobec" was stopped in her track by shots across her bow. There is reason to believe

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[51]Cagle, op. cit., p. 78; New York Times, December 5, 1953.

[52]Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 11.

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[51]Gamle, op. cit., p. 7; New York Times, December 4, 1953.

[52]Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 11.

that the "Agrobec" incident would have been soon forgotten without formal action had not a far more serious incident occurred soon after. While the British were deciding what course to take over the "Agrobec," relations between Whitehall and Cairo reached a new low over the Baghdad Pact and its implications.[53]

On July 4, 1955, the 6,224 ton merchantman "Anshun" flying the British flag entered the straits and was struck broadside by a shot from the new heavy emplacement at Ras Nasrani. The shell struck amidships near the waterline and, while there were no casualties, there was considerable damage to the vessel. The irony of the situation was emphasized by the fact that the vessel had been previously cleared and was on its way to Aqaba to pick up a group of Moslem pilgrims on their way to Mecca.[54]

The "Agrobec" and "Anshun" incidents were debated in Parliament on July 13 and they served to bring the Gulf of Aqaba into the circle of increasing Middle East tensions during the summer of 1955.[55] A sharp diplomatic note from

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[53]While there are numerous accounts of the political climate in the Middle East in the standard texts referring to this period, a real appreciation can be grasped from Editorial Comment, Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March, April, May and June-July, 1955, and from the London Times, April 15 to May 3, 1955, passim.

[54]Cagle, loc. cit.

[55]British and Foreign State Papers, Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 543, Col. 1917, July 13, 1955; London Times, July 14, 1955.

that the Parliament Buildings would have been soon [illegible] without formal action had not a few more serious incidents occurred soon after. Only the British were activities which [illegible] to [illegible] over the [illegible], relations between Britain and Cuba reached a low ebb over the Maghdar Pact and the legislation.[53]

On July 4, 1895, the British [illegible] "Kinlow" flying the British flag [illegible] the [illegible] was [illegible] by a [illegible] from the [illegible] employment at Sea Reserve. The [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] and while [illegible] [illegible], there was [illegible] damage to the vessel. The [illegible] of the situation was emphasized by the fact that the vessel had been previously [illegible] and was on its way to Spain to pick up a group of Spanish pilgrims on their way to Mecca.[54]

The "Kinlow" and "Maghdar" incidents were followed in Parliament in July 1895 and they served to bring the [illegible] Spain into the [illegible] of increasing [illegible] [illegible] during the summer of 1895.[55] A sharp diplomatic note from

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[53] While there are numerous examples of the political climate in the Middle East, in the [illegible] period relating to this period, a real appreciation can be grasped from Parliamentary Debates, Foreign Affairs and Political Series, Hansard, April, May and [illegible], 1895, and from the London Times, April 15 to May 1, 1895, passim.

[54] [illegible], loc. cit.

[55] Quotes are taken from [illegible], Royal Prelude, Parliamentary Debates, [illegible], loc. cit., Dec. 1895, July 1, 1895; London Times, July 4, 1895.

Great Britain was answered by Egypt to the effect that the "Anshun" had failed to state her destination.[56] The British rejected the Egyptian note and the Foreign Office issued a statement of policy on the Gulf declaring that it was an international waterway open to all ships. Somewhat sternly, the statement pointed out that insofar as the straits lay inside territorial waters, Egyptian authorities had the right to inforce only such measures "as customs regulations and public health rules." The ambiguity of the term "customs regulations" was never pointed out, however, as the Egyptian position linked customs and blockade into the same category. The Egyptian answer to the British protests was a general regulation issued on August 29, 1955, to the effect that 72 hours advance notice was now required for any passage through the Gulf, and a statement by Colonel Nasser in his October 5 press conference that Egypt had "a legal right to control shipping in the Egyptian territorial waters of the Gulf of Aqaba."[57]

This was the same press conference at which the Soviet Arms Deal was announced.[58]

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[56]This contradicts both Bloomfield and Rosenne, who claim that the Egyptian answer merely stated that they had not meant to hit the vessel, but Cagle's account, loc. cit., as given here, agrees with press reports of the incident. See London Times, July 11, 1955, et seq.

[57]London Times, October 6, 1955.

[58]Ibid.

Great Britain was answered by Egypt to the effect that the tankers had failed to state her destination.[56] The British rejected the Egyptian note and the Foreign Office issued a statement of policy on the Gulf declaring that it was an international waterway open to all ships. Somewhat sternly, the statement pointed out that insofar as the straits lay inside territorial waters, Egyptian authorities had the right to enforce only such measures "as customs regulations and public health rules." The ambiguity of the term "customs regulations" was never pointed out, however, as the Egyptian position linked customs and blockade into the same category. The Egyptian answer to the British protests was a general regulation issued on August 23, 1955, to the effect that 72 hours advance notice was now required for any passage through the Gulf, and a statement by Colonel Nasser in his October 3 press conference that Egypt had "a legal right to control shipping in the Egyptian territorial waters of the Gulf of Aqaba."[57]

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[57] London Times, October 4, 1955.

[58] Ibid.

Meanwhile, Premier Ben Gurion made a major speech at Beersheba on July 10th which added to the tension and probably served to crystalize the Egyptian response to the British note. The port Eilat was being completed so that passage to the Indian Ocean could be assured, he declared, "if necessary with the help of the Israeli Navy, Air Force, and Army."[59] He spoke of his plans to build the Eilat-Beersheba railroad and in another major speech on September 25, he answered the new stiff Egyptian Blockade regulation by prophesizing that "in a year or less," the situation would be resolved although he reiterated a previous stand that he would renew his efforts to discuss the matter with Nasser once the port construction was completed.[60] Israel had just taken title to two surplus British destroyers, which renamed the "Eilat" and the "Yaffo," were being refitted in British yards. They were ready within the year, 1,710 tons each with four 4.5 inch deck mounts, six 40 mm. anti-aircraft weapons, eight torpedo tubes and a maximum speed of 37 knots.[61]

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[59] Cagle, op. cit., p. 79.

[60] Ibid.

[61] These vessels were the real start of the Israeli Navy. Prior to their purchase, the navy had consisted of three ex-Canadian river class frigates of 1,445 tons each, with four 4 inch guns, ten 20 mm machine guns, capable of a maximum speed of 20 knots. The "Eilat" and the "Yaffo", former Z type first line British destroyers, were ready for action in the Sinai war. Egypt acquired two similar ships

Meanwhile, Israeli Jet Division made a major breakthrough as Dassaults on July 1st were taken by the Israelis and probably served to crystallize the Egyptian reticence to the British notes. The part Israel was taking complicated so much possible to the United Nations could be assured, so Israeli, the necessary with the help of the Israeli Navy, Air Force, and Army.[77] He spoke of his plans to build the Nile Expedition reference and to another major crisis in September 56, he answered the one of Egyptian Blockade recognition by pronouncing that "in a war or loss," the situation would be resolved without he relinquished a preventive stand that the United Nations Force efforts to operate the water with Egypt over the port concession was completed.[78] Israel had just taken risks on two nuclear British destroyers, which evaded the military and the Nile's were being rendered to Egypt's forces. They were ready within the year, 1,770 tons each with four 4.1 inch dual purpose mounts, six 40 mm. anti-aircraft weapons, eight torpedo tubes and a maximum speed of 37 knots.[79]

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[77]Gazit, op. cit., p. 79.

[78]Ibid.

[79]These vessels were the real start of the Israeli Navy. Prior to their purchase, the Navy was consisted of three ex-Canadian river class frigates of 1,445 tons each, with four 4 inch guns, six 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, capable of a maximum speed of 20 knots. The "Eilat" and the "Haifa", former a type first line British escorts, were ready for action in the Israel navy. Both acquired two similar ships

While these tensions continued to mount, the Anglo-Egyptian tension suddenly began to relax. On November 30, 1955, Prime Minister Eden announced that an agreement of sorts had been reached with Nasser and the agreement itself is significant to an understanding of how the power structure in the Middle East was beginning to be altered. It also indicates a growing concern in London for the massive implications of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The English accepted the September, 1955, regulations in the strait on a de facto basis while never accepting the

> contention of the Egyptian government that they are entitled to exercise at the present time beligerent rights with regard to shipping going to the Gulf of Aqaba. They /Her Majesty's Government/ have, however, accepted these arrangements . . . on practical grounds pending a wider settlement.[62]

In the United States, the official posture was to irritate as few of the touchy principals as possible. Accordingly, following a normal international practice, the Hydrographic Office issued a warning to all American flag vessels to identify themselves prior to transiting the

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at the same time from Britain as well as two Skory class Soviet destroyers. See United States Navy, Recognition and Identification Guide, Ships (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955, with corrections to 1962), looseleaf, and Cagle, loc. cit.

[62]Quoted from Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. 546, Col. 2,297, November 30, 1955, and Vol. 549, Col. 364, February 22, 1956, in Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 26.

While these sentiments continued to rumble, the Argyle-Argentina crisis suddenly began to calm. On November 30, 1955, Prime Minister Ibáñez announced that an agreement of sorts had been reached with Argentina and the agreement itself implicitated in an understanding of how the power structure in the Atlantic area was positioned by the alliance. It also indicated a certain unwillingness on Ibáñez for the negative implications of the Swift-Argyle relationship. The English newspaper The Daily Telegraph, 1955, reminiscence on the effort on a no longer Ibáñez with even accepting the

> assertion of the Argentine government that they are entitled to exercise it own present size jurisdiction rights with regard to shipping going to the Gulf of Ligia. They [the Argentine government] have, however, entered into arrangements . . . as practical proof of a wider evidence.[1]

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[1] Quoted from Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. 545, Col. [illegible], November 8, 1955, and Vol. 547, Col. 1051, February [illegible], 1956, in Bowman, Gulf of Ibáñez, p. 56.

straits[63] and four weeks later the complete text of the Egyptian revision to the regulations concerning the blockade was promulgated verbatim without comment.[64]

The Blockade Before the United Nations

Under the terms of the Armistice of Rhodes between Egypt and Israel, a Mixed Armistice Commission was established to execute its provisions and decide on procedural and substantive matters concerning the terms of the agreement.[65] On question of principle, there was a provision for appeal from a decision of the Commission to a special committee composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one Israeli and one Egyptian member.[66]

In the late summer of 1950, an appeal was made to this special committee against a decision by the Mixed Armistice Commission which had ruled that the matter of the Suez Canal Blockade was a matter outside the scope of its competence, but while this appeal was still pending, Israel brought the matter before the Security Council on September 16.[67]

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[63] Notice to Mariners, No. 40, October 1, 1955, in U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, NOTAM SUMMARY OCT 1955, 1955 (mimeographed, looseleaf).

[64] Notice to Mariners, No. 44, October 25, 1955, ibid.

[65] Article 10.

[66] Article 10, para. 4.

[67] Security Council Official Records, 5th year, Supplement for September-December, 1950, p. 55, Document S/1794.

states.[63] And then again later the unofficial text of the Egyptian revision to the revolutionary constitution the Tripoli was promulgated contained similar comments.[64]

The Tripoli Charter for Joint Action

Under the terms of the Agreement of Union between Egypt and Israel, a Joint Arbitration Commission was established to consider the provisions and limits of preliminary and substantive matters concerning the terms of the Agreement.[65] On question of principle, there was a provision for appeal from a decision of the Commission to a special conciliation commission or the United Nations Chief of Staff or the Truce Supervision Organization and the Israeli and the Egyptian members.[66]

In the late summer of 1970, an appeal was made to this special commission against a decision by the Mixed Arbitration Commission which had ruled that the decision of the Mixed Commission was a matter concerning the scope of the convention, the matter fell outside the appeal and was still pending. Israel brought the matter before the Security Council on September 16.[67]

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[63]Article 4, Agreement on Principles, Sec. 1a, October 1, 1973, in U.S. Joint Publications Office, Arab Republic of Egypt, 1973 (Microfiche), Jerusalem).

[64]Article 4, Agreement on Principles, Sec. 4a, October 21, 1973, 1973.

[65]Article 12.

[66]Article 12, para. 4.

[67]Security Council Official Records, 25th year, Supplements for September, October, and November 1970.

The Council refused to consider the matter until the committee had reported a decision[68] and by June 12, 1951, by the deciding vote cast by Lieutenant General Riley, the United Nations Chief of Staff, the committee agreed with the Mixed Armistice Commission that it did not have the right to demand a suspension of the Suez blockade from Egypt.[69] This ruling in effect opened the way for a full dress Security Council consideration of the entire matter of the Suez Blockade and on September 1, 1951, a lengthy Resolution was passed calling upon Egypt "to terminate the restriction on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal . . . and cease all interference with such shipping."[70]

Egypt ignored the resolution.

After the incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba described above indicated that Egypt had every intention of applying the same measures to the Gulf, Israel once again complained against Egypt following the "Albion" and "Maria Antonia" incidents, at a time when she felt she could muster the support needed to vote a resolution through which would

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[68]Ibid., p. 124, Document S/1907.

[69]Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Supplement for April-June, 1951, p. 162, Document S/2194.

[70]Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Meeting 558, p. 2, Document S/2322. The sentence quoted is the last sentence of the resolution. The sponsors were the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and the supporters were Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Netherlands.

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[68] Ibid., p. 241, Document S/1907.

[69] Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Supplement for April-June, 1951, p. 129, Document S/2194.

[70] Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Meeting 558, p. 2, Document S/2322. The previous quotation is the last sentence of the resolution. The sponsors were the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and the supporters were Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Netherlands.

specifically apply to the Gulf.[71] This time, she requested action against Egypt by the 1954 Council for non-compliance with the 1951 Resolution adding the additional charge for "interference . . . with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba," and persuaded Sir Leslie Munro, the New Zealand Representative to sponsor it.[72] She also submitted an explanatory memorandum in which the development of the blockade since 1951 was traced.[73] The Resolution was introduced on March 24, 1954, at the 644th meeting of the Security Council calling on Egypt to comply with the prior resolution and which also contained the provision that the Aqaba question would be directed to the Mixed Armistice Commission "in the first instance . . . without prejudice."[74] Lebanon and the Soviet Union voted against the measure and the door was closed, by the Russian veto, for any further Security Council action on the Blockade question.

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[71]*Supra*, pp. 65-66.

[72]Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[73]*Security Council Official Records*, 9th year, Supplement for January-March, 1954, pp. 1-2, Document S/3168.

[74]This was a procedural move designed to preclude the MAC from deciding that it did not have competence, repeating the 1951 experience. Abba Eban, the Israel representative, took the veto with bitterness. *Security Council Official Reports*, 9th year, 664th meeting, March 29, 1954, p. 22.

specifically apply to the Jews.[75] Thus also, the resolution asking against action by the U.N. Council for non-compliance with the 1951 Resolution adding the additional clause for discriminations . . . with assigning processing to the Israeli part of Zion on the Gulf of Aqaba,[76] and preventing the Israeli people, the two nations representative to convene it,[77] the also authorized an explanatory memorandum in which the appointment of the Palestine since 1951 was stated.[78] The Resolution was introduced on March 24, 1954, at the open meeting of the Security Council initial, we hope to comply with the prior resolution but which also contained the provision that the Arab question would be directed to the Israel ministry commissioner via the first instance . . . non-act provision.[79] Lebanon and the Syrian voted against the measure and the motion was closed, by the Russian veto, for any further Security Council action on the Jordanian question.

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[75] Ibid., pp. 65 66.

[76] Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 47.

[77] Security Council Official Records, 5th year, supplement for January, 1954, pp. 1-7, document S/3161.

[78] This was a procedural move intended to preclude the UN from assuming that it has been compromise, the meeting the 1951 agreement. Also then, the Israel representative, Moshe Sharett, was not with Lebanon. Security Council Official Records, 5th year, 658th meeting, March 24, 1954, p. 12.

Deterioration of Stability--1955-1956

The complicated politics of the 1955-1956 period form the background setting for the next phase of the Aqaba story, and a brief resume of some of the more important events of that period, as they bear on the main topic of study, is now in order. It will be remembered that in February, 1955, after long and occasionally bitter exchanges between the supporting Hashemite-oriented camp and the opposing Egyptian oriented camp, the Baghdad Pact was signed drawing Iraq into the western alliance system to the consummate disgust of President Nasser. At the same time, Israel began a particularly vicious and savage series of raids across the armistice lines into Gaza and the combination of these two events placed the issue of modern arms well into the forefront of Egyptian policy considerations. The subsequent "commando" raids Egypt launched in retaliation were devices to arouse Egyptian public opinion and to disguise Egyptian weakness[75] and by November, 1955, Nasser was inventing counter-attacks for this purpose. The fedayeen program was just getting under way on the scale originally planned.[76]

In April, 1955, meanwhile, Nasser had attended the

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[75]Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 75.

[76]Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959), p. 126.

Deterioration of Stability—1955-1956

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Bandung Conference of Asian Powers where he met Chou en-Lai and in the Spring and Summer of 1955, a new line emerged in the troubled Middle East which was typified by the now famous Czechoslovakian Arms Agreement. The prospects of a Moscow-Cairo axis troubled the western powers considerably[77] to say nothing of the obvious Israeli concern. It was fairly clear that the arms Nasser was obtaining from the Eastern Bloc were designed for ground warfare against Israel and the western concern, quite naturally, was that the supply of petroleum from the Middle East would be cut as soon as any major outbreak of hostilities occurred or even, possibly, as a prelude to such an outbreak.

The Security Council gave renewed consideration to the events in the Middle East during the early part of 1956, particularly to the Israeli attacks against the Gaza Strip. Over the vigorous protests of the Israelis, an encompassing resolution was passed on June 4, 1956,[78] which took note of the inflammatory actions on both sides but made little reference to the blockade. Secretary General Hammerskjold had been surveying the general situation since April 4 under a previous Security Council Resolution but in a statement on April 16, 1956, he announced that his interpretation of the

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[77]John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 119-120.

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[78]See *New York Times*, June 5, 1956, for complete text and comment.

Security Council mandate gave him no authority to deal with the blockade question itself.[79] He was able to arrange a "cease fire" by conciliation on April 18.[80]

In order to dramatize the blockade at a time when Israel was coming in for censure for her own actions, the "Panagia" incident was manufactured[81] out of Egyptian refusal to allow this Greek ship to transit the Canal on May 25, 1956. It was a Greek vessel loaded with cement bound from Haifa to Eilat, at what was probably the most inauspicious moment in history for a trouble-free voyage, and was detained at Port Said from May 25 to September 8, 1956, while its presence was milked for propaganda by both sides.[82]

On June 18 the last contingent of British soldiers left the Canal Zone in accordance with the 1954 Treaty;[83] Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was entertained in Cairo at a three day celebration[84] and the orientation of

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[79]Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 29. See also New York Times, April 18, 1956.

[80]New York Times, April 19 and 20, 1956.

[81]This judgment is original in view of the context in which the incident occurred. Obviously, the Israel government needed sympathy in the United Nations and on balance, she probably deserved it even though her own record was not completely clean.

[82]Rosenne, loc. cit.

[83]Fisher, op. cit., pp. 621-622, provides an excellent background on the Treaty.

[84]New York Times, June 21, 23, 25, 26, 1956.

Security Council members have now an authority to deal with the Arabian question fully.[77] He was able to arrange a peace treaty by conciliation on April 14.[78]

In order to demonstrate the violence at a time when Israel was coming in for criticism for her own actions, the Egyptian Justice was arbitrarily[79] and at Egyptian refused to allow this Israel ship to transit the Suez Canal on May 20, 1956. It was a Greek vessel loaded with cargo bound from Haifa to Eilat, at also was probably the most innocuous account in history for a commercial voyage, and was detained at Port Said from May 21 to September 6, 1956, while the pressure was mounted for proceedings by both sides.[80]

On June 11 was last conference of British officers left the Canal zone in accordance with the 1954 Treaty;[81] Egypt, the Soviet Bloc Nasser, was celebrated in Cairo at a three day celebration[82] and the withdrawal of

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[77]Bowman, Hell or Peace, p. 70. See also New York Times, April 12, 1956.

[78]New York Times, April 17 and 20, 1956.

[79]This question is original in view of the conduct in which the Israeli ship is concerned. Obviously, the Israeli government acquiesced in the Egyptian decision and in isolation, she probably considered it with regard for the secret was her cooperately close.

[80]Bowman, loc. cit.

[81]Fisher, op. cit., pp. 228-229, providing an excellent background on the issues.

[82]New York Times, June 21, 22, 23, 26, 1956.

the "new" Egyptian foreign policy was now causing serious concern in the foreign ministries of the western world.

Pending throughout the summer was the American offer to finance part of the development cost of the Aswan High Dam project. In mid-July, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, returned to Washington from Cairo with instructions to notify Secretary Dulles of Nasser's decision to accept the aid offer, but on July 19, 1956, in possibly one of the most fateful decisions in recent history, Dulles withdrew the offer.[85]

The retraction was a heavy blow to Egyptian hopes, since the American loan had been the prerequisite for World Bank and British participation in the project, offers which were also immediately withdrawn.[86]

The withdrawal of the Aswan offer was the spark which ignited the tinder box.

The blaze began, slowly at first, which would soon engulf the Middle East in one of the most bizarre events of modern times, bringing the last of the old political world into sharp contact with the new.

The _status quo_ was about to be radically altered.

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[85]See John R. Beal, _John Foster Dulles, 1888-1959_ (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), pp. 247-259, for the background. For Secretary Dulles' comment on the Beal analysis, see his press conference of April 2, 1957, in the _New York Times_, April 3, 1957.

[86]_New York Times_, July 22, 1956.

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concern in the foreign ministries of the Western world.

Pending alternatives, the answer was the American order
to finance part of the development cost of the Aswan High-
Dam project. In actuality, Aswan Hussein, the Egyptian
Ambassador to the United States, returned to Washington from
Cairo with instructions to really determine Dulles or Eisenhower's
decision to accept the aid offer, but on July 20, 1956, in
probably one of the most forceful gestures in recent history,
Dulles withdrew the offer.[45]

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[45]See John R. Hall, Joint Foreign Policy, 1953-1959 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 247-257, for the background. For Secretary Dulles' comment on the final analysis, see his press conference of April 2, 1957, in the New York Times, April 3, 1957.

[46]New York Times, July 22, 1956.

CHAPTER IV

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH

The Suez Crisis was one of the most significant events of the last decade. It has been effectively chronicled, analyzed, regretted, defended and interpreted so many times in the last few years that for the purposes of this study, only the more obscure implications of the events in the southern Sinai peninsula need be explored in any great detail.[1]

The Suez Crisis began, if a beginning must be established, with the nationalization of the Suez Canal on the evening of July 26, 1956.[2] The decision to nationalize had not been a hasty one[3] but within the framework of the political context in which it was made, it was taken by Great Britain and France as something not far short of a declaration of war. There were four separable issues which disturbed the West but paramount was the fear engendered by Nasser's

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[1]A good approach to a thorough understanding of the series of events known popularly as the "Suez Crisis" might be the simultaneous examination of the accounts of the last half of 1956 in Beal, op. cit., pp. 246-308, for the American orientation; in Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), pp. 467-654, for the British orientation; in Merry and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez, trans. by James Cameron (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, Ltd., 1957), for what is purported to be the French orientation. All are more or less mutually contradictory on many points.

[2]Michael Adams, Suez and After (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 1-8.

[3]Partner, op. cit., p. 78.

new ability to close the Canal at some unforseen time and thus jeopardize the security and economy of whatever nation he chose, ominously underscored by his increasing closeness with the Soviet Bloc. Secondly, there was the matter of doubt as to the ability of the Egyptians to handle the mechanical and administrative details of the operation. There was, thirdly, a great prestige factor to be considered. The events of July began to look more and more each day like a great Egyptian political victory gained with the assistance of neutralist India and the Soviet Bloc. Finally, there were a maze of economic considerations not the least of which was the fact that the Canal itself would add little to the building costs of the Aswan Dam unless major changes were introduced in the economic regime of the Canal and a concern over capital improvement of the Canal itself was deep on all quarters.[4] By the end of October, 1956, with the United States in the throes of a presidential election and under the impression that the crisis caused by the nationalization was cooling off, the Israeli army had fully mobilized and the French and British combined task force was in a position to act.[5]

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[4] See, for example, Fisher, op. cit., p. 633.

[5] The newspaper accounts of the last days before the Sinai war are impressive for their lack of indication that anything was afoot. Less and less space was being devoted to the Middle East during the last week of October as the election and Hungary took precedence.

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The Israeli Defense Ministry, during the summer of 1956, was faced with a growing concern over the deterioration of the delicate balance of power in the Middle East following the arms deals. During the summer the Arabs had engineered a united military front aimed at the destruction of Israel.[6] The lid placed on the Middle East arms race by the 1950 Tri-Partite Declaration[7] had lost all relevance after the arms purchases of September, 1955, and the military alliance of the following summer constituted a major change in the land order of battle against Israel. In troubled Jordan, telling Israeli border attacks against the fedayeen based there were taking their toll of Arab prestige and although Great Britain affirmed its intention of fulfilling her commitments to Jordan if that matter became more serious, the anomalies of the situation were extreme.[8] (The question during the summer was whether the British, already at swords points with Egypt over Suez, would fight Israel on behalf of Jordan if requested.)

In a clear cut political victory in Jordan in October, the pro-Nasser nationalist Sulayman Nabulsi took office and

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[6]Syria and Saudi Arabia concluded a military pact with Egypt putting their armies under joint command. See Campbell, op. cit., pp. 91-95.

[7]By Great Britain, France and the United States to monitor the arms purchases of both sides to insure stability. See Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 352. This arrangement was claimed as the "legal" justification of the Anglo-French operation in November.

[8]See Eden, op. cit., p. 571ff. for the gravity with which the British Prime Minister viewed this possibility.

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immediately offered the Jordanian Army to the Arab alliance.

Having lost all faith in the truce keeping machinery of the United Nations and dubious of the actual value of the original armistice agreements in light of their repeated violation (and counter-violation), plans for preventive war had been made in Israel during the summer and finalized shortly after the Nabulsi victory.[9] The objectives of the Israeli operation were to be three-fold.

One objective was to be the destruction of the fedayeen bases in the Gaza Strip. A second was the occupation of as much of the Sinai peninsula as possible, to hold as a bargaining counter in subsequent dealings with Egypt. The planners realized full well that the Israeli Army lacked the wherewithall to hold Sinai permanently but they were apparently interested in forcing the hand of the United Nations and were willing to settle for demilitarization of Sinai as a victory if the campaign were successful. World interest in the Israeli cause had eroded during the progress of the Cold War and a refocussing of this interest on the complicated new developments was felt to be in order.

Finally, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a burning issue in Israel. In addition to holding Gaza, Rafa and Abu Ageila, the original plan aimed at holding the narrow strip of territory which extended from Eilat down the western shore

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of the Gulf to andincluding Ras Nasrani, Sharm el-Sheikh and the island of Tiran until the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba could be permanently removed. It is now an open secret that the original objectives were considered overly ambitious by the military and by the civilian political leaders who were privvy to the plan.[10]

The Israeli Army jumped off on Monday, October 29, exercising her "inherent right of self-defence" under the United Nations Charter.[11] The Soviet Union was absorbed with huge troubles in Warsaw and in Budapest. The United States was entering the final throes of an election.[12] The French and British support units were in place according to plan and after the Eden-Mollet ultimatum twenty-four hours later, the operation looked as if it were succeeding brilliantly. All political and military thrusts seemed to dovetail nicely and smoothly.[13]

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[10]Edgar O'Ballance, The Sinai Campaign of 1956 (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 79.

[11]Statement made by Abba Eban, Israeli Representative to the United Nations, on November 1, 1956. See the New York Times, Nov. 2, 1956.

[12]The New York Times had a field day. Often, during the week instead of all the news that was fit to print, it printed all the news that fitted.

[13]On the subject of French-British-Israeli collusion, there has been much written. Eden (op. cit., p. 572) states that the possibilities of the Israeli action had been discussed in mid-October but no actual formal collusion had occurred.

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The first or northern prong of the Israeli attack entered Gaza and secured the strip by the end of the week.[14] A second central prong moved westward through Sinai toward the Canal and after the British and French paratroop attacks had secured much of the Canal zone the general collapse of the Egyptian Army was immanent.[15]

But the most significant and abiding advantage of the entire campaign was being accomplished in southern Sinai by the sweep of the "Eastern Task Force" whose mission it was to open the Gulf of Aqaba. The problem was largely one of

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Beal, on the other hand, treats the collusion as a proven fact (op. cit., pp. 277-279) and the collusion angle is the entire thesis of the Bromberger book, cited above. While fascinating in itself, the point has only tengential relevance to the Aqaba issue. But it would seem to be well established that the British, French and Israeli actions were taken as if there had been prior arrangement between them.

[14]This, admittedly, is an oversimplification. Each author "numbers" the prongs differently, and there were actually four separate operations rather than three. The numbering here is for simplicity sake and orders the attacks geographically.

[15]Interestingly enough, these two campaigns were the only ones to receive press coverage until November 6th, for reasons that will become clear below, and the coverage in both the London and New York Times is quite unsatisfactory. The communiques issued by the Israeli and Egyptian Army commands during the battles are worthless.

The first is Nasser's proof of the Israeli attack against Egypt was secured only by the act of the West.[14] A second security pact was arranged through Sinai towards the Canal and after the British and French imperialist attacks had assured such of an Israel with the general collapse of the Egyptian army in the desert.[15]

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[14]This, undoubtedly, is an overestimation. Both military resources are, some sufficiently, and there were already from Israeli's resources rather than theirs. The underlying issue is for strategic aids and orders the attacks operationally.

[15]Interestingly enough, there was negotiation were the only ones in recent years covering until November 1956, for reasons that will change their tune, and the overtures in both the Israeli and British times is quite considerably. The commitment issued by the Israeli and to obtain Army commands during the operation are noteworthy.

geography rather than strategy. There were no roads to speak of leading from Eilat to the Straits, only a "track" through crags and mountains which paralleled the western shore,[16] and the entire operation had to be conducted in secrecy while the northern and central attacks were receiving great quantities of publicity.[17]

The Military Campaign to Open the Gulf of Aqaba

Shortly before dawn on Thursday, November 1, 1956, the Ninth Infantry Brigade[18] departed from Kuntilla and arrived at Ras el-Naqb, the roadhead on the Egyptian-Israeli border five miles north-west of Eilat, that same afternoon.[19] The Ninth Brigade had been mobilized on October 26 and was a reserve group composed of artisans, farmers and a sprinkling

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[16] O'Ballance, loc. cit.

[17] Most of its inaccurate.

[18] In the Israeli Army, a "Brigade" is equal to an American regiment.

[19] What follows here is an account which has been synthesized from five principal sources: the communiques of the Israeli Defense Ministry as published in the New York Times, November 1,through 9, 1956; S.L.A. Marshall, Sinai Victory (New York: William Morrow, 1958); O'Ballance, The Sinai Campaign of 1956, cit. supra; Henriques, op. cit.; and the personnal recollections of the Assistant Military Attache of the Government of Israel, who unwilling to be quoted by name, had access to information bearing directly on the problem of research and who provided substantiation for many of the judgements made here. See also, Eden, op. cit., pp. 600-626, Brombergers, op. cit., passim and Calvocoressi and Wint, Middle East Crisis (Baltimore, Penguin, 1957), passim.

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of white-collar workers from the northern part of the country. The commanding officer, Colonel Avraham Yoffe, was one of the best troop commanders of the Israeli Army. On the day of mobilization, arrangements had been made to haul five LCMs from Haifa to Eilat for use in the operation and after being hauled to Beersheba on flat-cars, these landing craft were placed on phosphate trucks, carted to Eilat, and floated on the afternoon of Monday, October 29, the day the campaign in the north had started. The LCMs were an important element of a plan which envisioned a march down the western side of the Gulf, periodic off-shore replenishment from the "Mike" boats, conquest of the Egyptian installations at the Straits (if possible after a union with the Central Airborne force proceeding southward from Mitla pass) and an amphibious assult on Tiran and Sanifir.

Arriving at Ras el-Baqb[20] the force regrouped and rested for the march southward and at 5:00 A.M. Friday, November 2, it commenced the first phase of its advance, a hard hilly run of almost one hundred road miles. The group reached the top of the watershed at 2:00 A.M. the following morning and the oasis of Ein el-Furtuga two hours later. It was now Saturday, November 3.

There is a track from this oasis down to the shore of the Gulf and arrangements had been made for the first

[20]Not to be confused with Ras el-Nabq (sometimes Nabk, Naqb) in Jordan mentioned <u>supra</u>, Chapter II, p. 29.

of white-collar workers from the northern part of the country. The nationalist politicians, Colonel Abdullah Tekri, one one of the best known secretaries of the Iraqi Lawyers Corps. On the day of mobilization, arrangements had been made to hold five LCOs from Syria to Kilos for use in the operation and after being helped to Sunduqiya in Tiberias, these landing craft were placed on checkpoint duties, carried to Kilos, and flashed on the attention in action. Between 7:, the day the campaign in the north had started. The LCOs were an impressive element of a plan which envisaged a march down the western side of the Gulf, principally self-drive replacements from the "Wolf" horse, component of the Syrian Invasion of the Straits (if possible either a motor with the Central Alawite Force proceeding southwards from Kilis pass) and or amphibious assault on Tiran and Sharm.

Activity on the airdrop[70] was force suspended and waited for the worse weather and at 1100 A.M. Friday, November 6, it commenced the first phase of its purpose, a hard fully rec of armed and battered men relief. The group reached the top of the mountain at 1100 A.M. the following morning and the claim of the airdrop was two hours later. It was not successful, however).

There is a track from Bir, which leads down to the shore of the Gulf and arrangements had been made for the first

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[70]See on the overhead air the Al-Sharq Laboratory Yahya Bey) in Arabic mentioned Qaqiya Chapter II, p. 70.

replenishments from the LCMs to be made at the point where this track reached the water at a deserted fishing village, Nuweiba. The 220 vehicles were in good shape. Travelling in four groups, none had broken down during the night although considerable hauling and pulling had to be done and in some cases, engineers had been required to carve passages through the crags to manage it.

After replenishing gasoline and water from the boats, the column pushed south toward the next rendezvous planned at Dahab the following afternoon. The going got considerably tougher south of Ein el-Furtuga where the trail ran uphill between large boulders which allowed, in some tight spots, only a few inches clearance between the rocky walls and the vehicles themselves. Each single wheeled vehicle had to be manually pushed and pulled up to the top of the watershed which was reached, after a night of effort, with only eight vehicular breakdowns. From the top of this watershed, the trail led down toward Dahab and at this point Yoffe had to cope with an unexpected logistics problem due to the shortage in his gasoline supply after the exhorbitant usage of his vehicles over the rough night travel. He elected to remain at the high point himself, radioing back to Eilat to the LCMs for additional gasoline at the Dehab transfer, and he spent the morning shepherding the rest of the column up over the saddle back.

replacements from the ZOTA so it is dark as the grave where this train reached the water or a deserted fishing village, nowhere. The car rattles back to good cover. Travelling at slow speed, the pad driver keep moving the light at enough constantly hunting and pulling out to be done and to any cases, engineers had been required to carve passages through the rocks to manage it.

After replenishing petrol and water from the tanks, the Indian trained much longer the last rendezvous planned at Kabul the principal airstrip. The going had moderately improve even on the bi-fuelling where the train built between large boulders which already, to make right speed, only a few inches clearance remain the rocky walls and the wheelies timeworn. Such single wheeled vehicle had to be manually pushed and pulled up on the top of the mountained which was reached, after a night of effort, with only eight remaining kilometers. From the top of this mountain, the small lun some towns there and at this point Tony had to come with an unexpected logistic problem due to the shortage in his petrol supply after the substantial usage at his wheelies over the rough right travel. He planned to remain at the high point instead, realizing that he failed to the line for additional petrol at the Kabul transfer, and he spent the morning complaining the fact of his failure to arrive the middle east.

Meanwhile, the first element of the convoy had come down from the highlands and engaged the first Egyptians which they had seen during the "war." As it pushed down into Dahab at around 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, 3 November, this first element was ambushed by an Egyptian Frontier Force and three Israelis were killed and six wounded before the squad of Egyptians withdrew southward on camels toward Nakeb.[21]

While the skirmish did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the Brigade, it was the first taste of blood and it took the edge of pleasure off the arrival of the LCMs shortly after four. The LCMs were able at this point to off-load two French AMX tanks which now took their place in the column for the drive to Nakeb[22] 32 miles south and the force moved out at 7:00 P.M. that evening after a brief rest. South of Dahab, some of the roughest terrain yet encountered took the group through the Ashira Divide

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[21] This encounter is difficult to establish definitely as to time and place. Henriques fails to mention it at all. General Marshall describes an encounter at Dahab at about the same time of the same day but his details sound suspiciously like the skirmish O'Ballance places at Nakeb the following afternoon. (See <u>infra</u>.) To add to the confusion, Henriques describes an ambush as described here in place of the Nakeb incident.

[22] Sometimes <u>Naqb</u>, <u>Maqb</u>, <u>Naqeb</u>.

Meanwhile, the first element of the convoy had come down from the highlands and escaped the fleet Egyptians which they had seen during the day.[7] As it pushed down into Dabob at around 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, 2 November, this first element was embarked by an Egyptian Provisional Force and other Israelis were killed and our wounded before the issue of Egyptian reinforcements surfaced on Gamila Board Mabob.[21]

While the skirmish did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the brigade, it was the first taste of blood and it took the edge of pleasure off the arrival of the LCMs shortly after four. The LCMs were late at this point to off-load the Fenoc and Lanka which now took their place in the column for the drive to Mabob.[22] It rains hard and the force moved out at 7:00 P.M. that evening after a brief rest. Cloud of Dabob, some of the regulars carried yet unnoticed cool the cover through the Ladies Divide

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[21] This encounter is difficult to establish definitely as to time and place. Eurydome Falla in searing is at pit. General Marshall describes an encounter at Dabob at about the same time of the same day but his details seem suspiciously like the skirmish of Mabob plains at Mabob the following afternoon. Yes indeed! To add to the confusion, Herrigoes describes an encounter as described here in place of the Mabob incident.

[22] Sometimes Mabob, Mabb, Mapel.

which although blocked for at least a mile by boulders, was cleared in the dark by the sapper company working with the infantry troops.

By noon Sunday, November 4, the line approached Nakeb through a small pass cut in the bleak terrain by the Wadi Kaid. Here it was ambushed by another camel patrol, which had managed to blow some boulders across the track down the wadi bed. The patrol harrassed the column briefly but no damage was done and no casualties incurred.[23]

Nakeb had been a listening and watching post forming part of the Blockade complex and had been apparently evacuated Saturday afternoon. The camel patrol had been left to delay the line of march which, undelayed, now faced a relatively easy run down five miles of flat beach to Ras Nasrani, the linch-pin in the Egyptian installation.

After contacting the LCMs again, the first element hit this road for the run south. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force began working on Ras Nasrani with napalm and as they headed south, the infantry and armor spotted the B-17 and the P-51s which were softening up what was expected to

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[23]This incident is placed by General Marshall at 2:30 A.M. Sunday morning followed by an incident in a radio conversation between Yoffe and General Moishe Dayan which Henriques places more nearly in the time context mentioned here. Henriques mentions this incident as the first of the actual enemy contacts but consistent with the rate of march and other internal evidence, the account here seems unquestionably correct and follows the account given by O'Ballance. Additionally, the earlier encounter in which casualties did occur as described here is placed by the majority at Dahab.

which although checked for at least a mile by boulders, was cleared in the dark by the engineer company working with the infantry troops.

By noon Sunday, November 4, the line approached Dahab through a small pass cut in the [illegible] by the Wadi Kid. Here it was ambushed by another camel patrol, which had managed to place some boulders across the track down the wadi bed. The patrol harassed the column briefly but no damage was done and no casualties incurred.90

Dahab had been a listening and watching post forming part of the Ras Nasrani complex and had been apparently evacuated Saturday afternoon. The camel patrol had been left to delay the line of march which, undelayed, now faced a relatively easy run down five miles of flat beach to Ras Nasrani, the northernmost of the Egyptian installations.

After conducting the line again, the first element hit this road for the run south. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force began working on Ras Nasrani with rockets and as they headed south, the infantry and armor spotted the B-17 and the P-51s which were softening up what was expected to

90 This incident is placed by General Marshall at 7:00 A.M. Sunday morning followed by an incident in a quite separate action between [illegible] and General [illegible] Dayan [illegible] planes were nearly in the same context mentioned here. Henriques mentions this incident as the first of the second enemy contacts but consistent with the rate of march and other internal evidence, the account here seems reasonably correct and follows the account given by O'Ballance. Additionally, the earlier encounter in which casualties did occur as described here is placed by the majority at dawn.

be the main redoubt in the south, the fortress of Ras Nasrani.

The Egyptian Defense of the Strait

Ras Nasrani is a small headland which, following the Egyptian decision to blockade the Gulf, had been well fortified. The defenses were strong and constructed in accordance with the usual Egyptian desert fortification plan. In addition, concrete breastworks had been laid up and the complex entangled in effective barbed wire defenses. It mounted two 6 inch and four 3 inch coastal guns set in concrete pointing seaward covering the Enterprise passage between the mainland and Tiran, sitting at the other side of the channel two miles to the east. The passage itself, eight hundred yards wide, made an excellent target for the guns and coral reefs and shoals accounted for the remainder of waterspace between the two land masses. Tiran itself was not fortified, nor was Sanifir, although temporary installations on Tiran had been used from time to time during the Blockade.[24]

Base defense of the installation was provided for by machine gun emplacements laid out in a semi-circular hedge-hog of concrete bunkers and inter-connecting trenches,

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[24] *Supra*, p. 32.

by the seam remained in one month, the fortress at Ban Ganeral.

The Surprise Failure of the Attack

The Nanyang Lia's small bandwood which, following the surprise decision to bombard Sia Kuit, had been with reluctance, the ultimate task having not contributed to accordance with the usual Jungfrau events fortification plan. In addition, Sabrina's Imperial-Ma had been held up in the people's emerging in alternative defend also defences. In consulted and a high and lower 1 high coastal guns and in concerns policing assumed towards the Siberian passage between the mainland and Tiran, visiting at the other side of the channel in relation to the town. The planned heavy night bombard plans also, made on occasions longer for the guns and coral reefs are shoals lookouted for the remainder of waterways between the two land masses. Tiran itself was not fortified, nor was Sabrin, although temporary installations on Tiran had been made from time to time during the blockade.[1]

Less defense of the installation was provided for by making the Nanyang-Sabrina Line in a boat-circular battle-dog of stations lumbers and inter-connecting trenches,

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[1] Gaetano A. 32.

all with overhead cover and set in a well-designed minefield.[25]

The base commander was a senior Egyptian Regular Army Colonel who came directly under the command of the General Headquarters in Cairo. On Friday evening, November 2, word had been received that a "reconnaissance detachment consisting of several tracked vehicles" was moving south and would be at the installation within the next six days. Acting in response to what he and his field commander, Lieutenant Colonel Neguib, determined to be the best strategy based on the information available, he had evacuated this magnificent position over the weekend and when the Ninth Brigade charged up to the fortress ready for an all out attack, incredibly the installation was completely abandoned. Neguib had ordered the position evacuated completely and he had instead, entrenched his force at Sharm el-Sheikh, a few miles to the south, where he decided to make his stand. There he was supplied with 200 cubic meters of fresh water, a purification plant sufficient to sustain his troops with purified sea-water indefinitely and food for several months, including 500 live sheep. He had sent his sick and weak back to Egypt during the previous week and had a total of 1500 men and 43 officers with

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[25]"One batalion, firmly committed to the defense of this position, might have withstood a division attack, so artillery resistant were its works." Marshall, op. cit., p. 221. This from a military expert.

all with southern tower and cook in a well-sheltered dou-
ble.[25]

The town commander was a senior Egyptian Imperial Army officer who was currently under the command of the General Headquarters in Cairo. On Friday evening, November 4, word had been received that a 'considerable Ottoman force consisting of several armed vessels' was sailing south and would be at the installation within the next six days. Acting in response to that by his field commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hegazi, interpreted to be the best strategic result in the circumstances prevailing, he had evacuated the magazines position over the weekend and when the Turks finally charged or to the Interior Ministry for an all out attack, inevitably the installation was completely abandoned. Hegazi had ordered the position evacuated completely and he had trained, withdrew his force at Sidi Ali-Gharib, a few miles to the south, where he decided to make his stand. There is now supplied with 200 cubic metres of fresh water, a prudentially place artillery to enfilade his trenches with artificial sub-water inundations and food for several months, including 200 live sheep. He had seen the site and found back in Egypt during the previous week and had a total of 1200 men and 10 officers with

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[25] Ibid. (ibidem). Hegazi mentioned to the commander of this position, 'they have mistakenly a strategic advance, no artillery replacing were the worse.' Ibid., pp. 220 - 1, 221. This from a military source.

which to stage his defense.

Much criticism has been heaped on Colonel Naguib (no relation to the more famous Naguib or Neguib of the same name) for deserting such a defense position at Ras Nasrani to make a stand at Sharm el-Sheikh. The criticism is from the Israeli side, generally, and seems usually to be based on an over-emphasis of the hardware at Ras Nasrani. After his capture, for example, Neguib expressed the point that he had made his decision based on the principle of concentration---that he felt it would be better to defend from a single concentrated position than from two widely separated points. While generally belittled as a narrow approach to the problem and while certainly in contrast to the Israeli philosophy of calculated military boldness, such a stand had the additional merit of placing his force where there was both a deep water quai and a usable air strip. No such facilities existed at Ras Nasrani. This would have ruled out supplying or evacuating large numbers by sea or air, or at least by sea assuming a state of real seige.

Before leaving Ras Nasrani, however, Neguib had seen to it that the heavy coastal guns had been spiked.[26] It is

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[26]Israel, of course, claims credit for this. See, for example, Eytan, loc. cit. While they undoubtedly caused it to be done, it was actually accomplished on Saturday evening, November 3rd, by the Egyptian Naval detachment assigned to the installation.

which to stage his defence.

Much criticism has been heaped on Colonel Eagrin for relation to the notorious Fagrin or Eagrin of the mess menu for describing such a serious position as the Bazaral to mere a stand at Sharm el-Sheikh. The criticism is from the Israeli side, generally, and seems usually to be based on an over-emphasis of the burdens at the Bazaral. After his capture, for example, Eagrin expressed the point that he had made his decision based on the principle of concentration--that he felt it would be better to defend from a single concentrated position than from two widely separated points. While generally subjected as a narrow approach to the problem and while correctly in contrast to the Israeli philosophy of calculated military boldness, such a stand had the additional merit of giving his force where there was both a deep water port and a ready air strip. No such facilities existed at Ras Bazaral. This would have ruled out supplying or reinforcing large numbers by sea or air, or an issue by sea assuming a state of real siege.

Before leaving the Bazaral, however, Eagrin had seen to it that the heavy armaments had been spiked.[26] It is

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[26]Israel, of course, claims credit for this. See, for example, Eyran, loc. cit. While they unfortunately caused it to be done, it was actually accomplished on Saturday evening, November 3rd, by the Egyptian Naval ordnance machines to the installations.

submitted that any criticism of Neguib from an impartial critic must center around this action more than any other. The guns were the raison d'etre for the defensive installation in the first place and the political implications of the spiking of the guns seems to be the most valid focus of any criticism of Neguib.

The Final Assault

Quickly moving past the defensive fortifications, the Ninth Brigade arrived at the outer defenses of Sharm el-Sheikh at mid-afternoon Sunday, November 4, and proceeded to over-run these perimeter defense posts. The main body concentrated and refueled and while there was spasmodic firing all that afternoon, most of the force got some rest and refreshment. The temperature was 82 degrees and there was a good breeze blowing off the sea. The LCMs arrived in the afternoon, unloaded two more AMX tanks from Eilat and in conjunction with a P-51 strike on Tiran, landed a small party on the island which found it deserted.

Encamped before Sharm el-Sheikh, the Brigade was now the last Israeli unit still in action against Egypt. The operations in the north were over and the Airborne Brigade which had fought through Mitla pass was at that moment hurrying around the western tip of Sinai to join in an expected pincer on Sharm el-Sheikh. The Air Force, relieved of all other commitments, was able to give its full attention to the

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<u>The Final Assault</u>

Quickly moving past the defensive fortifications, the Ninth Brigade arrived at the outer defenses of Sharm el-Sheikh at mid-afternoon Sunday, November 4, and proceeded to over-run three perimeter defense posts. The main body concentrated and refueled and while there was sporadic firing all that afternoon, most of the force got some rest and refreshment. The temperature was 87 degrees and there was a good breeze blowing off the sea. The LCMs arrived in the afternoon, unloaded two more AMX tanks from Eilat and in conjunction with a P-51 sortie on Tiran, landed a small party on the island which found it deserted.

Encamped before Sharm el-Sheikh, the Brigade was now the last Israeli unit still in action against Egypt. The operations in the north were over and the Airborne Brigade which had fought through Mitla pass was at that moment hurrying around the western tip of Sinai to join in an expected attack on Sharm el-Sheikh. The Air Force, relieved of all other commitments, was able to give its full attention to the

southern tip of Sinai and all afternoon low passes were being made by aircraft while anti-aircraft fire kept the passes from doing any damage.

The defensive position was a wide one. Yoffe decided that his first task would be to clear the road to build himself a start line for the attack, which he planned to start at daybreak, Monday (Nov. 5). At 3:30 A.M. therefore, one company of infantry was moved down to the position blocking the road but pinned down by small arms fire from the Egyptians, they attempted to retreat back to their lines. In the dark, they made a wrong turn and blundered into the eastern flank of the main defense, only to find it deserted. They quickly hitched the guns there to half-tracks and hauled them back to their own lines.

At dawn a classic infantry charge began, wavered, and had to be discontinued in the face of withering fire from the Egyptians. At 7:00 A.M. Yoffe called for and received a napalm laydown over the trenches from a Mystere jet. The beginning of the end of the physical blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba dates from 7:10 A.M. on the morning of November 5, 1956, when this napalm landed. By 8:30 the wire perimeter was broken and at 9:00 A.M. the Egyptian Commander surrendered.

He had lost 200 men, fought well and lost honestly.

After his capture, Neguib gave three reasons for his defeat. The morale of the force had been shattered by air attacks, to which he had only limited response and no

southern tip of Long Island and all afternoon the planes were being made to circling while anti-aircraft fire kept the planes from doing any damage.

The defending position was a wide one. Fritz Wendel called upon his first men which he had in Lake the road to build hinself a wide line for the attack, which he planned to start at daybreak, Monday (Nov. 2). At 7:30 A.M. therefore, one squadron of infantry was moved down to the position directly the area, as planned down by small arms fire from the Japanese, they advanced to retreat back to their lines. In the dark, Wendel made a broad sweep and encircled into the eastern flank of the main defense, only to find it deserted. That quickly brought the gun crews to half-dressed and hauled them back to their lines.

At 1:00 A.M. Fritz called for and received a napalm layoum over the Japanese from a Grumman jet. The beginning of the end of the Japanese bivouacs of the Half of Japan began from 7:00 A.M. on the morning of November 2, 1944, when fair weather landed. By 4:30 the wind parameter was between and at 1:00 A.M. the Japanese Grumman aircraftered.

In had less 300 men, rough well and lost heavily.

After his capture, Hagoto were then reasons for his defeat. The points of the lines had been shattered by air attacks, he added he had only limited weapons and no

counter-air capability. Secondly, he had no artillery support to speak of, although it would have been difficult to imagine any coming from anywhere other than from within his own lines.

Finally, he complained that his men had been no good.

This comment, when it was all said and done, was unfortunate. Anthony Eden has grasped this remark and has used it to explain the entire Egyptian defense effort but in balance, it would seem rather that he had been outclassed and out imagined by a group of weekend warriors who simply had more to fight for.

Aftermath

As long as the Israeli army held their position in southern Sinai, the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was ended. It became almost immediately apparent however that continued military occupation of the Strait was neither practical nor popular (to say nothing of the legality of it) and the site of the struggle for the Gulf of Aqaba now shifted dramatically to New York where for the first time in history, it became one of the momentous issues of the day.

Israel had won a smashing military victory and did not want to be deprived of the political fruits of that victory. War, the extension of diplomacy by other means, had anachronistically (in the age of total nuclear destruction)

counter-air capability. Secondly, he had no artillery support to speak of, although it would have been difficult to imagine any soaring five airplanes taking off from within his own lines.

Finally, he complained that his men had been so good.

This comment, when it was all said and done, was noteworthy. Although Lara had grasped this reality and has used it to explain the Argentine defeat, effort had in balance, it would seem rather that he had been outclassed and was imagining up a group of weakened warriors who simply had more to fight for.

Afterwards

As long as the Falkland war held their prestige in southern Lima, the Argentine leaders of the Gulf of Aqaba was secure. It became almost immediately apparent however that continued military cooperation on the Gulf was neither practical nor popular (to say nothing of the legality of it) and the idea of the struggle for the Gulf of Aqaba for Bridge Brandtistrity to New York where for the first time in history, it became one of the economic issues of the day.

Lara had not a moment's pleasure, victory and did not want to be involved in the political fruits of that victory. Yet, the resumption of diplomacy by other means, has unfortunately (in the eye of Arab nuclear development)

managed to achieve the purpose for which the institution of international violence had been invented. In possession of Gaza, overextended but triumphantly encamped deep in Egypt and in undisputed command of the Gulf of Aqaba for the first time in her history, Israel could hardly be expected to willingly forego these advantages and return to anything resembling the same position of insecurity from which she had launched the attacks. The Rhodes Armistice had been "torn up" on the night of the 29th in the hopes of replacing it with a negotiated peace when the smoke cleared.

Ben Gurion, "with full moral force and unflinching determination" presented a seven point declaration to the world summarizing his policy:

1. The armistice agreement with Egypt is dead and buried and cannot be restored to life.

2. In consequence, the armistice lines between Israel and Egypt have no more validity.

3. There is no dispute whatever between the people of Israel and the people of Egypt.

4. We do not wish our relations with Egypt to continue in the present anarchic state and we are ready to enter into negotiations for a stable peace, cooperation and good, neighborly relations with Egypt on condition that they are direct negotiations without prior conditions on either side and are not under durress from any quarter whatever.

5. We hope that all peace-loving nations will support our desire for such negotiations with each of the Arab states, but even if they are unprepared for a permanent peace, so long as they observe the armistice agreements, Israel on her part, will do so too.

manage to achieve the purpose for which the invitation of international relations has been invented. To guarantee, of course, unconditional but indefinitely extended aid in Egypt and to unlimited manual of the Gulf of Aqaba for the first time in our history, Israel could hardly be expected to willingly forego these advantages and return to anything resembling the same position of insecurity from which she has launched the attacks. The Gaza Strip had been "torn up" on the night of the 29th in the hope of regaining it into a negotiated peace when the smoke cleared.

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5. We hope that all peace-loving nations will support our desire in such negotiations with each of the Arab states, but even if they are interrupted for a shorter period, so long as they observe the armistice agreements, Israel on her part, will do so too.

6. On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how it is called, in her territory or in any of the area occupied by her.

7. Israel will not fight against any Arab country or against Egypt unless it is attacked by them.[27]

This was at least, an explicit position, but the realities of international politics in November, 1956, were something else again. Because the United Nations were unable to force the Arabs to talk peace with the Jews, the immediate question emerged as to what kind of a de facto alteration in the power structure might emerge in regard to the withdrawal from Sinai, Gaza and the status of the Gulf itself.

The context was complicated.

On the one hand, in the inter-domestic setting, the difficulties of co-existence between Jew and Arab were all but hopeless during that first week of November and delicate statesmanship would have been required even if that had been the sole problem facing the assembled delegates in New York. Two other situations bore directly on the context however, following the Soviet offer of "volunteer" interven-

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[27] United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, September, 1956-June, 1957, Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957) Publication 6505, pp. 203-204.

5. In no country will Israel agree to the establishment of a foreign army, no matter how it is called, in her territory or in any of the area occupied by her.

7. Israel will use force against any Arab country or country that believes it is advisable to act. [27]

This was at least, an explicit ultimatum, but the realities of international politics in November 1956 were something else again. Because the United Nations were unable to force the Arabs to talk peace with the Jews, the Israelites question emerged as to what kind of a *de facto* adjustment to the power structure that would be regard to the withdrawal from Sinai. There are two sides of the Gulf Israel.

The solution was long-lasting.

On the one hand, in the Inter-Oceanic sector, the difficulties of re-entrance between Jew and Arab were all but insuperable during that first week of November and delicate arrangements would have been impossible even if they had been the sole problem facing the assembled delegates in New York. The other circumstances bore directly on the matter however, following the Israeli refusal of "unclear" interven-

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[27] United Nation Documents at Sinai, United Nations Policy in the Middle East, Secretary, Jerusalem, 1957, Economic Consequent Contribution Fighting Drive, 1957, Publication 1955, pp. 301-304.

tion to clear the Middle East of aggressive armies[28] and after the physical blocking of the Suez Canal the previous day brought the entire Canal question into a second, more complicated phase.

At an emergency meeting of the United Nations the previous Saturday afternoon,[29] a plan for the establishment of a United Nations Police Force had been approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming vote and with the leverage gained by having a positive suggestion to replace the rapidly degenerating chaotic policies of the separate antagonists, a cease fire was agreed to by all concerned which was based on the realities of the military situation on the afternoon of Monday, November 5.[30] The following Sunday, Scandanavian and Canadian members of the first United Nations Emergency Force were reported to be on their way to Egypt.

There had been a suddenness on the part of Ben Gurion to revise the previous truculence of point 6 of his statement

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[28] New York Times, November 6. See the complete text of the cablegram from Shepilov to the President of the Security Council dated November 5, in Department of State, op. cit., p. 178ff. entered into the record as United Nations Document S/3736.

[29] New York Times, November 4, 1956.

[30] The Israeli cable read, "Since this morning 5 November all fighting has ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces . . . and full quiet prevails." Full text in Department of State, op. cit., p. 178.

tion to clear the Middle East of aggressive armies[24] and after the physical disarming of the Suez Canal the vessels may bring the entire Canal problem into a second, more complicated phase.

As an emergency measure in the United Nations the previous Secretary Generaal,[25] a plan for the establishment of a United Nations Police Force has been approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming vote and with the leverage gained by having a moderate suggestion to replace the rapidly deteriorating shaky politics of the Suezrie escapade, a cease fire was agreed on by all concerned which was based on the realities of the military situation on the afternoon of Monday, November 5.[26] The following Sunday, Scandanavian and Canadian members of the first United Nations Emergency Force were rushed at 24 on their way to Egypt.

There has been a suggestion on the part of Pan Gurion to revise his previous ultimatum at point 6 of his statement

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[24] New York Times, November 6. See the complete text of the resolution adopted unanimously by the President of the Security Council urged Soviets to leave, in Department of State, op. cit., p. 1202. urging upon the moral as United Nations Document 0/1120.

[25] New York Times, November 5, 1956.

[26] The Toronto radio news, 12:00 this morning: Government all firing was ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces . . . Sec. Gen. Hall gives presidency. This best in Department of State, op. cit., p. 1202.

quoted above, which he did within twenty-four hours after issuing it.[31]

There seems to be little question that the over-extended forces near Suez were the least of his political concerns and that his primary attention was focussed on the Sharm el-Sheikh and on Gaza. His original reaction might have been based on a mistrust of the effectiveness of the United Nations holding power or again, the allusion to "foreign force" may well have applied in his own mind only to the direct unilateral or bilateral actions of the Soviet Union or the United States. The previous day his own troops had pillaged and all but destroyed the Turce Station in Gaza and harsh protests were all that he had received from that escapade.[32] It would be one thing to allow the Egyptians to move back into Sinai; it would be quite another to let them back into Gaza. But in retrospect it would seem that the paramount consideration was for the Sharm el-Sheikh and the ability of whoever occupied it to keep the Strait of Tiran open. He stood much more to gain, therefore, by resisting the United Nations initially and progressively easing his position point by point in return for something than by immediate acquiescence to a force which was not yet in being and which would have been of highly suspect parentage.

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[31] _Supra_, pp. 95-96.

[32] _New York Times_, 8 November, 1956.

Qadhafi story, which is his private twenty-four hours after leaving it.[32]

There seems to be little question that the "very-organized forces over-run were the least of his political concerns and that his military situation was threatened by the Ghaem al-Omeidi and on Zawa. His original reasons might have been based on a measure of the effectiveness of the United Nations supplying power or again, the alleged to "foreign forces" may well have applied in the one, that only as the current military or political actions of the Arab Union or the Omeiyad Dynasty. The practical day his own strong had pillaged and all was destroyed the Turks Ghaem in Zawa and Ghaem property were all were he has escaped from that security.[33] In spite of one rating to allow the Egyptians to very upset Jamal Nasser Jamal; it would be quite another to let them back into Zawa. But in retrospect it would seem that the paramount consideration was for the Ghaem al-Omeidi and the ability of whoever succeeded it to keep the Italian of Tripoli open. He should not have to fail, therefore, by isolating the United Nations initiative and progressively easing his position point by point to remove for something than by isolated explosions of a force which was not yet in being and which would have been of highly suspect patronage.

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[32]Qadhafi, pp. 23-26.

[33]New York Times, 1 November 1969.

There was the psychological consideration, of course, in that the seven points were delivered to a Knesset wildly intoxicated with victory but there can be no doubt that the letter of President Eisenhower dated November 7th was the occasion, if not the cause, for Ben Gurion's change of heart. In this letter, the President "viewed [the reports that Israel did not intend to withdraw from Sinai] with deep concern."[33] Almost immediately, Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, "had the honor . . . to inform" the Secretary General of the United Nations the following day

> that the government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the emergency international force.[34]

In a face saving reply to Eisenhower, therefore, claiming a delay in transmission on "owning to a breakdown in communications between the Department of State and the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv," Ben Gurion himself reiterated this new line after taking care to impress the president with the spontaneity of the change.[35]

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[33]White House News Release, November 8, 1956, quoted verbatim in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

[34]Department of State, op. cit., pp. 212-213, recorded as A/3320.

[35]The London Daily Telegraph of November 10, 1956 (page 2) carries a report that "evidence is accumulating that Britain, American and possibly France warned Israel that she would have to meet any Soviet threat alone if she refused to

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[33]White House Exec Release, November 3, 1956, quoted verbatim in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

[34]Department of State, op. cit., pp. 212-213, recorded as 4/23/20.

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It soon developed that the withdrawal was to be somewhat less than whole hearted. On Monday, November 19th, Dag Hammerskjold had requested the status of the withdrawal from the British, French and Israeli representatives in view of the fact that the "arrangements" for the United Nations Force were thoroughly in operation. Both the western powers hedged on the grounds of Egyptian violation of the cease fire and Israel reported that its forces had been withdrawn "for varying distances along the Egyptian front," but that it was awaiting "satisfactory arrangements . . . such as will insure Israel's security against the treat or danger of attack and against acts of beligerency by land _or_ _sea._"[36] By December 22, the Anglo-French withdrawal was complete and only the Israeli forces remained in Egypt, along the Sharm and in Gaza.

The Diplomatic Order of Battle

In effect, the Gulf of Aqaba was opened on the morning of Monday, November 5th but it was not the kind of opening that either faction could be expected to live with. It was certainly distasteful to the United Nations.

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withdraw" and quoted a second hand source quoting Ambassador Larson to the effect that Israel was running the risk of forfeiting dollar aid in her intransigence. Such a situation is not unreasonable to assume.

[36]Report of the Secretary General, November 21, with annexes thereto, in Department of State, _op. cit._, pp. 232ff.

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<u>The Multinational Order of Peace</u>

In effect, the Gulf of Aqaba was opened on the morning of Tuesday, November 6th but it was not the kind of opening that either Canada could be expected to live with. It was certainly unacceptable to the United Nations.

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[10]Report of the Secretary General, December 21, with summary observed, in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 232ff.

It was, moreover, an uneasy military de facto situation, perilous to maintain without diplomatic and political foundation. On the one hand, the United Nations was promising its protection for the freedom of access to the Straits of Tiran provided Israel withdrew the forces she felt vital to the situation she wished to maintain. Israel felt that little by little the gains achieved in November were slipping through her fingers and on the Aqaba question, she decided to make a stand. The United Nations had theoretically also guaranteed her borders during the preceding seven years, and she knew from personal experience how easily these borders had been violated in both directions. Meanwhile, Nasser, through the diplomatic backup he was getting from Russia, was already beginning to emerge as the apparent victor.

On the other hand, a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Suez and a negotiable position in Gaza would leave him with a fight in which his means were more equal to his opposition. Instead of three weak stands in the face of an aroused world opinion, he would be able to concentrate his political and diplomatic strength on the one single stand in the Straits and as 1957 began, Ben Gurion began to act as if this were his main plan. In order to emerge with the single victory of freedom of access to the Gulf, therefore, three things would be necessary.

The first, of course, would be Israeli possession of the headland commanding the Strait of Tiran or, failing that,

It was, however, an heavy military to <u>have</u> alienation, perhaps on realistic grounds diplomatic and political foundation. On the one hand, the United Nations was jeopardizing its protection for the freedom of access to the Straits of Tiran provided Israel withdrew the forces and full vital to the situation she wished to maintain. Israel felt that little by little the Arabs violated in Brewster were slipping through her fingers and on the Aqaba question, she decided to make a stand. The United Nations had theoretically also guaranteed her borders during the preceding seven years, and she knew from personal experience how easily these borders had been violated in both directions. Meanwhile, however, through the diplomatic source he was getting from Russia, was already beginning to emerge as the superior tyrant.

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demilitarization of the area under a truly effective international administration which would be in a position to sanction its protection with armed force and political strength. It must be remembered that in the period under discussion, the concept of an effective United Nations Emergency Force was wholly new, the only precedent being General Burns' wobbly Truce Supervision Organization of the early fifties which drew little respect from either principal.

The second requirement was a strong, carefully worked out political position based on the unanimous support of the major powers. This position, it is submitted, was necessarily conceived of as being independent of the self-interest of the supporting states narrowly conceived. What Ben Gurion probably had in mind was a support which would be given to the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and <u>not</u> support given to Israel simply out of national interest. The support he wanted would have to be given in the name of international law or some such other universal principle which would be independent of an Arab-Jewish policy. For this, he would have to "work" on the United States since both he and Mrs. Meir were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the Israeli-American honeymoon of the Truman administration and the early, quieter Eisenhower years was all but over in the wake of the 1956 election and the Suez Crisis. There was the increasing shadow of Soviet interest in the Middle East to consider and its effect on an American Middle East

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policy was not to be taken lightly. If the United States found itself in a position of support for freedom of access to the Gulf because it was supporting Israel, it would be a weak, unrealistic position which could not possibly hope to correspond to the broader issues at stake. Ben Gurion and Mrs. Meir were apparently realistic enough to realize that the Cold War took precedence over everything else in American foreign policy and a strictly Israeli policy in Washington was out of the question. Dulles' disenchantment with Israel was well known and a more withdrawn policy would make good sense in Washington.[37] Indications were that such a policy was coming late in 1956 and that the Eisenhower Doctrine then being formulated would be only one of a series of steps calculated to present a new face to the Arab world on which Israeli friendship would be nothing but a black eye.

Finally, Israeli planners realized that if Eilat itself were ever to fulfill the role required of it, it would necessarily have to be both politically and commercially able to handle Persian Gulf crude. Quite possibly, this problem was the most acute because it threw the situation right back into the inter-domestic political conflict with the Arab League. Politically, the solidarity of the League

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[37] Drummond and Coblentz, Duel At the Brink (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 178-181.

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[19] Drummond and Coblentz, Duel at the Brink (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 170-[illegible].

presented a problem in that it required Israel to look to Iran for any crude it might attempt to move. The solidarity of the League had been amply demonstrated in November when Syrian sabotage had all but cut the throughput flow to the Mediterranean, when Iraq choose her commitment to the Arab Joint Defense Pact over that of the Baghdad Pact (despite the fact that 68% of her economy was in oil she could not move) and when even the sheikhdoms exhibited hostility, sabotage and strikes in sympathy with Nasser.[38] Arabian oil was obviously out of the question and with the Canal blocked, the Eilat-Beersheba pipeline was an inflammatory issue in the Arab world. Commercially, the blacklist of vessels and firms doing business with Israel was an important factor to consider. Even if she could arrange it, any ship which carried Iranian oil to Eilat and any company which moved it would face severe economic retaliation unless suitable arrangements could be made to defy the blockade and the black-list profitably and continue the defiance.

The pipeline was begun in January, 1957, its success contingent on three factors:

1. Strong political support from the Great Powers for continued access to the Gulf with or without United Nations Forces, but in any case without Egyptian or Saudi interference.

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[38] George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 345 ff.

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[18] George Lenczowski, *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 315.

2. Passage of at least one flag vessel from as many of the major maritime powers as could be arranged, preferably carrying crude, to establish a precedent of unmolested passage.

3. Machinery of some kind on an international scale to procure at least American support for the venture and to engage a ship, cargo and crew which would undertake both the commercial and physical risks of such a voyage in the glare of the publicity which would be an essential element of the operation.

She would be prepared to pay the price of a complete withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh if the plan could be successfully carried off and would acquiesce in assisting the new American Middle East policy by staying out of the American-Soviet context if she could open the Gulf.

Somewhat incredibly, this is precisely what happened.

4. Leasing of an Israeli one flag vessel from an
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CHAPTER V

THE FORGOTTEN VICTORY

With the arrangement of the Cease Fire in Sinai, vast changes had taken place in the power structure in the Middle East and the geopolitics of the new situation were important. The Israeli forces were deep in the heart of Egypt, Gaza was in the hands of the Jews and on the Strait of Tiran, the Ninth Brigade controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba to insure freedom of passage to any and all ships.[1]

The United States and the Soviet Union, occupied with other problems and acting in far less concert than is usually remembered, had succeeded in interjecting sufficient pressure from outside the immediate crisis area to separate the antagonists. The key question of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal was at least temporarily overshadowed by the presence in the Canal of scuttled ships and barges which had to be removed immediately. All sides had promised to withdraw after some preliminary diplomatic skirmishing[2] which had involved the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India who formulated a strong communique on

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[1]Would Israeli forces have prevented the passage of an Egyptian merchant ship through the Gulf carrying arms for Jordan? An interesting question which was never brought up.

[2]Chapter IV, <u>supra</u>, pp. 97-100.

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THE INDECISIVE VICTORY

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the subject on November 14[3] and which had been followed, the next week, by a similar communique issued from the Conference of Nine Arab States held at Beirut.[4]

As noted above, Ben Gurion seems to have looked upon the Sinai occupation and the resolutions calling for his withdrawal[5] as not one but three separate problems. The Suez forces were of only insignificant importance to Israeli security and were to be the first to come back home, the withdrawal graciously made in a bid for favorable publicity. The Gaza problem was somewhat more vital to the defense of the country from the fedayeen and withdrawal from the Strip would have to depend on successful bargaining for as much international peace-keeping machinery as could be obtained. But Gaza was less than critical; in the changed military context even a return to the status quo would have been tolerable although it worried Israel considerably.

On the Strait of Tiran, the problem was acute. The Gulf was significant and as the diplomacy of the middle weeks of November unfolded, it seemed that Israel was content to

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[3]Department of State, op. cit., pp. 217 ff.

[4]Ibid., pp. 220-222.

[5]Resolutions 997, Emergency Session of November 2, 1956, and 1002 of November 7th, 1956, verbatim in Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 184 ff. The first Resolution had been sponsored by the United States and carried 64 to 5. The second, submitted by the neutrals, was merely a repeat of the provisions of the first. The intervening Resolutions (998, 999, 1000 and 1001) all refer to the situation and the UNEF. See Department of State, op. cit., pp. 157, 160-162, 175, 205-207.

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play a waiting game and adjust her withdrawal to the pressures brought to bear. One of these pressures came on the 24th, when the General Assembly, without reference to committee, passed a resolution reiterating its call for withdrawal. Over the weekend of the 24th, Ben Gurion met with his cabinet[6] and when the General Assembly implemented its United Nations Emergency Force Resolution on Monday, November 26th, the withdrawals began in some earnest.[7]

The month of January was a month of virtual deadlock, during which three rather clearly defined positions could be identified. Israel continued to hold out for positive assurances that she would gain more than she would lose by withdrawing, the gain being related to relative security in Gaza and absolute security on the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary General, caught in the middle, was working furiously toward achieving compliance with the withdrawal resolutions on the one hand and effecting the withdrawal and substitution by the United States Emergency Force in such a manner as to build more security than was being destroyed on the other. Egypt, at the opposite pole, was content to play the role of innocent and patient creditor carefully making no specific

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[6]London Times, November 27, 1956.

[7]Coincident with and intertwined among the negotiations was another Israeli diplomatic ploy, asking the UN to assist Israel in communicating with Egypt. It may well have been a lever to cover further delays. For the texts of the applicable documents, see Department of State, op. cit., pp. 158-160.

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commitments either way in an effort to take advantage of a situation which was proving to be considerably embarrassing to her enemy.

It was at this point that the United States entered the lists in earnest.

The United States and the Gulf of Aqaba

In an aide memoire handed to Ambassador Eban on the 11th of February, Secretary Dulles reviewed the situation as it had progressed since the cease fire.[8] On the Gaza matter, he assured Israel that he understood its position and struck a bargain. In the first part of the document, Dulles went on record in favor of prompt and unconditional withdrawal from Gaza "leaving the future of the Gaza Strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations." Ben Gurion was undoubtedly willing to do this, for a price.

In the second part of the document, he repeated the stand taken publicly so many times in the past that the Gulf was an international waterway and quoted at length from the Egyptian aide memoire of January 28, 1950,[9] on the subject

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[8]Full text in Department of State, op. cit., p. 290. Naturally the text was not released immediately but was held until February 17 when it was released as Department of State Press Release 72 of that date. In his March 5th conference, Secretary Dulles was questioned at length on this note. See New York Times, March 6th.

[9]Supra, p. 48.

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[9]*Ibid.*, p. 64.

of free passage "in conformity with international practice and the recognized principles of the law of nations."

The United States, he then declared,

> is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.
> It is of course clear that the enjoyment of the right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with United Nations Resolutions, . . . The United States is prepared publicly to declare that it will use its influence, in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented. (Emphasis added.)

Israel was now in a position to claim solid American support in return for a withdrawal from Gaza and Sinai. Characteristically, Ben Gurion was not about to give the impression that American influence had anything to do with a change of his heart, although this attitude benefitted American prestige with the Arabs in the long run as much as it saved Israeli face. When President Eisenhower addressed the nation on the evening of February 20, 1957, he recounted some of the problems of the previous months and informed the American people on his stand over Aqaba. He was able to criticize Israel for its insistence on "firm guarantees," and in a question summarizing the public image of the United States, said:

> This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal?[10]

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> This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal?[19]

[19]Department of State, op. cit., pp. 191-197.

This statement was made to maintain the impression that whatever settlement was to be achieved was to be a victory of right and justice over opportunism. In this regard, it also gave Ben Gurion the opportunity to express public displeasure at the American attitude based on the same "high regard" for principle when he addressed the Knesset the following day to comment at length on the President's speech. His attitude was one of virtue scorned, of patient righteousness; what he actually said was that Israel would indeed withdraw both from Gaza and from the Gulf if the United Nations would meet his price.[11] He already had the American guarantee of support in his pocket.

By the 25th, Abba Eban was ready to talk business with Hammerskjold on the Gulf of Aqaba. Three things were bothering Eban, in a private conversation with Hammerskjold, which would have to be resolved before his troops would leave. Would the United Nations Emergency Force be specifically instructed to keep the straits open? Hammerskjold replied that it would. Would the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force be subject to the concurrence of the entire General Assembly? Hammerskjold dodged this very vital question and replied that it would be up to the advisory Committee for the United Nations Emergency Force. Finally, Eban wanted to know if the United Nations would agree to

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[11] Ibid., pp. 308-310.

station a United Nations Naval Force in the Gulf at the Strait "to ensure free and innocent passage." This, Hammerskjold replied, would be beyond the competence of the Secretary General.[12]

The fact that Eban and Hammerskjold were talking in this vein is proof positive that Dulles had hit his mark with his February 11th note. The ritualistic pronouncements of the two heads of government were useful in setting the intended diplomatic scene to embellish the positive developments which were shaping up with a faint aura of antagonism as the Eisenhower Doctrine was being discussed in the Arab world. Israel was getting her backdoor to the east. All that was required of her now was to obey the resolutions calling for withdrawal and hand over the territories to the United Nations Commander.

The Arabs meanwhile were having similar experiences.

A meeting was held late in February between the Arab Heads of State at Koubbeh Palace in Cairo.[13] King Saud had recently returned from a visit to the United States and Hussein, Kuwatly and Nasser were on hand to sound out the reactions he had made and received on his visit. The report sounded considerably more encouraging than it actually was

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[12]Ibid., pp. 318-321, recorded as UN Document A/3563 of February 26, 1957.

[13]New York Times, February 27, 1957.

mission a United Nations Naval Force in the Gulf of the Straits for mutual free and innocent passage." This, Hammarskjold replied, would be beyond the competence of the Secretary General.[12]

The fact that Eban and Hammarskjold were talking in this vein is proof positive that Dulles had hit his mark with his two-day lift move. The ribbonlike promenadements of the two cases of government were useful in getting the Israeli diplomatic crowd to modulate the positive developments which were showing up with a fairly sure of acceptance as the Eisenhower doctrine was being discussed in the Arab world. Israel was getting her headlocks on the east. All that was required of her now was to obey the resolutions calling for withdrawal and then over the territories to the United Nations Commander.

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[12]Ibid., pp. 342-43, recorded as UN Document A/3563 of February 27, 1957.

[13]New York Times, February 27, 1957.

and a serious split seems to have developed at this meeting as to what the next Arab diplomatic move would be.

Nasser had been forced through a soul searching similar to the one which the past three months had forced on Ben Gurion. Just as there were three aspects to the Israeli problem, there were similarly three problems for Egypt and some kind of a priority of value had to be estab-lised to determine which plum could be lost first. The blockade of the Straits of Tiran looked like a losing propo-sition to Egypt in February, 1957. American opposition to the "tri-partite invasion" in October had certainly not made an Eisenhower Republican out of Nasser but American influence was at least to be respected for its consistent stand against the action. While this respect was all but neutralized within a month when the United States agreed, at Bermuda, to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, there was still enough of it around in February to have had some effect on the conference. A controversy developed, probably, as to how serious the Americans were and a decision seems to have been reached to settle for no decision at that time other than a reaffirmation of the old territorial waters position and a renewed affirmation of Arab sovereignty over the Gulf.

In the second matter, that of Gaza, the Arabs had a stronger political case dating back to the Rhodes agreement and intertwined as it was with the refugee settlements in

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Gaza and the American position that the agreements should be implemented across the board, they were willing to accept the United Nations as what would amount to a return to the status quo.

The game they could not afford to lose was the Suez Canal. On this point they were ready to stand or fall and ultimately, they were successful. It is interesting to note how the three Arab problems were inversely proportional to the Israeli problems[14] and how, although the meeting ended with absolutely no agreement on how to solve any of them, they all agreed that there were problems which required a certain priority of settlement. The communique they issued listed "decisions" reached, but the decisions were nothing more than a catalogue of these same problems.[15]

By March 1st, real progress had been made. Dulles met with the ambassadors from the Arab countries in Washington on that date and reported to them the intention of the Israeli government to withdraw from Sinai.[16] Almost at the same moment, Mrs. Meir, in the United States for an exploratory visit, made a similar statement to the United Nations

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[14]In a direct report from Cairo on March 21, Michael Adams viewed the same three problems but from a different aspect. "Suez," he wrote, "seems the most immediately soluable, Gaza the most dangerously urgent, and the Gulf of Aqaba the hardest to solve." Manchester Guardian, March 24, 1957.

[15]Department of State, op. cit., p. 321.

[16]Department of State, Press Release 103 of March 1, 1957.

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[15]Department of State, op. cit., p. 124.

[16]Department of State, Press Release 109 of March 1, 1957.

General Assembly.[17] There was an interesting disclaimer, however, in the State Department Press Release referring to the Dulles meeting with the ambassadors. It mentioned the fact that Communist propaganda was spreading a story in the Arab world to the effect that there "was a secret understanding between the United States and Israel" and deplored this story as a misrepresentation of "what was, in effect, a great achievement for the principles and efforts of the United Nations." (In her New York speech, however, Mrs. Meir made considerable capital of the American readiness to exercise the right of freedom of passage.)

In the New York speech, Mrs. Meir laid out the Israeli position on the "final" settlement of the Aqaba issue. The Gulf was an international waterway. Israel would do nothing to impede Arab maritime traffic, would protect its own ships in the Gulf and would interpret an attack on its vessels as entitling it to exercise its rights of self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Finally, she had "received with gratification the assurances of leading maritime powers that they forsee a normal and regular flow of traffic of all cargoes in the Gulf of Aqaba."

The last Israeli forces left the Sharm el-Sheikh on

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[17]Department of State, Documents, p. 330.

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[17]Department of State, Documents, p. [illegible].

the afternoon of March 8, 1957, to the plaudits of Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations,[18] and a somewhat glum silence from the Arab states. The United Nations Emergency Force, once again under General Burns, took the positions vacated by the Israelis and the Gulf of Aqaba was open, finally. Israel had gained and the Arab possession of Suez was virtually irrevocable.

Only Great Britain and France seemed to have lost.[19]

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[18] Ibid., p. 345.

[19] "We were not successful. . . . [W]e did not bring about Arab-Israeli peace or restore international control of the canal. It is true that some successes were gained. The military weaknesses of the Egyptian forces was exposed and duly noted, in particular by her neighbors. This had important consequences. From the day of the Egyptian defeat in the Sinai desert, the chances of a Nasser Empire were scotched, not killed. Even so, the Sudan did not hesitate to resist the grasping demands which Nasser later made on her northern territory. It is unlikely that Nasser or any other Arab leader will undertake a war of extermination against Israel in the immediate future, without outside support. As against this, Nasser remains, ruler of Egypt, his ambition still dangerous. . . . Our intervention at least closed the chapter of complacency about the situation in the Middle East. It led to the Eisenhower Doctrine and from that to Anglo-American intervention in the following summer in Jordan and Lebanon. It helped show that the west was not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltration and subversion by others. But these were only partial gains. The uneasy equipoise still continues.

"Happily, by a combination of brilliant courage and firmness, Mr. Ben Gurion was able to secure for his country one capital advantage, free passage of the Gulf of Aqaba to the port of Elath [sic] which could transform the economy of Israel and make everything that small country endured worthwhile." Anthony Eden, op. cit., pp. 646 and 625.

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In Gaza the situation remained critical as each side jockeyed for position astride an imaginary Armistice Line. In mid-March an important flare-up developed. General Burns had set up his headquarters there when the Israelis withdrew and on the 15th Egypt asserted a claim to exercise complete authority over the liberated area. Neither the United Nations Emergency Force nor the Egyptians seem to have displayed much tact in the matter and for a day or two it posed a serious threat between the United Nations and Egypt. This would have wide implications because it seemed almost possible at this juncture that the Eyptians might insist on United Nations withdrawal in which case the entire keg would have blown sky high again. The situation calmed down after a United Nations concession to Egypt, over the bitter protests of Israel.[20]

In Suez, the original problem of usage and control became significant once again after General Wheeler had accomplished the initial clearing of the passage. On February 19th, an interim plan providing for toll collection by an international body but allowing full Egyptian operation was rejected by Egypt. The Egyptian answer, on March 19th, was an Egyptian Canal Authority which would respect the 1888 Convention but which would collect its own tolls and operate its own funds. Since there seemed to be no

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[20] New York Times, March 21-29, 1957; Michael Adams, Suez and After, p. 147.

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[20]*New York Times*, March 11-20, 1957; Sherman Adams, *First Hand Report*, p. 247.

feasible alternative to this plan, the Suez Canal Users Association, formed the previous summer, authorized its members to begin using the waterway on the Egyptian terms and on May 13, the British lifted their ban and allowed payment of tolls in sterling. The French followed a month later.[21]

The Voyage of the "Kern Hills"

Diplomacy in the Middle East during the last week of March and the first week of April, 1957, resembled nothing as much as a tangled web, beautiful and symmetrical from a distance but difficult to unravel. The Canal was about to open fully and American Ambassador to Egypt Raymond Hare was conducting secret talks with the Egyptian foreign minister daily. These talks took on a new significance and part of the mystery about them cleared up after the release of Nasser's Suez policy, but at the same time the Egyptian government modified its stand in Gaza just barely enough to allow full United Nations patrols in return for their continued ascendency there.[22] Dag Hammerskjold held extensive talks with Mrs. Meir the previous week[23] and had assured her

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[21]Europa Publications, The Middle East 1961 (London: Europa Ltd., 1961), p. 387.

[22]The London Times made almost daily reference to these talks during the last week in March whereas the New York Times carried only two small notices of their progress, "buried" in the back pages. See the two newspapers for March 26 and 29, but particularly April 4 and 6.

[23]New York Times, March 23rd.

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[23]*New York Times*, March [illegible].

that he "believed there would be no interference" with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. News was also leaking out of a secret pact concluded by Mrs. Meir with the French on her way home from Washington that weekend, and Hammerskjold was now complaining publicly of Israeli silence concerning his contacts with Nasser which were now in progress.[24]

At the end of March, these talks were said to have culminated in a "gentleman's agreement" whereby Nasser allegedly modified his intransigence on Aqaba and Gaza enough to strike a bargain for concessions to Egyptian sovereignty in the Canal.[25] By the following weekend, April 6th, President Eisenhower was cooly refusing to come to Ben Gurion's diplomatic assistance in the matter of Israeli access to the Suez Canal.[26] The impression can be gathered that the United States was unwilling to press Israeli access to the Canal at a time when Hare was himself negotiating in Cairo for a more basic arrangement dealing with everybody's access to the Canal. Certainly the State Department realized that Nasser was making what amounted to a concession in his own eyes by the mere presence of the United Nations Emergency Force, particularly in southern Sinai and

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[24] Ibid., March 26th.

[25] Ibid., March 28th.

[26] Ibid., April 7, 1956, apparently datelined before the arrival of the "Kern Hills" at Eilat.

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the outstanding promissory note to exercise the right of "free and innocent" passage through the Strait of Tiran was not exactly adding to Dulles' peace of mind. Once the right had been exercised, however, the slate would apparently be wiped clean.[27]

It was an important slate to wipe clean, this American-Israeli "collaboration" (as the Arabs viewed it) as the Eisenhower Doctrine[28] was about to be put to the test in Jordan and as the United States was making a new bid for influence in the Middle East.[29] At a press conference on March 5th, Dulles had been asked about his intentions in the matter of exercising the American right of passage, and the following interchange was reported:

> Q. You said . . . that the United States expected to exercise its right of free and innocent passage through this Strait /the Strait of Tiran/ into the Gulf of Aqaba. Have you taken any steps or do you contemplate taking any steps to establish this exercise of right on the part of the United States --in other words, should a ship or ships normally begin to move through there now? Have they already moved?
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> A. Well, there is no-prearranged exercise in that respect. It would be normal that a ship of United

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[27]The New York Telegram of March 19th reported a decline in American prestige among the Arabs, the Jews and the western powers. "Most objectionable is the refrain that President Eisenhower has broken his pledge."

[28]Which had been signed as Public Law 85-7 on March 9. See Department of State, op. cit., p. 44.

[29]Ambassador James P. Richards was touring the Middle East "to present and discuss /President Eisenhower's/ proposals." See his statement of March 12, as he departed, in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

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States registry would be going through there. You see, it is only quite recently that the port of Elath /sic/ has been developed so that it is a port which attracts shipping. Now there has been a development at the port of Elath to a point where there will probably be considerable shipping going there in the normal course of events that would include a vessel of United States registry.

Q. But you don't know of any particular ship?

A. No, I haven't looked into that. Of course that is a matter which is primarily under private direction. The shipping companies send their ships where they will. We assume that one will be going there, but that is not based on any checkup with the companies.

Q. I wondered sir, whether it would be normal procedure for the United States government to send notice to the shipping companies that the strait is considered open or whether everybody is supposed to know it?

A. Well, I think that everyone is supposed to have read the newspapers in that respect, particularly if they are in the shipping business.[30]

At the Tuesday, March 26, press conference the Secretary of State faced the same line of questioning. The only significant modification he made at this conference was a declaration that "I think that a certain amount of shipping is or shortly will be passing through the straits."[31]

Although the United States had committed herself to Israel to exercise the right of free and innocent passage in return for a withdrawal in Sinai, the Secretary of State now was attempting to give the impression that it was up to

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[30] New York Times, March 6, 1957.

[31] Ibid., March 27, 1956.

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[30]New York Times, March 4, 1957.

[31]Ibid., March 27, 1957.

American free enterprise which now would be compelled by some inner mysterious force to reap the benefits of the newly developed port which would be "attracting" shipping. This is a difficult statement to accept on face value.

On the one hand, Eilat in April, 1957, had little commercial interest for American shipping unless a profitable charter arrangement made calling at Eilat and blacklisting worthwhile. The difficulties of unloading petroleum into storage tanks made such a voyage expensive and the pipeline north to Beersheba, a tiny 8 inch jump pipe, was not scheduled to be tested until April 15. On the other hand, there was a kernel of truth to the statement. The United States would certainly not "send" a warship up the Gulf and the United States Merchant Marine was a congress of independent shipowners and operators.

If such a venture was planned, the first week in April was unquestionably the best time to do it in the political context. Tensions had cooled considerably, Richards was reporting civil reception in the Arab world[32] and State, viewing the Jordanian situation with a weather eye, was probably anxious to extricate the United States government from its promise to Israel.

Accordingly, arrangements were completed sometime

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[32]Daily press reports of the trip are confusing. See text of Ambassador Richards' radio and television address on May 9, 1957, reporting on the trip to the American people. Department of State, op. cit., p. 69.

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during the last week in March or the first week in April by the Israeli National Petroleum Company to purchase a shipload of crude oil at Abadan consigned to Capetown, Union of South Africa, on an American flag vessel. The Israeli National Petroleum Company, DELEK, had a charter arrangement of long standing with a certain North Atlantic Marine Company which operated a fleet of tankers owned by dummy corporations whose capital stock was completely owned by the same individual who owned North Atlantic Marine. In effect, therefore, the ship which was selected for the mission was owned by the Fairfield Steam Ship Corporation in name but in fact was owned by North Atlantic. The president and sole owner of both corporations was Samuel H. Wang.[33] Wang himself, a Polish Jew by birth, was active in American Zionist circles in the late forties and through the influence of a close friend, Stanley Unger, did most of his shipping business with the Israeli government. Unger, a vice president of North Atlantic Marine, had been employed by the American Israeli Steamship Company from August, 1948, when it was

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[33]City of New York, County of New York, County Clerks Office, public records of incorporation with amendments thereto for the American Bulk Carriers Incorporated, North Atlantic Marine Co., Inc., Fairfield Steamship Corporation. Fairfield was one of eleven dummy corporations which owned the eleven ships operated by North Atlantic and was probably named after Fairfield Road in Great Neck, N.Y., where Wang lives with his family. (From Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.) There is nothing unusual about this arrangement, although it adds to the research problem considerably.

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originally incorporated, to February, 1953, when he resigned as Port Captain to work for Wang.[34]

The vessel itself was the "S.S. Kern Hills," a war-time T-2 tanker built at Salusito, California, in 1945. It was one of five operated during 1957 by North Atlantic Marine although the operating arrangements between North Atlantic and the dummy corporations which "owned" its ships was so fluid that its fleet waxed and waned monthly keeping one step ahead of the Egyptian blockade where necessary.[35]

The captain of the "Kern Hills" was Glenn E. Mosely, whose thirty-eighth birthday was celebrated on March 21, 1957, as the ship was inbound to Abadan. The ship was being operated as a tramp through the Caribbean during late 1956 and Mosely was living in New Orleans, although the home port of the ship, once North Atlantic took it over, was New York. The crew was American, a union crew, most of them signed on at Galveston on January 6, 1957, for "various ports of the Caribbean and Atlantic and any other voyage."[36]

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[34]Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.

[35]Wang declared a petition of bankruptcy on January 16, 1960. The involved ownership arrangements during 1956-1958 were too complicated for Lloyds Registry of Shipping (London: Lloyds Ltd., 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958), Vol. I, to keep up with but the ownership is traced in the annual editions of U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Transportation Lines on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956 and 1957).

[36]Shipping Articles for the "S.S. Kern Hills," Year 1957, a public record in Headquarters, United States Coast Guard.

originally incorporated, in February, 1972, when it replaced as Port Captain to what for some.[34]

The vessel itself was the S.S. Sam Mills, a wartime T-2 tanker built at Baltimore, Maryland, in 1945. It was one of five operated during 1972 by Seven Islands Marine alongside the operating arrangements between South Atlantic and the owner corporations which "manned" the ships was so fluid that the flags which Sam wanted monthly changing one step ahead of the Security Officers more necessary.[35]

The captain of the "Sam Mills" was Glenn H. Mandy, whose thirty-eighth birthday was celebrated on March 21, 1972, as the ship was leaving to Alaska. The ship was being operated as a tramp through the Northeast during late 1970 and Mandy was living in New Orleans, although his home port of the ship, once North Atlantic took it over, was New York. The crew was American, a mixed crew, most of them signed on at Galveston on January 6, 1972, for "various ports of the Caribbean and Atlantic and any other voyage."[36]

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[34]Sam and Bradstreet, Inc.

[35]Sam maintained a position of bankruptcy on January 16, 1970. The involved secondary arrangements during 1970-1972 were too complicated for Lloyd's Register of Shipping (London: Lloyds Ltd., 1970, 1971 and 1972), Vol. I, to keep up with but the ownership is known in the Journal Publications of F.S. Lane, Ports of Mariners, Transportation Lanes on the Atlantic, Dual-Port Fleetly Cover (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970 and 1971).

[36]Shipping Articles for the S.S. Sam Mills, Port 1972, a public record in Washington, United States Coast Guard.

After its tramp trip through the Caribbean in January (where, at Aruba, British West Indies, it signed on its last crew member on January 23), the ship sailed for Abadan via Capetown late in February and arrived on the Persian Gulf at the end of March.[37]

After a short layover on the Gulf, it loaded 15,500 tons of crude and 1,000 tons of fuel oil and, according to arrangements with North Atlantic, set sail for Capetown on April 3. Meanwhile, the actual initiative in the political arrangements seems to have been seized by the Israelis. State knew the "Kern Hills" was in the Middle East and it was aware of the charter arrangements with DELEK. After a series of conferences in Washington during the last days of March, representatives of Israel pressed the Israeli request for implementation of the American promises and agreement was reached, "almost with relief," that the "Kern Hills" would get the job.[38] Accordingly, Mosely received instructions at sea from DELEK to deviate from his original destination and to deliver the cargo at Eilat.[39]

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[37]Recollection of crew member who requests anonymity.

[38]This is according to a source which is, at best, second hand. It has been included here because it ties in with other evidence setting the time context but the author does not and cannot vouch for its validity.

[39]Despite a statement of Mr. Wang's to the contrary, blanket clearance for American vessels to visit Eilat had not been formally given at this point although he may well have been referring to the Dulles statement of March 5, <u>supra</u>, p. 121. While there was little chance of trouble with

After the group trip through the Caribbean in January (where, at Aruba, British West Indies, it signed on the last crew member on January 23), the ship sailed for Abadan via Capetown late in February and arrived on the Persian Gulf at the end of March.[17]

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[19] Despite a statement of Mr. [illegible] to the contrary, Eilat clearance for American vessels to visit Eilat had not been formally given at this point although it may well have been referring to the Dulles statement of March 5, supra, p. 151. While there was little chance of trouble with

The ship sailed up the Red Sea during the night of Friday, April 5th, and passed the United Nations position at Sharm el-Sheikh at daybreak Saturday morning. The weather was poor owing to a dust storm on the Sinai peninsula and as it passed Ras Nasrani, the old signalling station where the spiked Egyptian guns still pointed at the Enterprise passage, greetings were exchanged with the United Nations Force and a flare signal fired from the shore. Earlier, the ship had been challenged in the Red Sea during the night by the "USS Stormes," an American destroyer on patrol attached to the Middle East Defense Force. When she answered "Eilat," the "Stormes" had signalled "Good luck" and good luck seems to have been the rule of the day.[40]

Shortly after three on Saturday afternoon, April 6, Mosely dropped anchor as close to the shore at Eilat as he could, having been boarded by the Eilat harbor master from a rowboat as he approached. Eilat was technically closed on Saturday, the Jewish holiday, but this rule was neglected on this particular Sabbath. As soon as the pleasantries were exchanged, a twin-necked sea-pipe was floated out to the ship and connected to the main discharge standpipe on the

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Egypt in view of the progress being made with Nasser, some apprehension was felt over a Saudi statement the previous week that reaffirmed the Saudi intention to "maintain the blockade." See the New York Times, March 27, 1957. Saudi troops were at Aqaba after March 28th.

[40]This account corresponds point for point with press reports in the New York Times, April, 6, 7, and 8, 1957.

The ship sailed by the Tel Aviv during the night of February, April 9th, and passed the United Nations position at Shems at-Zouth in Syrian Saturday morning. The weather was poor owing to a heavy fog on the Syrian peninsula and as it passed the Syrian, the all signalling station where the spies Zorpolian gave still pointed at the Enterprise passing, greetings were exchanged with the United Nations Force and a flare signal fired from the shore. Earlier, the ship had been challenged in the Beirut area. The ship by the "USS Enterprise," an American destroyer on patrol attached to the United Nations Force. When she answered "Ship," the "Enterprise" had signalled "Don't land and good luck seems to have been the color of the day."

Shortly after noon on Saturday afternoon, April 9, Beaver dropped anchor as close to the shore as light as he could, being fired upon by the Syrian harbor master from a rowboat as he approached. Kilat was technically closed on Saturday, the Jewish holiday, but this rule was violated on this particular occasion. As soon as the ploughshares were unshipped, a twin-wooded gun-ship was floated out to the ship and towed to the main cleanup principle on the

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Keep in view of the troubles being made with Beaver, some apprehension was felt over a small statement the previous week that restricted the Jaffa Jewish to "maintain the blockade." See the New York Times, March 27, 1947. Small troops were at Lydda after March 1948.

"This account corresponds quite far right with press reports in the New York Times, April 9, 10, and 11.

deck of the tanker. This was "a little out of the ordinary" for Mosely,, but it permitted much speedier unloading into the storage tanks on the quay, which were to hold the crude until the pipeline could take it the following week. Sea-pipe unloading is tricky, but all went well.

The unloading took thirty-six hours. After a rest and a swim in the Gulf, the crew had the ship outbound from Eilat Monday evening at midnight. This was arranged so that the straits could be transited at first light Tuesday morning, since Mosely was afraid of negotiating the long unused Enterprise channel in the darkness. The beacons were unlighted and he had noted the previous weekend that the buoys gave a very poor radar reflection.

On April 19, the first oil was piped from the storage tanks[41] through the new pipeline and Israel marked the successful delivery of her first Persian Gulf crude through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. It was a pitiful drop in the bucket to be sure, but the Middle East would never be the same.

There were now two countries with frontage and facilities on the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

The evaluation of the significance of the passage of the "Kern Hills" depends almost wholly on the viewpoint of

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[41]This date is difficult to substantiate and the impression given here may be in error. The pipeline was <u>tested</u> for the first time on the 19th and it is assumed it was tested with "Kern Hills" oil.

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The unloading had hardly begun before, after a rest and a bath in the hull, the crew saw the ship outbound from Sidi Kouaky crossing at midnight. This was arranged so that atmosphere could be introduced as fine-light turning gas-gas, which hopefully was effective in neutralizing the long unused Sheerness channel to the tankers. The bunkers were lighted and he had noted the previous smoke that the buoys gave a very poor radar reflection.

On April 16, the crude oil was piped from the storage tanks[41] through the new pipeline and initial marked the successful delivery of her first Persian Gulf crude through the Ras Sen Ras the Gulf of Aqaba. It was a pleasant drop in the bucket to be sure, but the Arabian Sea would never be the same.

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the evaluator. The overall significance of the opening of the Gulf and the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force at Sharm el-Sheikh is obviously great but did the passage by an American flag vessel under the circumstances just described materially affect the situation in either way?

In context, the Gulf had been travelled by north-bound shipping and had been patrolled by the Israeli frigate "Miznak" almost as soon as the military campaign had ended. Less than a week after the final shots had been fired, the Israeli merchant ship "Queen of Sheba" had anchored off Tiran[42] and on December 26 the "Miznak" arrived from Haifa and Eilat was opened as a "naval base." The first Israeli ship to transit the straits waited until June 4, 1957, when the cargo ship "Atlit" sailed from Djibouti, French Somaliland, to make a test trip north, arriving at Eilat on June 6.[43]

What value was there in testing the blockade? While there was a certain "moral" or sentimental significance in delivering crude oil for the first time, several more trenchant political questions remain to be answered.[44]

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[43]Cagle, op. cit., p. 80.

[44]It is frequently claimed that the voyage established a precedent of innocent passage. This is not true. It established a precedent of free passage by an American tanker

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One of the more significant aspects of the voyage probably had to do with the context in which it was accomplished, the "way things were" during that first week in April, 1957. In a sense, the voyage indicated both a beginning and an end--a beginning for Israel, in a certain emotional sense, and an end for the United States in the harder sense of international politics. It was the end of the series of definite, public international commitments to Israel; was it also an end to a phase of American policy?

The positioning of an international force in Egyptian territory demanded Egyptian consent. What concessions were made to insure that this consent would be given and, once given, not rescinded? Did the fact of UNEF presence at the signalling station at Ras Nasrani indicate a willingness, albeit unpublicized, to "put up" with passage through the strait despite the formal continuation of the blockade?

The question of Israeli access to the Gulf is directly dependent on Israeli access to the Negeb; her access to the Negeb is directly dependent on the so-called "final" settlement of the Arab-Israeli War. Can it be argued that with Eilat open for international trade, the question of Israeli tenure in the Negeb, one of the perennial major issues of the conflict, is at least politically

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carrying contraband Persian Gulf crude, and in the abstract, served American interests as well as it served Israeli interests.

One of the more significant aspects of the voyage probably had to do with the context in which it was undertaken, the "war crisis zone" during that first week in April, 1967. In a sense, the voyage indicated both a beginning and an ending, a beginning for Israel, in a certain additional sense, and an end for the United States in the larger sense of international politics. It was the end of the period of activist, public international commitments to Israel; and it also led to a phase of American policy[1]

The positioning of an international force in Egyptian territory demanded Egyptian consent. Many leaders alone were made to insure that this consent would be given and, once given, not withdrawn. But the fact of UNEF presence at the critical moment at the Gaurdi Gulfiers a sufficient, albeit unjustified, to "put off" that passage through the straits despite the formal justification of the blockade.

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carrying contraband American civil-goods, and in the aftermath, forced American intervene as well as in secret Israeli interests.

finalized? Is it valid to argue further that in return for Egyptian control of the Canal, Nasser surrendered any future claims he might have made that Israel further modify her territorial status along the Israeli-Egyptian frontier?

Is there any sense in the statement that an even trade occurred in late 1956 and early 1957--Suez for the Gulf of Aqaba?

The theoretical question of victory and defeat in the exercise of arms is another thorny problem. Who really won and who really lost?

Finally, did the opening of the Gulf mark a turning point in Arab-Israeli affairs and is an eventual solution of the conflict more likely or more politically feasible because of it?

These are some of the questions which must be examined.

The questions are quite simple. The answers may give some difficulty.

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It bears any added to the statement that we have been concerned in Jaro-Lyon and early 1957-Suez for the Gulf of Aqabat.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this study the point has been frequently made that the events of the Middle East Crisis of 1956 ended in a "victory" for Israel in the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. Two basic questions determined the major substantive problem of research--the "how" and the "why."

In exploring the how, an examination has been made of the geopolitics of the Gulf and the implication of the Egyptian Blockade on certain relationships that pertained to Israel. The course of the military and diplomatic maneuvers to guarantee Israeli access through the Strait of Tiran form an essential part of this exploration as does the effort of the international community, whose stake in the game was far more procedural than substantive, to restore if not stability at least a brake to the spiralling instability. The efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to provide the framework for settlement and the efforts of the Secretary of State of the United States to provide the focus--these have been important parts of the how. So also have been the fleeting glimpses of Avhaham Yoffe and Glenn Mosely who as instruments more than as agents have merited a place of

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prominence in the history of an obscure waterway in an obscure corner of the globe.

The second problem, the question of "why," remains to be answered.

Why was there a victory for Israel?

<u>The Theoretics of Victory</u>

Victory is relative to defeat.

As nations act to maximize their values, however, the complexities of life in the modern political context tend to blurr this relationship as national action in the modern world becomes open-ended, a non-zero-sum game in which a gain for one country does not automatically become an equivalent loss for another. In analyzing the notion of victory however, bearing this factor in mind, a conceptual spectrum may be erected which spans a framework whose parameters are absolute victory on one end and complete and total defeat on the other. The simplified way of looking at this spectrum attempts to force it to do what it cannot do. If a nation is "better off" after a particular maneuver has been completed than it was before it began, the simplified concept of "victory" is applied; if the nation is worse off than when it started, the condition is called "defeat." Unfortunately for the simplicity of this method, "starts" and "ends" are attributed to historical occurrences only in history books. Such a simple dichotomy is relatively useless

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in the complicated setting of the modern political world where simultaneous motivations and occasionally mutually exclusive aspects of a single national interest are used as criteria for actions planned, moves made and decisions formed in relation to a bewildering series of inter-acting forces and conflicts.

In examining the inputs to the spectrum of success, there are three variables which determine position on the spectrum with a far greater degree of accuracy than that which can be determined by the simplistic "seaman's eye."

The first of these inputs is the <u>process concept</u>--the objectives established in the order of priority or the values that are intended to be maximized in any given maneuver. For a nation with a high degree of what might be called political solvency, these values are likely to be more procedural than substantive. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, despite some substantive differences, are engaged in the current Cold War for what are largely procedural issues. Each disagrees with the other on the procedural base on which world politics are to be conducted. For a nation almost politically bankrupt, as was, for example, the Republic of the Congo during much of 1961, the issue is entirely the substantive one of sheer survival. In the Arab-Israeli difficulties in the decade following the year 1947, there was an admixture of the substantive and the procedural until

is the complicated service of the modern political world where consciousness orientations and subjectivity actually constitute aspects of a single political language you need as artists for making choices, using many and sometimes formed in relation to a constituting series of inter-working forces and realities.

In relating the impact to the experience of audiences, there are various strategies which situations produce in the spectator with a far greater degree of certainty than which can be determined by the stereotypic "audience's type."

The first of these tactics is the [illegible] concept-the objective multiplicity in the order of priority of the values that are introduced or [illegible] in any given encounter. For a nation-wide [illegible] of what might be called political [illegible], these values are likely to be more [illegible] than subsequent ones. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, despite some fundamental differences, are engaged in the market cold war for what are largely [illegible] 'brands' that disagree with the [illegible] or the [illegible] which political [illegible] are to be [illegible]. For a nation-state politically [illegible], as was, for example, the [illegible] of the Congo during mid of 1960, the issue is [illegible] the substantive [illegible] of [illegible]. In the [illegible] difficulties in the Congo following the year 1960, there was an [illegible] of the [illegible] and the [illegible]

by the summer of 1956, the Israeli objectives, as best determined from operation analysis, were punitive action against the fedayeen bases in Gaza, political leverage to embarrass or unseat Nasser and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is important to remember that in the day to day tyranny of the IN basket in a Foreign Ministry, priority of objectives constantly shift and change. Whatever the priority, however, the first and most obvious input to the determination of success or failure must deal with the objectives intended by the maneuver under analysis.

The second input to the process of determining success or failure is the cost concept, the calculated bearable loss which a nation is willing to accept in order to fulfill its process concept. If, for example, nation A has a dispute with nation B but feels that any cost expended to settle the dispute in its favor would be unbearable, there will be no maneuver and consequently no question of success or failure. The dispute will smoulder. When the threshold of bearable loss is expanded to provide the flexibility for some kind of risk, the world witnesses what is known as an international crisis and so are the history books filled. Usually, when this threshold of bearable loss applies to ends (or, in other words, when both sides feel they can afford to lose the entire dispute) the question is able to be settled by judicial means. When the threshold applies

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only to means (how many casualties, how many planes) the crisis becomes acute.

The third input is the conflict concept, the underlying psychological context in which the objectives are entertained and the costs calculated. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, have between them a certain psychological relationship which determines that a conflict between them will be "waged" in accordance with an extremely delicate and low threshold of cost and bitterness, largely dependent on the overall world situation in which such a conflict might occur. The United States and the Soviet Union have a different conflict concept, to be sure, which determines the level of action which will be taken by either side probably based on a somewhat higher threshold of bitterness. The Cold War with its undulating current of tension is an excellent example of the way in which this conflict concept changes from time to time in accordance with the overall world political situation. The Arabs and the Jews, the extreme case perhaps, have an elaborately worked out conflict concept between them which determines almost automatically the choices each side feels it must make at any moment in their relationship and which gives permanence to the listing of difficulties which keep them from *rapprochement*.

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The third input is the *conflict concept*, the underlying psychological concept in which the objectives are interpreted and the costs calculated. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, have between them a certain psychological relationship which determines that a conflict between them will be "fought" in accordance with an extremely definite and low threshold of cost and bitterness, largely dependent on the overall world situation in which such a conflict might occur. The United States and the Soviet Union have a different conflict concept, to be sure, which determines the level of action which will be taken by either side probably based on a somewhat higher threshold of bitterness. The Cold War with its underlying current of tension is an excellent example of the way in which this conflict concept changes from time to time in accordance with the overall world political situation. The Arabs and the Jews, the extreme case perhaps, have so elaborately worked out conflict concept between them which determines almost automatically the choices each side feels it must make at any moment in their relationship and which gives permanence to the limiting of activities which keep them from *rapprochement*.

Based on these three variables, therefore, it might be said that absolute victory in any act intended to maximize substantive or procedural values is defined as a situation in which objectives are achieved in the order of established priority at or below the calculated bearable cost with a major change in the psychological relationship between the antagonists which renders the conflict irrelevant.

Corresponding to the absolute victory of one protagonist is the idea of absolute defeat on the part of the other. Absolute defeat then would be defined in terms of capitulation (or the absence of objective achievement)[1] following unbearable cost with a major change in the psychological relationship rendering the antagonist irrelevant. In defeat the loser loses more than he feels he can bear and his influence on the enemy is reduced to zero.

In nuclear war, a preoccupation of the world since August, 1945, much has been written on the thesis that absolute victory is impossible and in the rhetoric of the framewhat erected above, it is simple to see the logic of this position. Nuclear war, regardless of objectives achieved, imposes unbearable cost on both sides removing any outcome from the "absolute" end of the spectrum. The determination of relative victory and defeat is quite another matter.

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In the old fashioned kind of war, though, there can be an absolute winner. Whether it is called "limited" war or "conventional" war in honor of its less sophisticated weaponry or its long history, one of the major objectives of the institution we know of as the United Nations has been to prevent such a situation from occurring. The rationale of collective security is designed to prevent wins and losses in war, if not to prevent the wars which give wins and losses.

But if there are statutory provisions and political precedents in the modern world to prevent absolute victory, there are still opportunities for relative or qualified victories. If, for example, objectives are realized at or below programmed cost although the conflict worsens, a certain kind of qualified victory can be claimed. If some but not all objectives are realized at, below or above programmed costs, then a different kind of victory has ensued. As can be seen, the permutations are almost endless.[2]

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[2]An additional complication arises in conflict analysis in which the number of antagonists is greater than the classic two. Where three, four or more nations act at cross purposes with differing, variable objectives shifting in priority on an *ad hoc* basis in a context sensitive to extraneous political considerations (Hungary; the American election) victory and defeat became so difficult to identify that the exercise loses most of its relevance for all but the main parties.

In the old fashioned kind of war, though, there was of an absolute winner. Whether it is called "limited" war or "conventional" war is lower or its less sophisticated weaponry of its long history, one of the major objectives of the institution we know of as the United Nations has been to prevent such a situation from occurring. The rationale of collective security is designed to prevent wins and losses in war, if not to prevent the wars which give wins and losses.

Yet if there are statutory provisions and political precedents in the modern world to prevent absolute victory, there are still opportunities for relative or qualified victories. If, for example, objectives are realized so or be-low programmed cost although the conflict worsens, a certain kind or qualified victory can be claimed. If some but not all objectives are realized at, below or above programmed costs, then a different kind of victory has season. As can be seen, the permutations are almost endless.[2]

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In the preceeding chapters it has been indicated that during the summer of 1956 the government of Israel appraised the chronic Arab problem and examined its own objectives in the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East. At the risk of over-simplification, these objectives fell into three basic categories: Egypt, Gaza and Aqaba. Sometime during the summer a modification in the cost concept occurred in that the threshold of bearable cost was expanded to include large scale military action with the anticipated loss level shifted correspondingly higher. Finally, the Israeli analysis of what has been called the conflict concept above indicated that the psychological relationship between herself and her neighbors had reached the point where nothing was relevant <u>except</u> the conflict. The Arab military arrangements with Egypt crystallized this position and plans were made for what became the Sinai War.

Following the nationalization of the Canal on July 26, a similar appraisal had been made by England and France. Still another similar appraisal was made in Cairo but in the case of the Egyptians, the actual maneuver made them the objects rather than the subjects of action and they had only static objectives to consider after July.

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The Sinai War began at 3:00 P.M. on the evening of October 29, 1956. It ended at 9:00 A.M. on the morning of

the 5th of November.[3] Analyzing the Israeli political position three months later, the following judgments must be made:

1. Egypt. Israel was, if anything, worse off than before with regard to political leverage over Egypt. There were several factors behind this turn of events, not the least of which was the American attitude toward the Arab cause in general and the growth in Arab prestige as a result of the political ramifications of the Suez invasion, the Soviet notes and the split in the western alliance.

2. Gaza. She was somewhat better off in Gaza than she was before although her objective of destroying Egyptian capability to field fedayeen attacks from the Strip was not able to be determined. While Egyptian supremacy in administrative matters was restored, the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force guaranteed at least a modicum of improvement over what was there before.

3. Aqaba. Unquestionably better off than before.

Such was the recapitulation of the process concept.

The cost factor was almost negligible. The total casualty count was a delightful surprise. The added military prestige and the captured equipment left her with a profit.

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The conflict concept is less simple to generalize. Anything less than unbearability is a relative improvement. After the defeat of the Egyptian armies in Sinai, the conflict remained no less bearable politically probably but the "iron grip" with which she had been grasped was broken and remains so to this day.

In achieving one of her major objectives, partially achieving another despite frustration in her third, considerably below programmed cost with a slight lowering of the general tenor of the conflict, Israel must be placed on the victor side of the spectrum.

A relative victor, to be sure, but more the victor than vanquished.

Similarly, Egypt in retaining sovereignty over the Canal (and indeed strengthening it), in increasing her political influence at the loss of her blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba and her high military casualties in a slightly diminished atmosphere of tension with Israel--probably a negative value for her--also emerged on the victorious side. It would be incorrect to say that Egypt "won" a victory in the same sense that Israel did. Both won, nevertheless; but if both won, who lost?

Earlier it was noted that the problems of the world have become increasingly open-ended, that more and more often both sides can win without a corresponding loss by either side. The loss, however, must be absorbed someplace. And so it was in the Middle East Crisis.

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Actually, the world lost.

The Defeat

The institution of war was invented as a normal necessary adjunct of the nation-state system. In the absence of an international legislature or executive, relations between states resembled relations between individuals under primitive American and English tort law, where redress for wrong was an individual affair. While the solutions produced by war often bore no relationship to the rightness or wrongness of the victor's case, since the strongest or luckiest always won, the institution itself survived virtually unscathed until it threatened to destroy the very parameters of the society it was intended to serve.

In 1945, the United Nations was established by the states who, realizing the inability of war to finalize political solutions, intended to abolish it by mutual consent. In abolishing the legal right to individual redress, it was hoped that political conciliation would become a substitute for war, an institution which could perform the same task that war had performed with a greater degree of "accuracy" and with far less expense. Unhappily, what emerged was rather than a substitute for war, merely an alternative to it.

When Israel jumped off on Monday, October 29th, she put the traditional institution of war to the test. She had tried diplomacy and diplomacy did not work. She resorted to force in an attempt to do in the desert what she could not

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do around the green table. In eschewing diplomacy from the very beginning as a way to settle the conflict, the Arabs were every bit as much to blame as Israel for this turn of events. Had action in the United Nations ever been a substitute for war, the whole thing would have been impossible. In the absence of a substitute, the alternative could only work if both sides wanted it to work.

Force was called in to do the job.

Force seems to have prevailed until the states on the sidelines realized what was happening and remembered that it was 1956 and not 1856. The United Nations Emergency Force was established to remind the principals of the date. To the extent that the status quo was changed by the use of force, regardless of the substantive issues involved, the world could be said to have suffered a defeat.

Fortunately, it was a relative defeat.

Dag Hammerskjold personnified the objectives of the world community, or to remain in the framework erected above, the process concepts. They were entirely procedural; the important thing was the way things got done. But insofar as the procedural objectives of peace, order and stability were only insured with the expense of an at least unplanned-for cost in a psychological context attributing new utility to the exercise of arms, the immediate result had to be written

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The Pragmatics of Victory

As a final section of any study such as this, it is useful to evaluate the impact of the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba on subsequent developments in the Middle East. Two extremes--exaggeration and belittlement--must be avoided.

The first and most obvious effect of the opening of the Gulf was on the Israeli economy. With her backdoor to the east, a new self-confidence marked her economic policies during the years that followed the battle of Sharm el-Sheikh. While the 100,000 tons of cargo moved through there annually through 1960 represented only fifty port-days operations, it was a huge assurance to her. The 18 inch pipeline was recently completed and parallels the new Beersheba Eilat railway but petroleum discoveries in the Heletz area have taken at least some of the edge off her dependence on the Eilat deliveries. Tourism, on the other hand, has become a big industry in Eilat and the fact that the Israelis up north now can go south for their annual vacations seems important in a country in which too few things like that are ever considered.

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The political implications were certainly positive. As a result of the continued and effective United Nations presence at Sharm el-Sheikh stability in the area has gone up and down since 1957 but the presence of the United Nations has accounted for more stability than it has discouraged. Saudi claims of sovereignty over Tiran and their annual threats to re-institute the blockade seem to be taken seriously by no one; the blue flag flies over the minaret at Sharm el-Sheikh and virtually all nations have dipped their flag to it at one time or another since the "Kern Hills." The blockade in the Suez Canal has had a curious history but in balance Israel seems to have learned to live with it and only makes propaganda mileage out of it when the climate is ripe.

The military implications have been somewhat more indirect, but no less substantial. The experience has impressed the Arab world with the fact that Israel will be displaced from Palestine only by brute force, and that brute force (even obsolete brute force manufactured in Czechoslovakia in 1946) remains a symbol of anti-Zionism. Arms and the buildup of arms in the Middle East therefore have important domestic political implications and it was by this route that the Soviet Union was able to gain a toehold in the area. Military advisors and hardware were an important part of the Communist economic offensive through 1961 and although follow-up in this area posed the greatest single threat to the west from 1958 to 1961, follow-up was what the Soviet bloc did least well and

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the West has managed to weather the storm--by default perhaps. The bottom fringes of the emerging middle class, now finding its political voice in the new revolution in the Middle East, like to see arms in the market-place on holidays, and arms is what they get.

The opening of the Gulf in the way it was accomplished impressed many in the West with the seriousness of the dogma of positive neutralism which as a result, is becoming better understood in the places where it should have been understood in 1951.

But the most overwhelming effect of the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba has not been on Israel, but on Egypt.

Arab-Israeli antagonism and the Arab thesis that Israel does not exist is petulent, somewhat ridiculous but above all, unreal. While Nasser has a reputation for petulence and is on occasion somewhat ridiculous, the Suez Canal has made a realist out of him and the Gulf of Aqaba has helped him understand himself. It is submitted that the mystique of anti-Israelism is as important to Nasser as a shibboleth as is the traditional regard for motherhood of Pennsylvania Avenue. Most Arabs need Israel and would feel vaguely uncomfortable if it were not there to disparage; Nasser seems to recognize this. He also seems to understand, more than any other Arab figure, that Israel is not going out of business next week without a self-defeating clash which would signify the end of the world order which we now know and his attitude

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on the Gulf of Aqaba matter seems to bear this out.

Whether or not he may have looked at it in quite this way, Nasser traded the Gulf of Aqaba for the Suez Canal in 1957 and the Suez Canal is by far more important to Egypt than Aqaba ever might have been. To say that he took a substantive gain for a procedural loss is possibly a contrived way of describing a situation which was done for two very definite and quite realistic reasons, both political.

In the first place, Nasser was enough of a realist to understand that the acquiescence of the United States was the deciding factor in March, 1957, which tipped the scales in the direction of the Sphinx. The price was small on the scale of values who had a huge job to do in his own way. Aqaba was that price. By consolidating his political position he was in a far better position to face the world and to gain customers for the Suez Canal Authority.

The second reason is more subtle. It was politically impossible for Nasser or any other Arab leader to retain or regain ascendency in the Arab political world after 1957 by a soft line on Israel. On the other hand, it would have been equally impossible for Nasser to cultivate the impression that he was the responsible Canal operator in the face of Israeli claims that her port of Eilat was blockaded by force, that she was kept from her contacts with the East and that

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her economic life was being strangled by Nasser's maritime policy. World opinion was particularly important at a time when the World Bank was considering what became of its $56.5 million loan in 1959. When the Egyptian government somewhat "graciously" allowed the United Nations into the Sharm el-Sheikh and abandoned its Blockade on the Gulf, it certainly did not weaken its position on Suez.

The Egyptian policy on the Israeli access to Suez would seem to make sense only if this interpretation--world opinion--were part of the interpretation of that policy also. The Canal policy is curious. Explicitly, the policy prohibits Israeli ships but not Israeli cargoes from the Canal. In practice, the Canal has been occasionally closed to certain Israeli cargoes on certain ships for no clearly discernable reasons. The most famous case, the "Inge Toft," was a Danish ship chartered to an American firm hauling stone from Haifa to the Far East. At Port Said, the Egyptian government barred the Canal to her passage and attempted to seize the cargo. This was on May 21, 1959.

Coincident with this, Nasser and Kassim were engaged in a bitter propaganda battle during a time when the United Arab Republic had expressed overt support for the Mosul revolt and there seemed to be a serious bid by the USAR to overthrow the Iraqi government. Was there a connection between the propaganda war and the seizure of the "Inge Toft," an act symbolic of absolutely nothing except anti-Israelism?

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In the light of this, and remembering the development projects carried out at Eilat while the Gulf was still firmly shut, it is probable that following nationalization of the Canal in July, Nasser understood the political impossibilities of the Aqaba Blockade as well as Ben Gurion understood the inevitability of its termination.

The overall implication or effect of the opening of the Gulf on the ultimate solution of the Palestine is negligible. If the removal of the Blockade had occurred in an exclusively legal context and if the controversy had been waged in strictly legal terms, the effect would have been greater of course. The removal of the blockade by Egypt would be argued by Israel to be the legal underwriting for her sovereignty in the Negeb and consequently her right to "exist" within the 1949 Armistice Lines. But on an effective level, the purely legal has little bearing.

The simple fact seems to be that the Arab-Israeli dispute is not a legal dispute; that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was no more legal than was its subsequent removel and that the exclusive application of international law to solve the conflict was useless after 1947.

The conflict is soluble, but it is not soluble in a court of law unless a sweeping change occurs in the political climate which would make a settlement on legal grounds relevant. With the Gulf open, the most significant problem between the two sides is probably the refugee question. The

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two situations are somewhat analogous. Israel will be required to make a diplomatic concession (repatriation or compensation) in the same vein as she made the diplomatic "concession" to withdraw in favor of the United Nations in Sinai. The Arabs will have to make a practical concession by integrating the refugees who refuse repatriation into their own societies, just as Egypt made the practical concession of refraining from reoccupying Sharm el-Sheikh.

Such a settlement is quite a long way off.

Finally, with regard to the United States, what did the State Department gain in its course of action with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba from February to April, 1957?

Increased flexibility.

And flexibility characterizes, as nothing else, the policy which the United States has managed to maintain with the developing world ever since. There have been false starts and blind alleys, to be sure, but in extricating herself from the bitter inter-domestic problem of the Arab-Jewish world in 1957, the United States was able to meet the Soviet economic offensive on much more realistic grounds. Indications seem to point to the fact that by 1962, flexibility has been the single most important asset in American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is the kind of flexibility that has been able to accept positive neutralism on its own terms and Zionism on American terms.

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With the help of the experience in the Aqaba matter, an important lesson seems to have been learned in Washington. The crises which have vexed State since 1957 have been crises--in Berlin, in Cuba, in Laos--which have been born out of situations in which the flexibility which should have been maintained has been gobbled up. Where the American policy was able to maintain this flexibility, important crises have been averted. This flexibility is the ability to remain free of the moral obligation to make a choice in a pre-determined direction. It is the ability to have choices to make based not on a previous policy "set" but on realistic considerations of national interest.

The United States, in developing a policy based on the ability to choose, has added to its political solvency.

The Arab-Israeli dispute will be solved one day when both sides acquire enough of this solvency to realize that the ability to choose is far more important than the necessity for choice.

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The Arab-Israeli dispute will be solved one day when both sides acquire enough of their potency to realize that the ability to choose is far more important than the necessity for choice.

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